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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAQ

PART 2

January to December 1948

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SECRET

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING IRAQ

PART 2.—JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1948

No. 1

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE SIGNATURE OF THE ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY, 15th JANUARY, 1948

Prime Minister, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like, first of all, to express the gratitude of His Majesty's Government and, I am sure, of our visitors to-day, to you, your town clerk, and your staff for the arrangements they have made for this ceremony at such short notice. We are very glad to be in Portsmouth. This city bears the scars of enemy attack. It also bears the formidable appearance of continuity, in spite of that attack, and it is an indication not only of the vindication of British policy in fighting Nazism and aggression, but it is an indication of the determination of the people of this country to maintain for themselves, and, as far as they can, for the people of the world, the principles of liberty and social justice.

To-day we have met to sign a new treaty with Iraq, and nothing has given me personally greater pleasure than to have had the opportunity of meeting the Prime Minister of Iraq, the Foreign Secretary, Minister of Defence, and the ex-Prime Ministers of that country in these negotiations. These, my Lord Mayor, have not been the kind of negotiations wherein two people seek to take advantage of one another, or to reconcile grievances; they have been negotiations to put our friend-

ship into words in accordance with the stage that our actual relationships have reached. We have removed everything that was objectionable in the old treaty and we have established in this one what has been, in fact, the practice for some time, and that is, to meet each other on terms of absolute equality, and to determine to make our mutual contribution according to our capacity, our strength, our man-power, and our will to the peace of the world. Secondly, this treaty is the beginning of a new series of treaties regularising and expressing the friendship between this country and the Arabic world. We prize that friendship. I am sure that they equally value it too. We believe that both of us have a contribution to make. We are determined to make it, and I therefore proceed to the signature of this treaty to-day, if I may say so, almost with a nice omen, for the sun is shining upon us, which I think is a good augury, an augury that we have done right, that we have confirmed this friendship, and that we shall carry it through together so as to establish a link between the great Arabic peoples and ourselves, and to preserve what is valuable to them and to us, each with our independence, but each making a contribution.

IRAQ: ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1947

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Attlee. (Received 21st January)

(No. 3)
Sir.Bagdad,
6th January, 1948

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a political review of events in Iraq during the year 1947, for the writing of which I am indebted to Mr. Richmond, Oriental Counsellor at this embassy.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, the British Middle East Office, Jerusalem, His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq, and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 2

I.—General

Iraq has suffered in 1947, in common with the rest of the world, from an increasing disillusion with the hopes of the brave new world which she shared with so many during the latter war and immediate post-war years. Nevertheless, she has had no wave of strikes, no breaches of internal security and no serious disagreements with other nations, except on the question of Palestine. The hope expressed, however, in last year's review that her political life might proceed in 1947 on sound and productive lines has not been fully realised.

II.—Domestic Affairs

2. During the first two months of the year the political energies of Iraqis were fully occupied with the elections, the first to take place under the slightly liberalised provisions of the Electoral Law of 1946. Everywhere the elections passed off quietly and the results were probably a fair reflection of the national will as a whole, though the more articulate and progressive elements were very disgruntled at their lack of success and were immoderate in their allegations of administrative interference. Such interference is inevitable in a country where political consciousness is so rudimentary as in Iraq and is the natural consequence of the imposition of a democratic constitution on a society which has only partially and recently emerged from tribalism.

3. The Government which emerged from these elections was not a strong combination although it was headed by perhaps the best of the younger front-rank politicians, Salih Jabr, and enjoyed the whole-hearted support of the Regent and of Nuri Pasha, who still retains his dominating position on the Iraqi political stage. The programme of the new Cabinet was ambitious and extensive, it consisted for the most part of an outline financial and economic plan for Iraq, the realisation of which would, in the nature of things, and especially of things Iraqi, take several years to complete. Other important items in the Government's programme were revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the improvement of Government machinery. This latter item is of cardinal importance, for on its successful achievement depends largely the success or failure of the economic development plans.

4. The parliamentary session ended on 19th July. In this session a mass of legislation was passed, and it is to the credit of the Government that so much was achieved. The main measures passed were economic or financial in character, and included the budget, the first since 1945. But even so a great deal of the Government's programme remained without being passed into law, let alone active implementation, and the most important reform, that of the machinery of Government administration had not been started.

5. The annual summer lull in Iraqi political life was intensified in 1947 by the absence of the Regent in England, of Nuri Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Lake Success and of the Prime Minister at the various meetings of the Arab League on the subject of Palestine. During this period the position of the Government was becoming more difficult as a result of the lack of competence of those Ministers left in Iraq, and of the mounting economic difficulties occasioned by the world shortage of dollars and by the exceptionally bad harvest of 1947 in Iraq. The Iraqi Government partly in response to pressure from the powerful landed interests and partly in their natural desire to obtain foreign exchange had permitted

the free export of barley, although they were well aware that the failure of the wheat harvest might well cause difficulties in feeding the populations of the large towns during the early months of 1948 before the next crop came on the market. The free export of barley has now been stopped. A standard mixed wheat and barley loaf has been introduced and strenuous efforts are being made by the Government to obtain imports of wheat. It is to be hoped that these efforts will be successful in obtaining sufficient wheat to avoid serious shortages in the months immediately before the harvest.

6. Perhaps the most notable of the developments in the climate of Iraqi politics has been the re-emergence of the type of thought which from its beginnings in the Bekr Sidqi movement in 1936 reached its culmination and consequent discredit in that of Rashid Ali al Gailani in 1941. The basis of this movement was two-fold, nationalist resentment at what were regarded as the fetters of the British connexion and a largely genuine disapproval of the corruption and inefficiency of governmental machinery in Iraq. These two motives are still operative and the disillusion caused by the disastrous failure of the Rashid Ali movement is beginning to wear off, while the progressive release or return from exile of his prominent supporters has added strength to the Right wing and the repressive measures taken by the Government against the Left have worked in the same direction. The events in Indonesia, the submission of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute to the Security Council and above all the vote at Lake Success on Palestine have helped to induce in young Iraqis a tendency to despair of fruitful co-operation with Western democracy and to turn towards Pan-Islamic reaction against the West. It is noteworthy that the Independence Party, that of the extreme Right, although professing its dislike of Communist ideology, is of all Iraqi parties except the illegal Communist Party the readiest for co-operation with the U.S.S.R.

III.—External Affairs

7. The revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 was accorded pride of place in the Government's programme, and received further mention in the speech from the throne at the opening of the December session of the Iraqi Parliament. Although this treaty has worked on the whole extremely well and to the

satisfaction of both parties to it, there is a widespread feeling in Iraq that, although the treaty has still some years to run, the interests of Anglo-Iraqi friendship would be served by its modification now. Certain of its provisions are held to be unnecessarily rigid and to place Iraq too obviously in the position of a junior partner. Many of those who argue in this way are undoubtedly genuine in their desire for continued Anglo-Iraqi association, though, of course, there are others whose motives are less praiseworthy. Iraqi desire for the revision of the treaty has undoubtedly been increased by her impatience to be rid of the imputation frequently cast at her by her fellow-members of the Arab League of not being free from British interference in her national life. During the visit of His Royal Highness the Regent to London during the summer, there were some preliminary exchanges of views and at the meeting of the Iraqi Parliament to discuss the reply to the speech from the throne on 31st December the Prime Minister announced his projected departure to the United Kingdom to undertake negotiations.

8. Iraq's relations with Turkey and Transjordan have been strengthened by the ratification during 1947 of treaties with these two countries. Neither of these treaties was received very graciously by the Iraqi Parliament and the debates reflected the lack of self-confidence of Iraq in herself, since both treaties were attacked on the grounds that they gave to Transjordan and Turkey the opportunity to interfere in the one case in the political and in the other in the economic affairs of Iraq. Nevertheless, both were passed by handsome majorities.

9. The increasing influence of the Arab League in Iraq has been illustrated in many ways. Iraq's recognition of the Indonesian Republic, her official interest in the future of the ex-Italian possessions of Libya and Cyrenaica and her semi-official reception of a prominent North African political exile are cases in point. This influence, with its increasingly pan-Islamic tendency, has not always been welcome to the Iraqi Government, but the latter has never felt sufficiently sure of its support inside Iraq to resist it, especially in view of the overriding necessity for the appearance of Arab unity in resistance to the partition of Palestine.

10. Iraqi political opinion shares to the full the Arab feelings of frustration and near despair about the partition decision which seems to them a cynical disregard

of natural justice out of deference to political and financial pressure. The proceedings in the General Assembly were anxiously followed and Iraq was not behind other Arab States in prophesies of violent Arab reaction against partition, by which they hoped to influence the Assembly's decision. The Assembly was not deterred, however, and the Iraq Government is now to some extent the victim of their own brave words which the opposition is not slow to challenge them to make good. How effective the Arab resistance to partition will be and what Iraq's share in it will amount to will appear in 1948. In 1947 the Palestine question has been a major preoccupation of the Iraqi Government, it has caused the absence from Iraq of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Nuri Pasha for much of the year. The Prime Minister himself has attended Arab League meetings on the subject, much to the prejudice of the functioning of

administration in Iraq and consequent weakening of the position of his Government. On public opinion in Iraq the effect has been to strengthen the hands of those who wish to turn their backs on Western civilisation, merely borrowing its technique in order the more effectively to resist it.

11. These latter are still few in numbers and small in influence and there is at present no reason to take a pessimistic view of the political future of Iraq. Her political future will depend to a great extent on the orderly development of her great natural economic resources and on a steady rise in the standard of life and education of her people. The Iraqi governing classes have recognised this and in their economic development schemes the present Government have begun to give effect to this recognition. They also recognise the value of Iraq's association with Great Britain and will not lightly cast it aside.

E 1163/27/93

No. 3

CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Busk (Bagdad)

(No. 16) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *26th January, 1948*

The Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister came to see me on 24th January to say good-bye. They left for Bagdad by air on the morning of 25th January.

2. The Prime Minister said that he had been astonished at the action of the Regent, firstly in summoning a meeting at the Palace which included enemies of the Government and of the régime and former friends of Rashid Ali, secondly in allowing them to discuss the treaty in the absence of himself and his fellow negotiators, and thirdly in allowing a statement to be issued from the Palace which connected the Regent's name with criticism of the treaty. The Regent's actions had been as unnecessary as they were unwise. He himself intended as soon as he reached Bagdad to see the Regent and to seek for an expression of his continued confidence. The treaty fully satisfied the national aspirations of Iraq, and he still believed that when he explained its real scope and intentions it would be approved by Parliament and the people. But his task had been made more difficult by the Regent. He would now have to interview political

leaders and Members of Parliament and see to what extent his majority had been affected.

3. I told the Prime Minister that I had received a message from the Regent asking for my views and that I was telling him that this was a moment for steadiness and firmness, and that in my view he should place confidence in his negotiators. I reminded the Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government had been under no obligation to negotiate a revised treaty at this stage. They had done so in a sincere desire to meet the wishes and aspirations of the Iraqi people, and I had met all the points which the Regent himself and the Iraqi representatives had put to me, and met them in a spirit of complete equality and friendship. I assured the Prime Minister that I had full confidence in him and in his fellow negotiators, and that His Majesty's Government looked forward to close relations and firm friendship with Iraq.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Washington, Paris, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Amman, B.M.E.O.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

E 1287/27/93

No. 4

NEW IRAQI CABINET

Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 29th January)

(No. 127) *Bagdad,*
(Telegraphic) *29th January, 1948.*
Following Cabinet was sworn this morning:—

1. Prime Minister, Muhammad Sadr (83).
2. Interior, Jamil Midfai (59).
3. Foreign Affairs, Hamdi Pachachi (46).
4. Defence, Arshad al Umari (36).
5. Education, Reza Shabibi (81).

6. Economics, Mustafa al Umari (88).
7. Finance, Sadiq al Bassam (108).
8. Social Affairs, Najib Alrawi (93).
9. Justice, Omer Nadhm (129).
10. Supply, Muhammad Medhi Kubba.
11. Communications, Jalal Baban (56).
12. Without portfolio, Nasrat al Rafisi (194).
13. Without portfolio, Duad al Haidari (43).
14. Without portfolio, Mohammed Habib.

E 651/27/93

No. 5

ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY OF ALLIANCE

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Busk (Bagdad)

(No. 26. Secret) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *6th February, 1948*

I transmit herewith a copy of the text of the treaty signed with the Iraqi delegation at Portsmouth on 15th January. Attached thereto are copies of three letters and their acknowledgments which were signed at the same time and which have been published with the treaty, and copies of three further letters and their acknowledgments which were signed subsequently, but which are not to be published. I also enclose the text of a letter from the Iraqi Prime Minister about the Royal Air Force levies, which was originally intended to be despatched on the return of the delegation to Bagdad but which was in fact signed in London. This letter also is not to be published.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Washington, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tehran, Angora and Athens, the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, and the United Kingdom High Commissioners at New Delhi and Karachi.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

(1) "Treaty Series No. 67 (1946)," Cmd. 7015.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5

Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His Majesty the King of Iraq

Portsmouth, 15th January, 1948

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas and His Majesty the King of Iraq;

Animated by the most sincere desire to consolidate the friendship and good relations which exist between them and to establish these relations on foundations more suited to the development of this friendship;

Desiring to conclude a new treaty of alliance with the object of consolidating the friendly relations which exist between them and of strengthening by co-operation and mutual assistance the contribution which each of them will be able to make to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United Nations(1);

Have accordingly appointed as their plenipotentiaries,

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas (hereinafter referred to as His Britannic Majesty):

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:—

The Right Honourable Ernest Bevin,
M.P., his Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs;

The Right Honourable A. V. Alexander,
M.P., Minister of Defence;

The Right Honourable A. Creech Jones,
M.P., Secretary of State for the
Colonies;

The Right Honourable the Viscount Hall,
First Lord of the Admiralty;

His Majesty the King of Iraq:—

His Excellency Saiyed Saleh Jabr, Prime
Minister of Iraq;

His Excellency Nuri Pasha Said, Presi-
dent of the Senate and former Prime
Minister of Iraq;

His Excellency Saiyid Taufiq Suwaidi,
Senator and former Prime Minister of
Iraq;

His Excellency Dr. Fadhil al Jamali,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq;

His Excellency Colonel Shakir al Wadi,
Minister of Defence of Iraq;

Who, having exhibited their full powers,
found in good and due form, have agreed as
follows:—

ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual peace and
friendship between His Britannic Majesty
and His Majesty the King of Iraq.

A close alliance shall continue between
the high contracting parties in consecration
of their friendship, their cordial under-
standing and their good relations.

Each of the high contracting parties
undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries
an attitude which is inconsistent with the
alliance or might create difficulties for the
other party thereto.

ARTICLE 2

Should any dispute between either high
contracting party and a third party pro-
duce a situation which involves the risk of
a rupture with that State the high contract-
ing parties will concert together with a
view to the settlement of the said dispute
by peaceful means in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United

Nations and of any other international obli-
gations which may be applicable to the case.

ARTICLE 3

Should either high contracting party,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2
of the present treaty, become engaged in
war, the other high contracting party will,
subject always to the provisions of article 4
of the present treaty, immediately come to
his aid as a measure of collective defence.

In the event of an imminent menace of
hostilities the high contracting parties will
immediately concert together the necessary
measures of defence.

ARTICLE 4

Nothing in the present treaty is intended
to or shall in any way prejudice the rights
and obligations which devolve, or may
devolve, upon either of the high contracting
parties under the Charter of the United
Nations or under any other existing inter-
national agreements, conventions or
treaties.

ARTICLE 5

The present treaty, of which the
annexure is an integral part, shall replace
the treaty of alliance signed at Bagdad on
the third day of June, one thousand nine
hundred and thirty⁽²⁾ of the Christian Era,
corresponding to the fourth day of Safar,
one thousand three hundred and forty-nine
Hajrah, together with the annexure, all
letters and notes interpreting or otherwise
exchanged in 1930 or 1931 in connexion
therewith, and the Railway Agreement
signed at Bagdad on 31st March, 1936,⁽¹⁾
which shall cease to have effect upon the
entry into force of the present treaty. The
above is without prejudice to any financial
obligations which have already accrued
under the treaty of 1930, any such letters or
notes and the Railway Agreement of 1936.

ARTICLE 6

Should any difference arise relative to the
application or interpretation of this treaty,
and should the high contracting parties fail
to settle such difference by direct negotia-
tion, the difference shall be referred to the
International Court of Justice unless the
parties agree to another mode of settlement.

ARTICLE 7

The present treaty shall be ratified and
shall come into force upon the exchange of
instruments of ratification, which shall take

place as soon as possible. It shall remain in
force for a period of twenty years from the
date of its coming into force. At any time
after fifteen years from the date of coming
into force of this treaty, the high contract-
ing parties may, at the request of either of
them, negotiate for its revision, which shall
provide for the continued co-operation of
the high contracting parties in the defence
of their common interests. The period of
fifteen years shall be reduced if a complete
system of security agreements under article
43 of the Charter of the United Nations is
concluded before the expiry of fifteen years.

At the end of twenty years, if the present
treaty has not been revised, it shall remain
in force until the expiry of one year after
notice of termination has been given by one
high contracting party to the other through
the diplomatic channel.

In faith whereof the respective plenipo-
tentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done in duplicate at Portsmouth this
15th day of January, 1948 of the Christian
Era, corresponding to the 4th Rabi'a al
Awwal 1367 Hijra.

(Signed) ERNEST BEVIN.

A. V. ALEXANDER.

A. CREECH JONES.

HALL.

SALEH JABR.

NOURY SAID.

T. SWAIDY.

MOHD. FADHEL JAMALI.

S. WAIDI.

Annexure

ARTICLE 1

(a) The high contracting parties recog-
nise the importance of air bases as an
essential element in the defence of Iraq
itself and of international security and as
a link in the essential communications of
both parties. They agree, moreover, that,
in the common interests of both of them,
His Britannic Majesty must be in a
position to discharge his obligations under
article 3 of the treaty.

(b) In the event of either high contrac-
ting party becoming involved in war, or of
a menace of hostilities, His Majesty the
King of Iraq will invite His Britannic
Majesty to bring immediately to Iraq the
necessary forces of all arms and will fur-
nish to His Britannic Majesty on Iraqi
territory all the facilities and assistance in
his power, including the use of railways,
rivers, ports, aerodromes and lines of com-

munication on the same financial terms as
those applicable to the forces of His
Majesty the King of Iraq.

(c) To maintain the Iraqi bases at Hab-
baniya and Shaiba at all times, whether of
peace or of war, in the necessary state of
operational efficiency, His Britannic
Majesty will provide at these bases the
necessary technical staff, installations and
equipment, and subject to paragraph (e) of
article 2 below will meet the cost of such
maintenance. No use shall be made of these
two air bases for civil aviation except on
the recommendation of the Joint Defence
Board referred to in article 5 of this
annexure. In the event of such use being
so recommended, the financial provisions of
article 2 of this annexure will be revised.

(d) Until such time as peace treaties have
entered into force with all ex-enemy
countries, His Majesty the King of Iraq
grants to operational units of the air forces
of His Britannic Majesty free access to
and use of the two air bases referred to in
(c) above, it being understood that the peace
treaties are to be deemed to be fully in force
when the allied forces are withdrawn from
the territories of all ex-enemy States.

After such time as the peace treaties have
fully entered into force, His Majesty the
King of Iraq may invite such units to use
the bases on the advice of the Joint Defence
Board in the light of circumstances then
prevailing.

(e) His Majesty the King of Iraq agrees
to permit aircraft of His Britannic
Majesty in transit across Iraq freely to use
the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba.

(f) The air bases of Habbaniya and
Shaiba shall be used jointly and in co-
operation by the Royal Iraqi Air Force and
such units of the air forces of His Bri-
tannic Majesty as may be disposed there.

(g) His Britannic Majesty shall not be
called upon to pay any charges in respect
of the use of any other landing grounds
in Iraq by his air forces.

ARTICLE 2

(a) His Majesty the King of Iraq will
provide at his expense the forces necessary
for the guarding of the air bases at Hab-
baniya and Shaiba.

(b) Day-to-day operation of the bases
and their security arrangements shall be
mutually arranged between the Iraqi and
the British commanding officers, who will
each retain the final responsibility for the
movement of the units of his own country.

(c) The administration of the units of
each country, including accommodation

⁽¹⁾ "Treaty Series No. 15 (1931)," Cmd. 3797.

⁽²⁾ "Treaty Series No. 28 (1936)," Cmd. 5282.

arrangements, shall be separate except where it is decided to pool resources.

(d) His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Britannic Majesty will each meet the cost of supplies and services furnished to his own air forces visiting or present at the two bases.

(e) His Majesty the King of Iraq will pay the cost of maintenance of all buildings and installations at the two air bases exclusively occupied by or erected for the Iraqi forces. Each of the high contracting parties will pay the cost of new buildings provided for the sole use of his own forces.

(f) The allocation of existing installations and buildings at the air bases will be decided by the Joint Defence Board. His Majesty the King of Iraq may purchase the installations and buildings allotted to the Iraqi forces at a fair valuation. On the final evacuation of British forces, the Iraqi Government shall either themselves take over such buildings and permanent structures at the bases as have not previously been purchased at a fair valuation having regard to the use to which they have been put, or shall afford such facilities as may reasonably be necessary to enable the Government of the United Kingdom to dispose thereof to the best advantage.

(g) His Britannic Majesty shall not be liable for any Iraqi rates and taxes in respect of the air bases or any buildings and installations therein.

ARTICLE 3

In order that the air forces of the high contracting parties should attain the necessary efficiency in co-operation with each other—

(i) His Britannic Majesty offers all appropriate facilities at Royal Air Force air fields in the United Kingdom and in any British colony or protectorate administered by the United Kingdom as may be required by the Royal Iraqi Air Force. In particular, His Britannic Majesty offers to make available to the personnel of the Royal Iraqi Air Force the facilities of the armament training centres of the Royal Air Force in the Middle East.

(ii) His Britannic Majesty will make available operational units of his forces to engage in joint training operations with the Iraqi Air Forces for a sufficient period in each year.

(iii) His Majesty the King of Iraq will make available facilities at air bases in Iraq necessary for the purposes of this joint training.

ARTICLE 4

(a) All Iraqi units at bases in Iraq or in the United Kingdom and any British Colony or Protectorate administered by the United Kingdom whether stationed or in transit, shall be under Iraqi command.

(b) Similarly, all British units shall be under British command.

ARTICLE 5

In the common defence interests of the United Kingdom and Iraq a permanent joint advisory body will be set up immediately on the entry into force of this treaty to co-ordinate defence matters between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government within the scope of this treaty.

This body, which will be known as the Anglo-Iraqi Joint Defence Board, will be composed of competent military representatives of the two Governments in equal numbers, and its functions will include—

(a) The formulation of agreed plans in the strategic interests common to both countries.

(b) Immediate consultation on the threat of war.

(c) The co-ordination of measures to enable the forces of either high contracting party to fulfil their obligations under article 3 of the treaty.

(d) Consultation regarding the training of the Iraqi forces and the provision of equipment for them. The Joint Defence Board shall submit annual reports thereon and recommendations to the Governments of the two high contracting parties.

(e) Arrangements regarding the joint training operations referred to in article 3 of this annexure.

ARTICLE 6

His Majesty the King of Iraq agrees to afford, in case of need and on request, all necessary facilities for the movement of units of His Britannic Majesty's forces in transit across Iraq, with their supplies and equipment, on the same financial terms as those applicable to the forces of His Majesty the King of Iraq.

ARTICLE 7

Subject to any modifications which the two high contracting parties may agree to introduce in the future, the Iraqi Government will continue to extend to the units of His Britannic Majesty's forces disposed in Iraq in pursuance of the present treaty, or otherwise by agreement between the high

contracting parties, the immunities and privileges which they at present enjoy in jurisdictional and fiscal matters and the existing provisions of any local legislation affecting units of the armed forces of His Britannic Majesty in Iraq.

The privileges and immunities to be extended to units and personnel of the Royal Iraqi Air Force visiting or present in British territory shall be defined on a reciprocal basis.

ARTICLE 8

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to grant whenever they may be required by His Majesty the King of Iraq all possible facilities in the following matters, the cost of which will be met by His Majesty the King of Iraq:—

(a) Naval, military and aeronautical instruction of Iraqi officers in the United Kingdom.

(b) The provision for the forces of His Majesty the King of Iraq of arms, ammunition, ships and aeroplanes of modern pattern such as are in current use by the forces of His Britannic Majesty on a priority which, having regard to the relative needs of each force, shall treat both forces equally.

(c) The provision of naval, military and air force officers to serve as instructors with the forces of His Majesty the King of Iraq.

ARTICLE 9.

In view of the desirability of identity in training and methods between his own forces and those of His Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes that, should he deem it necessary to have recourse to foreign military instructors, these shall be chosen from amongst British subjects.

He further undertakes that any personnel of his forces that may be sent abroad for military training will be sent to military schools, colleges and training centres in the territories of His Britannic Majesty, provided that this shall not prevent him from sending to any other country such personnel as cannot be received in the said institutions and training centres, or for courses not available in those territories.

He further undertakes that the armament and essential equipment of his forces shall not differ in type from those of the forces of His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 10.

His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes to grant general permission to His Britannic Majesty's ships to visit the Shatt-al-Arab on the understanding that His Majesty the King of Iraq is given prior notification of visits to Iraqi ports.

Exchanges of Letters

No. (1)

Mr. Ernest Bevin to His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

On the occasion of the signature of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, I have the honour to assure your Excellency that, with a view to assisting the Iraqi Government in their desire to carry out extensive plans of economic and social development, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will do all in their power to meet the requests of the Iraqi Government for the services of any experts or officials with technical qualifications of whom the Iraqi Government may stand in need.

I have, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

No. (2)

His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to Mr. Ernest Bevin

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of to-day's date which reads as follows:—

[As in No. (1).]

I have, &c.

SALEH JABR.

No. (3)

Mr. Ernest Bevin to His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

In connexion with the treaty signed by us to-day I desire on behalf of my Government to inform you that the military installations in the Basra area, built by the British forces during the war of 1939-45, specified below, will be handed over free of charge to the Iraqi Government.

The following are the installations in question :—

(1) Former British and Indian military hospitals in the Shaiba area known as Camp 57 and Camp 67.

(2) Shaiba water supply services, including filtration plant and distribution system.

(3) Shaiba electric power station and distribution system.

(4) Telecommunications systems in Shaiba, Ma'qil and 'Ashar area.

I have, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

No. (4)

*His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to
Mr. Ernest Bevin*

Portsmouth,

Sir, 15th January, 1948

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of to-day's date concerning certain military installations in the Basra area, which the Government of the United Kingdom intend to hand over free of cost to the Iraqi Government.

I have, &c.

SALEH JABR.

No. (5)

*His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to
Mr. Ernest Bevin*

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

With reference to article 4 of the treaty signed to-day, I desire on behalf of my Government to state that the Covenant of the League of Arab States signed on 22nd March, 1945, and the Saadabad Pact between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan signed on 8th July, 1937, are included amongst the existing international agreements to which this article refers and are agreements to which in this connexion my Government attaches particular importance.

I have, &c.

SALEH JABR.

No. (6)

*Mr. Ernest Bevin to His Excellency Saiyid
Saleh Jabr*

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of to-day's date which reads as follows :—

[As in No. (5).]

I have, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5

*Exchange of letters signed subsequently to
the Treaty, which are not to be published*

No. (1)

*His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to
Mr. Ernest Bevin*

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

With reference to the notes attached to the new Treaty of Alliance signed to-day relating to certain military installations in the Basra area which your Government are handing over free of charge to the Iraqi Government, I desire to confirm the Iraqi Government's acceptance of the proposals with regard to the maintenance of these installations made in Mr. Busk's letter of 5th December, 1947, namely :—

(1) The Iraqi Government will authorise their port directorate at Basra to take over the water and electricity supply systems, mentioned in Nos. (2) and (3) of your Excellency's note, and to maintain all their essential features so as to facilitate the redevelopment of the military base area Shaiba-Ma'qil-Basra in case of need.

(2) The former British and Indian military hospitals in the Shaiba area, known as Camp 57 and Camp 67, referred to in No. (1) in your Excellency's note, will be maintained in good condition by the Iraqi Government, and although normally occupied by the Iraqi army, will be made available for the use of the British forces should the need ever arise.

I have, &c.

SALEH JABR

No. (2)

*Mr. Ernest Bevin to His Excellency Saiyid
Saleh Jabr*

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

I have the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's secret letter of to-day's date relating to the maintenance of the military installations handed over free of cost to the Iraqi Government.

I have, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

No. (3)

*Mr. Ernest Bevin to His Excellency Saiyid
Saleh Jabr*

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

With reference to article 8 (a) of the annexure of the treaty, I have the honour

to inform your Excellency that my Government will contribute, during the first four years of the operation of the treaty, towards the expense of this instruction up to the amount of £20,000 a year. It is understood that the Iraqi Government will make a corresponding contribution. It is also agreed that at the end of four years the Joint Defence Board shall review the question of defraying the expense of instruction for a further period.

I have, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

No. (4)

*His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to
Mr. Ernest Bevin*

Portsmouth,

Your Excellency, 15th January, 1948

I have the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's secret letter of to-day's date, which reads as follows :—

[As in No. (3).]

I have, &c.

SALEH JABR.

No. (5)

*His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to
Mr. Ernest Bevin*

Portsmouth,

Dear Mr. Bevin, 15th January, 1948

In view of the fact that the agreement signed on 31st March, 1936, relating to the Iraqi railways is one of the subsidiary instruments abrogated by the new treaty, I wish to inform you that, if the Iraqi Government exercises its right to terminate the contracts of any of the six British officials mentioned in article 4 of the railways agreement before the end of the period of service specified in the contract, they will accord to the officials in question equitable compensation. If their contracts contain a clause providing what the compensation shall be in case of premature termination,

naturally the compensation will be in accordance with this clause. In any other cases the compensation will not be less generous than it would have been if a corresponding clause had been included in the contract.

Yours sincerely,

SALEH JABR.

No. (6)

*Mr. Ernest Bevin to His Excellency Saiyid
Saleh Jabr*

Portsmouth,

15th January, 1948

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of to-day's date concerning the intention of the Iraqi Government to grant equitable compensation to British employees of the Iraqi State Railways should their contracts be terminated before the end of the period of service specified in the contract.

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5

*His Excellency Saiyid Saleh Jabr to
Mr. Ernest Bevin*

Your Excellency,

[Undated

As you are aware, when the treaty which was signed in London comes into force, the present guards of the air bases of Shaiba and Habbaniya will be disbanded and they will be replaced by Iraqi forces. The Government of the United Kingdom might like to be informed of the intentions of the Iraqi Government with regard to these guards when they are disbanded. Some of them are not Iraqi nationals and they, of course, will be free to return to their own countries if they wish. As regards those of them who are Iraqi nationals, it is the intention of the Iraqi Government to give to these men the fairest possible treatment in recognition of their previous service in the Royal Air Force Levies.

I have, &c.

SALEH JABR.

DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRAQ

Rejection of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Attlee. (Received 17th February)

(No. 26. Confidential) *Bagdad.*
Sir, 25th January, 1948

I have the honour to submit in amplification of my recent telegrams a somewhat fuller account of the genesis and development of the situation in Bagdad which culminated in the issue of a statement from the Royal Palace implying that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed at Portsmouth on 17th January did not satisfy the aspirations of Iraq.

2. The underlying causes which produced the explosion of feeling in Bagdad were, I believe, many and various and for the most part had little connexion with Anglo-Iraqi relations. First of these underlying causes I should be inclined to place the mutual distrust between Government and people which is the unfortunate legacy left by the Ottoman Government to all those portions of the Turkish Empire which achieved independence as a result of the 1914-18 war. In Iraq, in spite of the very great material and moral progress which has been achieved since 1918, there remains a lack of confidence in the operations of Government and in the processes of a formal democracy which renders any Administration unstable and therefore unwilling to tell the people the truth. This lack of confidence extends, unfortunately, to the Royal House, who have, owing to a series of circumstances, many of them fortuitous, such as the early deaths of Faisal I and Chazi, never succeeded in establishing themselves firmly in the hearts of the people.

3. The second underlying cause is to be sought in the economic distress which is always present in Iraq and which has been enormously increased in the recent past by the inflation resulting from military expenditure during the war and by the partial failure of the grain crops last year. There is not and never can be famine in Iraq as a whole, but the working population in the large towns are now having difficulty in obtaining bread for their families, while the Government cost-of-living figure is more than seven times the corresponding figure for 1939. When Saleh Jabr brushed aside a debate on the

bread situation in the Majlis just before his departure for London, he did little to improve the chances of the treaty.

4. The third cause, and here we get closer to Anglo-Iraqi relations, is the existing tension resulting from the United Nations decision to partition Palestine. Iraqi opinion, in common with other Arab opinion, has grown steadily more and more concerned with what seems to them the manifest injustice of the National Home policy in Palestine. This conviction of injustice is rendered sour and bitter in the minds of the better-informed Iraqis by their realisation that the Arabs are relatively powerless to right this wrong, and that one of the reasons for their impotence is the unwillingness of the Arab Governments, including their own, to sink their own differences and combine wholeheartedly in defence of Arab Palestine. The man in the street and the coffee-house has been excited by the successive outrages in Palestine since the partition decision and Palestine has formed one of the subjects of slogans shouted in all the recent demonstrations in Bagdad.

5. Saleh Jabr's support in political circles in Bagdad had never been overwhelmingly strong. The influence of Nuri Pasha and of the Regent had enabled him to form a Government which would be sure of support in the Majlis, but too many of his Ministers and of those elected to the Parliament are men with no other claim to their positions than that of being friends with Nuri or Saleh Jabr. It was always to be expected that the first Shia Prime Minister would have to contend with strong opposition from Sunni circles as such and prominent and influential politicians are predominantly Sunni. The Prime Minister made little effort to placate this opposition, indeed it was freely said in Bagdad since he came to power that to be a Shia was a necessary qualification for a Government appointment. He has also been unwilling or unable to strengthen his Ministry and so split a potentially powerful opposition.

6. When Saleh Jabr and his delegation left for London, therefore, he left behind

him a situation which was not altogether reassuring. He had, it is true, taken some steps to ensure that the Majlis were behind him, but he left no good Ministers and those he did leave were not fully in his confidence about the terms of the treaty. He had refused to give to the "State Council" any details about the treaty, the negotiations for which were already sufficiently advanced to enable him to do so without difficulty. He did not even make it clear to them that negotiations had in fact been in progress over a period of months and that agreement was on the point of being reached. He and Nuri in fact seriously under-estimated the opposing political forces and once they had both left for England these forces had a chance which they did not neglect. With the exception of Senator Abdul Mahdi there was no powerful political friend to Saleh left in Iraq to support the Regent and the treaty. The Regent was very much alone, he could rely for disinterested advice on Tahsin Qadri, but not for political support, and when the storm broke on 20th January he must have regretted the absence of friends. When I saw him the next morning he was in a most nervous condition. It took an hour of quiet talk and encouragement to fortify him and he then complained bitterly that, while it appeared that the presentation to him of the situation had been exaggerated, the Cabinet had done nothing to help him to a true appreciation and that the Acting Prime Minister had rather worked on his fears of a possible massacre of the Jews and of animosity to the Royal House.

7. The first indication of the storm that was brewing in Bagdad took place the day before the departure of the delegation to London. This was the Law School demonstration reported in my telegram No. 30. As a result of this the Law College was closed and a certain number of arrests made. It was, however, opened two days later and the Acting Prime Minister made an announcement to the press advising students to return to their studies and warning the public that demonstrations would not be permitted. A week's relative calm followed this announcement, while the Regent toured in Basra Liwa. The opposition press, headed by *Liwa al Istiqlal* and *Al Yaqdha*, did their best to prejudice the issue of the treaty, and other papers, notably the organ of the Liberal Party, *Sawt al Ahrar*, took the line that the present critical situation, particularly as regards Palestine, was not a favourable

moment for treaty revision. The political parties were very active during this period preparing public opinion to suspect the good intentions of the negotiators. They made good use of the weapon which lay ready to their hand by pointing to the undemocratic manner in which the elections had been conducted. No treaty, they said, negotiated by such a Government and ratified by such a Parliament, could bind the Iraqi people. There was even talk of sending party representatives to London to put the "true views of Iraq" before the British authorities.

8. The news of the initialling of the treaty, so soon after the arrival of the Iraqi negotiators in London, made a bad impression on Iraqi opinion. Colour was lent to the accusation, which the political parties and the Opposition as a whole were already making, that the treaty was made in London and handed ready-made to the Iraqi delegation for signature. It was therefore said that the size of the delegation, particularly that of the military advisory section, was pure eyewash; the military advisers had barely arrived when the treaty was initialled. The text of the treaty when published, after a telegraphic contretemps over the Arabic translation, which cost Saleh Jabr much of the sympathy he still retained with Jamal Baban and Ministry for Foreign Affairs officials, tended to confirm this accusation, for it was seen that its provisions were precise and detailed and could hardly have been adequately discussed during the delegation's time in London. The annexure of the treaty, and, in particular, the Joint Defence Board, came in for the bulk of the criticism, and little attempt was made by the Ministers in Bagdad to counter it or to bring out the real merits from Iraq's point of view that the treaty contains.

9. Publication of the text led to an announcement of a three days' strike of students. There seems no doubt that moderate opinion and, in particular, the opinion of well-intentioned youth was disagreeably surprised by the closeness of the alliance contained in the treaty. The whole of student thought has been conditioned by the view that any foreign commitment takes away from full national sovereignty, and Iraqis suffer very badly from inferiority complex, even the Turkish and Trans-jordan treaties were attacked on this ground. Young Iraqis are therefore in general quite unable or unwilling to see the truth that Iraq by herself is helpless in the modern world and therefore must rely on a

close alliance with a major power. A further factor in the attitude of well-intentioned youth was a well-grounded disgust with the inefficiency and corruption of Iraqi Government which their national pride conditions them to blame on foreign or rather British influence.

10. The first demonstrations passed off quietly enough, but those who were concerned to produce chaos, the Communists, those who wished to oust the British and the Hashimites, the Istiqlal Party, and those who were anxious to gain power for themselves, the constitutional *bloc* and other political groups or parties had not been wasting their time. On Tuesday, 20th January, demonstrators infiltrated into the main street in small groups, thereby foiling police arrangements to confine and then disperse them without recourse to undue force. Many of these groups were looking for trouble, they carried bricks in their pockets and sticks under their clothes, many were armed with revolvers. The police, who were under instructions to disperse demonstrations with minimum force and who were for the most part only armed with short truncheons, were soon engaged in pitched battles with the demonstrators. There was a certain amount of firing, most of it from revolvers being emptied into the air by demonstrators. The police suffered a considerable number of casualties and it was judged necessary to bring up reinforcements in the shape of police trucks mounting Lewis guns; the order against the use of firearms was not, however, countermanded. An attempt by demonstrators to storm a truck and gain possession of a Lewis gun led to the discharge of that weapon and it seems that it was then that the fatal casualties occurred. The same evening Bagdad was full of ugly rumours about Jewish snipers firing on the crowds from the roofs of their houses, and the atmosphere was tense. I am not yet in possession of police reports, the above account is that given me by the acting Prime Minister.

11. Demonstrations began again on Wednesday, 21st January, in the bitter atmosphere engendered by two fatal student casualties of the day before. There were again casualties, including at least one dead; this was due, according to trustworthy witnesses to over-excitement on the part of the police. Demonstrations on this day seemed to me less widespread and dangerous than those of the day before, but this was not the view taken by the Iraqi authorities. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers held

about noon, the Director-General of Police, Commandant of Police, Bagdad, and Mutasarrif of Bagdad, reported their inability to control the situation unless the police were permitted to fire. They also reported that the popular resentment was no longer directed only at the Government and the Iraqi delegation, but at the Regent himself. Permission to fire was refused and the Acting Prime Minister summoned the Acting President of the Senate and the President of the Chamber to ask their advice. They replied that it was his responsibility not theirs. Having received this unhelpful reply, Jamal Baban went to the Regent and suggested the summoning of the meeting which, after some four hours discussion, decided on the issue of the Royal communiqué on the treaty, a copy of which is enclosed with this despatch for convenience of reference.

12. The actions of the Acting Prime Minister must appear to you feeble indeed, but in his defence it must be pointed out that the atmosphere of an oriental city in a time of civil tumult is unpleasant and is not conducive to calm thought and decisive action. His Ministers were gibbering with fear, the telephone exchange broke down under the pressure of calls, and disturbing rumours were very rife indeed. The very geography of Bagdad helps demonstrators, who can strangle traffic circulation with quite a small crowd. Jamal Baban is a stupid, lazy and extremely venal man, but he does not lack courage. He did not see the importance of the treaty for Iraq and was annoyed with the Prime Minister whose child it was. His only concern was to master the difficult situation in the streets of Bagdad and his ideas about achieving this were limited. The Iraqi police are not trained in the use of tear gas and the pressure in the water mains is too uncertain for the use of hoses to control crowds. Had either of these methods been available it is certainly possible that events might have taken a different course. So also might they have done if, as suggested in my telegram No. 105, he had allowed the demonstrators to march in the streets and arrested their leaders in the evenings. While this might have led to some minor incidents and destruction of property (which in any case did take place) it is possible that the sense of something being put through by force, which had been gaining ground, would have been allayed. A number of arrests were made, including Fa'iq Samarra'i, secretary of the Istiqlal Party, but their effect was not given time

to become apparent, since the president of that party, Mohammad Mehdi Kubba, was invited the next day, together with leaders of other political parties and prominent independent politicians to advise the Regent on measures to be taken to deal with the situation. The inclusion of the leaders of the political parties in this invitation was an admission of their influence which was, I feel sure, unnecessary, even if the necessity of the meeting itself be admitted. Jamal Baban's failure to defend his Prime Minister and the treaty in the course of the meeting was inexcusable, whatever the difficulties he may have experienced from Saleh Jabr.

13. The issue of the Royal Communiqué, according to the Acting Prime Minister, was received with expressions of rejoicing in the streets. It is certainly true that there have been no fatal casualties in the streets since it was issued. This may however be due to the fact that demonstrations, which continued up to and including Saturday, have been allowed to proceed through the streets and their leaders arrested in the evening. The Iraqi authorities maintain that these demonstrations are the work of Communists, when pressed they admit that the Independence party are also taking part, but they are at one in insisting that the popular feeling which made the situation critical on 21st January was appeased as soon as the people felt assured that the new treaty would not be ratified. Although I find it difficult to share this view, it must be admitted that the belief that Saleh Jabr's Government will fall and that the treaty in its present form will fall with it is all but universal. Shadow cabinets have been busily forming since the evening of the 22nd and persistent rumours of Saleh Jabr's resignation by telegram have circulated. Even such a staunch friend of the British connexion as the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs believes that Saleh Jabr will have to resign. Ahmad Pasha believes however that another Government perhaps under Jamil Madfai might be able to put the treaty or another one with only formal differences through the Majlis after a few months' delay.

14. Writing before the return of the Prime Minister and the delegation, I cannot think that their chances of retrieving the situation are bright. I fear it is unlikely that they can count on the support of their Cabinet colleagues and while the

Regent will certainly support them, the value of his support has been reduced by the events of the last week. The situation they will face is very difficult, almost every prominent politician in Iraq is associated with the issue of a public pronouncement that the Treaty of Portsmouth does not satisfy Iraqi aspirations. It is a situation which would be hopeless in a European country, but in an Arab one there is perhaps a slender chance. Much will depend on the loyalty of Tawfiq Suwaidi, as a member of the delegation who is not a member of the Government and is indeed normally in opposition to Saleh Jabr.

15. I do not think there is a danger of the treaty being debated in the Majlis and rejected. The Majlis is probably solid against the treaty now but should Saleh Jabr be able to show the merits of the treaty to such moderate opinion as dislikes it and at the same time demonstrate that violence in the streets is the work of agitators and hooligans who can be dealt with without bloodshed, the bulk of the deputies will probably come round again, particularly if Nuri uses his influence skilfully. If Saleh Jabr is unable to deal with the popular reaction in Bagdad he will have to resign for in that event he is likely to fail to obtain approval for the treaty in the Council of Ministers. It is indeed possible that on arrival he may be faced with the resignation of some of his Ministers; should this occur he would have great difficulty in replacing them.

16. At this stage it is of little value to speculate on the position which would arise if the Prime Minister fails to retrieve the existing situation, but it is perhaps worth while to point out that the demonstrations did not show any particular hostility to Great Britain and none to British subjects. With the exception of the offices of the *Iraq Times* (which had aroused indignation by describing—incorrectly—a previous demonstration as a "mob of looters") no British property was damaged. It does not seem likely that any alternative Government would take any step which would cause Anglo-Iraqi relations to deteriorate.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM

Enclosure in No. 6

Royal communiqué on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty

At 8.15 p.m. there was announced from Radio Bagdad the following important communiqué issued from the Master of Royal Ceremonies under No. 47 dated January 1948 issued at 8 p.m.

In view of the attachment by His Royal Highness the Regent and Heir Presumptive to the Throne to the general affairs of the country and present conditions and in view of His Royal Highness's desire to acquaint himself with the views of certain persons who held it, His Royal Highness graciously invited former Prime Ministers, vice-president of the Senate, the president of the

Chamber of Deputies and a number of Senators and Deputies and representatives of political parties, who met at the Royal palace at 3 p.m. today in the presence of the Cabinet and those present submitted their views concerning the draft Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Portsmouth. They unanimously agreed that it does not realise the aspirations of the country and was not a good instrument to consolidate the pillars of friendship between the two countries, especially as the Council of Ministers has not yet decided to approve the treaty in question. Therefore, His Royal Highness the Regent and Heir Presumptive promises the Iraqi people that no treaty whatever not ensuring the rights of the country and its national aspirations will be ratified.

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No. 7

GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN IRAQ

Prospect of a New Treaty

Mr. Busk to Mr. Bevin. (Received 18th February)

(No. 40. Secret)
Sir,

*Bagdad,
6th February, 1948*

Post-mortems are invariably gloomy, but they are sometimes useful. For purposes of record I feel it would be useful if I were to report on the various factors that led to the fall from the Premiership of Saleh Jabr and the shelving of the new Anglo-Iraqi treaty, for, despite the Iraqi Government's announcement, I do not think that we need regard it as irrevocably rejected.

2. In his despatch No. 26 of 25th January, Mr. Pelham brought the history of events up to 25th January. I returned to Bagdad on 26th January and thereafter I have reported fully by telegram, particularly in my telegrams Nos. 109 of 26th January, 117 of 27th January, 120 of 28th January, 149 and 152 of 3rd February and 154 of 4th February.

3. Perhaps the most important single influence in this whole affair has been the excessive secretiveness of the Prime Minister, which I have mentioned to you frequently in the past, and to which I called his attention on many occasions since he became Prime Minister. I have told him two or three times in so many words that those who did not trust others were not trusted themselves. He has always assured me that all would be well in the end and

that he would inform his colleagues as soon as it was necessary. But in practice he did nothing to mend his ways and I could easily compile a volume of anecdotes, important and unimportant, illustrating his obstinate determination to keep everything in his own hands. Perhaps now the ex-Prime Minister will be more inclined to believe what all his friends have been telling him for so long. He will probably also realise the strength of the feeling against him deriving from the fact that he was the first Shiah Prime Minister of Iraq.

4. The personality and failings of the Prime Minister, while perhaps largely responsible for what occurred, need not, in my view, have been decisive.

5. In the atmosphere of suspicion thus prevailing it was, on looking back, a mistake that we should have left the Regent—a notoriously weak man—in Bagdad without any staunch friend to support him. In fact such disinterested friends are very rare and in practice it really boils down to Nuri Pasha. You will recall that, when it was first suggested that Nuri Pasha should accompany the delegation to the United Kingdom, I did my best to counter the proposal. I was primarily actuated by the idea that any treaty in which Nuri Pasha had a hand was likely to be denounced immediately as the work of a pro-British

puppet, and this accusation is indeed still being made and still has its dangers. It was, however, Nuri Pasha himself who was desperately keen to come, and, though the Regent was, I think, reluctant, he felt unable to oppose his favourite Minister and staunchest friend. In this case, therefore, I do not feel that we need blame ourselves too much, particularly since Nuri Pasha's membership of the delegation would also not have been a decisive factor, if only the ex-Prime Minister had returned at once to Bagdad after the signing of the treaty on 15th January. Indeed, as it took some days to whip up agitation in Bagdad, it might actually have sufficed if he had arrived in Bagdad with his delegation on the morning of 21st January instead of five days later.

6. You will remember that every effort was made in London, not only by yourself and members of your staff, but by all the members of the Iraqi delegation, to persuade Saleh Jabr to return to Bagdad. All these efforts failed in the face of the opposition of one woman. Mrs. Saleh Jabr comes of a family of tribal sheikhs, she is accustomed to having her own way and, as events proved, no mere man could prevail against her. It is to be hoped that she too has now learnt a lesson.

7. Even the two factors I have already mentioned (the absence of Nuri Pasha from Bagdad and the delay in the return of the Iraqi delegation) would, however, still not have been decisive if the Regent had shown any courage in facing the undeniably unpleasant situation that arose in Bagdad. As I have already reported elsewhere, I have always known His Royal Highness to be weak, but I still feel that it was almost unimaginable that he should have disintegrated so completely. Here, incidentally, more petticoat influence appears. The Regent was certainly worked upon by his mother and sisters and I have reliable information that they were profoundly influenced by hysterical telephone messages from ladies in Bagdad. In at least one case I know that the messages were dictated to his daughter by a violent opponent of Saleh Jabr. His Royal Highness has since complained to me that he has now discovered that many of the stories told to him were untrue. I wish I could be sure that this would mean that he would not allow himself to be influenced by wild rumours in the future.

8. Another feature of the crisis was the weakness of the Acting Prime Minister.

Indeed it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was playing a double game. At 7 a.m. on 21st January he telephoned to the Prime Minister in London to say that there was no reason for any anxiety. At 12 noon he said the same to the British Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, who so informed Mr. Pelham. An hour later he was at the palace with the individuals he had thought it necessary to advise the Regent to summon, and the harm was done.

9. Finally must be mentioned the speed with which negotiations were concluded in London. Looking back, it was unfortunate that the Iraqi delegation had to conform to so tight a programme.

10. These, then, were the main factors affecting events, none of them decisive in themselves, but cumulatively devastating. To them must be added the economic situation, particularly the bad harvest and the consequent deterioration in the quality and supply of bread. Had the agitators not had this potent weapon to their hands, I am inclined to doubt whether they would have been nearly so successful, and I call attention to this particularly because at the present moment there is every sign that, owing to a second rainless winter, there will be a similar shortfall in this year's harvest. If this should occur it will be of the utmost importance that early steps should be taken to remedy it.

11. It should also be remembered that Iraq genuinely suffers from corrupt and incompetent government and that the outgoing Cabinet has done little to improve administration and has been notorious for ministerial corruption. Much resentment was caused among the political parties by their lack of success in the elections of 1947 and while this may reasonably be discounted the present Parliament cannot be called representative. Its composition is nearly though not quite fairly summed up by one of the new Ministers in conversation with a member of this embassy: his Excellency said that he realised that in Iraq for some years to come elections must in reality be selections, but Deputies should be chosen from men enjoying some measure of general respect and not, as in this case, on the sole ground of personal loyalty to Nuri Pasha or Saleh Jabr. The practical impossibility of such a Parliament effectively performing its constitutional functions has probably contributed much to the solidarity of the better-class student with those under the influence of the parties in the recent rioting.

12. The present Government has only been in power for a few days and it is early yet to try and forecast the future, but against what may appear to be all probability, I still do not think that a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty on the lines of this one is doomed. It is, for instance, a hopeful sign that there was practically no anti-British atmosphere in the demonstrations. Though the treaty provided an excuse, the outcry was almost entirely against Saleh Jabr personally. (I except the attack on the *Iraq Times* because this had become inevitable sooner or later as a result of an article in the paper six weeks earlier which inaccurately described demonstrators as a mob of looters.) It is also noteworthy that, though the Iraqi Government has officially rejected the treaty, it has expressed its desire to conclude a new one. This situation, viewed from Whitehall, must appear frankly ludicrous, but then Iraq is a ludicrous country.

13. In fact what is worrying me more is the question of internal stability. It would be of no value to us to have a ratified treaty if conditions in Iraq were so unstable that there were constant outbreaks of trouble. During the last two weeks the situation has been gravely disturbed. Law and order have been seriously menaced and I am afraid that there is danger that we may again, and in the very near future, be threatened by mob rule. There are as yet no signs that the new Government is alive to this danger, and the Regent is apt to take refuge in general twitterings rather than in advocating the concrete remedies so obviously desirable. We will all do our best to ensure that the gravity of the situation is brought home to the Government, and to encourage them to take the necessary steps, the most immediately important being to

raise the morale of the police, which has been seriously shaken by what they regard as unjust accusations against men who were only acting under orders in difficult circumstances. I fear, however, that the Government's present policy is to try and appease the mob by feeble appeals for good order and by promising enquiries into the incidents that took place after Saleh Jabr's return to the country.

14. I must also state that it is difficult to envisage any permanent form of security in Iraq if His Royal Highness cannot play a more effective rôle in emergencies.

15. Despite the setbacks of the last few days I remain convinced that the decision to negotiate at this time a revision of the 1930 treaty was correct. Now we can always fall back on the old treaty and we have time in which to manoeuvre. If we waited until the last moment and the same difficulties arose, our situation would be much less comfortable.

16. In conclusion, I would express the view, which is shared by all the Iraqis and British I have consulted, that there was almost certainly no one directing power behind the agitation. The demonstrations began mildly as student outbursts. As always in the past these fed on success and on the second and later days hooligans and professional agitators, seeing their chance, took it. I do not, however, think that even the most evilly intentioned agitator could have hoped in his wildest dreams to meet such disunity and weakness in responsible quarters. Indeed I feel confident that they are still surprised at the success of their unruliness. This will, however, merely encourage them and render them yet more dangerous in the future.

I have, &c.

DOUGLAS L. BUSK.

E 2362/27/93

No. 8

IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin (Received 19th February.)

(No. 44)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Bagdad Telegram No. 155 of 4th February, 1948, and your telegram No. 140 of 5th February, 1948,

copy of Iraqi Government's Note No. GH/131/131/5 of 4th February, 1948, together with copy of letter No. 95 to His Excellency Saiyid Arshad al Umari of the 11th February, 1948.

Bagdad,

11th February, 1948.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8

Saiyid Hamdi al Pachachi to Sir H. Mack.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
(Translation) Bagdad,
Chargé d'Affaires, 4th February, 1948.*

I have the honour to inform you that the Council of Ministers, having reviewed the contents, annexures and exchange of letters of the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which was signed at Portsmouth on 15th January, 1948, and having studied it fully, considers that the object which Iraq had in mind in negotiating a new treaty to replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which did not secure the wishes of the Iraqi Nation, was its replacement by a treaty which should be compatible with the foundations and principles on which the United Nations' Charter was based, and which should place the alliance between the two countries on a footing of equality of rights, balance of interests, and fitting co-operation between the two nations, so that the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance should ensure that each of the two parties should play its part in the consolidation of world peace. Since the Council of Ministers has observed that the new Treaty of Portsmouth is far from realising these aims and that it is not a fit instrument for strengthening the ties of friendship between Iraq and the United Kingdom, the Council has decided on the rejection of the treaty together with its annexures and exchange of letters.

I shall be grateful if you would convey this to your esteemed Government at the same time making it clear that the Iraqi Government, for the reasons given above, continues to desire the replacement of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, by a new treaty which ensures the realisation of the objects above mentioned.

Kindly accept, &c.

HAMDI PACHACHI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8

*Sir H. Mack to His Excellency Saiyid
Arshad al Umari*

(No. 95) *Bagdad,
Your Excellency, 11th February, 1948.*

I have the honour to acknowledge His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of 4th February, 1948, containing the decision of the Council of Ministers to reject the new Treaty of Portsmouth, and to state that I have communicated its contents to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

2. His Majesty's Government have noted the attitude of the Iraqi Government. It is their wish to develop still further the existing friendship between Iraq and the United Kingdom, and they are always ready to examine any possible way of achieving this end. They would, however, point out that so far as treaty revision is concerned they saw no need to revise the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 before its due time of expiry, and that it was only at the insistent demand of the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq that they accepted the idea of premature revision. The resulting Treaty of Portsmouth was based on Iraqi proposals.

3. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government find it hard to understand the agitation which was fomented against the Treaty of Portsmouth. They feel sure that when this treaty is studied more fully in a calmer atmosphere its merits will become apparent to responsible opinion in Iraq.

I avail, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

E 3239/27/93

No. 9

ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY QUESTION

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 10th March)

(No. 67. Confidential) *Bagdad,
Sir, 24th February, 1948*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a note from Saiyid Arshad al Umari who has been acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs during the absence of Saiyid Hamdi Pachachi at the Arab League meeting in Cairo. I have returned

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a simple acknowledgment of which I am also transmitting a copy.

2. It would perhaps be useful to describe the background which lies behind this note. On 16th February I received a message from Arshad Beg to the effect that he was unhappy about paragraph 3 of my note of 11th February (my despatch No. 44 of 12th

c 2

February) acknowledging the Iraqi Government's note rejecting the Treaty of Portsmouth. I subsequently saw his Excellency who explained that this paragraph was in his opinion an attack on the present Government to which he felt bound to reply. I argued with him at some length about the meaning of the paragraph and did my best to dissuade him from sending any reply. He finally agreed to postpone making one until after the Arabic translation had been checked and after he had had a further talk with me.

3. In the event Arshad Beg, who is an impulsive little man and sometimes quite irresponsible, only postponed the reply until the Arabic translation had been checked. The implications that his Excellency professed to see in paragraph 3 were as follows:—

(i) the phrase "agitation which was fomented" was directed at the present Government, since all of them were present at the Palace meeting on 21st January.

(ii) the second sentence of paragraph 3 implied either that the present Government had not fully studied the treaty or that they did not form part of responsible opinion in Iraq.

4. I do not suggest that any further notice should be taken of this communication since I feel that this kind of discussion can only be sterile and would moreover be likely to strengthen the impression among the present Iraqi Cabinet that this embassy is opposed to them personally.

5. At one stage in our conversation Arshad Beg tried to draw me into accepting in principle further discussions about a new treaty, and said that, if I wished, he was prepared to let me have a statement showing in detail the Iraqi Government's objections to the Portsmouth Treaty. Since he had repeated several times that that treaty was "dead," and since it is perfectly clear that no useful purpose would be served by any detailed discussion of it with the present Government, I said that I was not willing to discuss the question at this time. There were other matters which were far more important for the Iraqi Government to deal with. For instance, it was intolerable that when his Excellency wished to see me I should be forced to make a detour which took ten or fifteen minutes longer in order to reach his Ministry: the Iraqi Government would be much better employed in devoting

themselves to the improvement of public order in Bagdad and stopping the daily processions than in writing unnecessary notes to me. Arshad Beg made no attempt to answer this.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9

(Translation)

Saiyid Arshad al Umari to Sir H. Mack

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Bagdad,*

Your Excellency, 22nd February, 1948

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received your letter No. 95 dated 11th February, 1948, and I beg your Excellency to inform His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the following:—

1. The Iraqi Government is happy to learn that His Britannic Majesty's Government shares the feelings of the Iraqi Government, viz., a firm desire to develop further and further the ties of friendship which exist between the two kingdoms, and a readiness to study any possible means of realising this desire. The intentness of the Iraqi Government on this object is the principal reason for the continuance of their desire to replace at the earliest opportunity the Treaty of Alliance of 1930—which has become unsuitable for this object and does not accord with Iraq's position in the family of nations—by a new treaty which, considering the friendship existing between the two Kingdoms, will draw strength from the satisfaction with it of the peoples of the two Kingdoms and which as an alliance will be capable of an implementation which guarantees complete fidelity.

2. As for the text of the treaty of Portsmouth and its being based on Iraqi proposals, unfortunately the former Ministry did not leave in the Government archives any official records by whose assistance these proposals might be known. The present responsible Ministry, however, has studied the actual text of the above treaty calmly and deeply, and the more they studied it the stronger became their conviction not only that this text, with its twenty years' validity, is unsuitable to meet the

requirements for which it is desired to substitute it for the Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which had but a few more years to run, but also that it is far from being fitting for the realisation of the desired object referred to in paragraph 1 above.

Apart from the fact that the Treaty of Portsmouth was voided by the absence of approval of the Ministry responsible for it, I should like to affirm that the unsuitability of this treaty was so clear as to be apparent to Iraqi public opinion and it (the treaty) was greeted with general unrest, to which it is unnecessary to refer as it was demonstrated in all parts of the Kingdom. This makes me unable (however much I would wish to try to reconcile the facts with what may have been reported to you)

to accept the description of it as an agitation which was "fomented."

I avail, &c.

ARSHAD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9

Sir H. Mack to Saiyid Hamdi al Pachachi

(No. 141)

Bagdad,

Your Excellency, 24th February, 1948

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of note dated 22nd February from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and to inform you that I am communicating its contents to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I avail, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

E 4291/27/93

No. 10

POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 6th April)

(No. 104. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, 29th March, 1948

I have the honour to submit the following report on the present political situation in this country.

2. You are familiar with the circumstances in which the present Iraqi Government took office. I will only say here that they became the Government of the country contrary to the Regent's wish and that they forced his hand by means of street demonstrations and by obtaining the apparent support of all the discontented elements of the population to an extent which must have frightened them. These elements included Communists, Nationalists, remnants of the followers of Rashid Ali, the students of the Law College, disaffected elements suffering in many cases from want and bad social conditions, who are to be found in distressingly large numbers in Bagdad, and all those who had been brewing up grievances during the past twenty years. Dislike of Saleh Jahar by the old gang and of the apparent rapidity with which the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded, combined with the bad economic situation, were the chief causes of the January disturbances. The treaty itself was merely the excuse. Only the Istiqlal Party has published a criticism of its provisions in any detail. Few of its critics have even read it. No one here believes that

there was a single guiding brain behind the demonstrations or that the hand of Moscow was directly responsible.

3. A brief description of the members of the Cabinet is essential. The Prime Minister, Saiyid Mohammad al Sadr, is a respected figure who might have stepped out of the pages of the Old Testament, religious, vain and with no knowledge whatever of the practical business of Government. With him, when he formed his Government, there were three former Prime Ministers. Of these Jamil al Madfai, the Minister of the Interior, has since resigned on grounds of health. He is one of those whom the Regent dislikes intensely and His Royal Highness accepted his resignation without regret. Hamdi al Pachachi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has just died suddenly. He is a distinct loss to the Government and to the country. He was to me one of the more sympathetic members of the Cabinet and I had hopes that we could have done some useful business with him. The third ex-Prime Minister is Arshad al Umari, Minister of Defence, who has acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs during the frequent absences of Hamdi al Pachachi at Arab League meetings. I have described him in an earlier despatch as unbalanced and irresponsible. It was he who was largely responsible for organising the opposition

to Saleh Jabr and the intimidation of the Regent in January. He is unfortunately the most active member of the Government. He has of late been cultivating the Regent with some assiduity, but I heard two days ago with some satisfaction that he had overreached himself and that the Regent, not without some prompting from me, is wise to his motives and ambitions. The Minister of Education, Sheikh Mohammad Ridha al Shabibi, has a distinguished position in the Arab world of letters. He seems to have the right ideas about education and the control of the schools and colleges, but it is doubtful whether he is strong enough to carry them into effect. Daud al Haidari, the Minister for Social Affairs, was Iraqi Minister in London for some time during the war and is known to your Department. I think he can be described as Anglophil. He is also well-meaning but corrupt and a lightweight. The Minister of Communications, Jalal Baban, is at first sight not an impressive figure but he may be more capable than he appears. Nasrat al Farisi, the new Minister of the Interior, is a lawyer, slow and cautious; he will do nothing rash. His appointment to the Interior was a surprise as he lacks the necessary experience of internal administration and personalities. Sadiq al Bassam, the Minister of Finance, is always dismissed in five words; he knows nothing about finance. The Minister of Economics, Mustafa al Umari, is a capable crook who had a good name as Minister of the Interior in an earlier Government. Najib al Rawi became Minister of Justice a fortnight ago in succession to Omar Nadhmi, whose original inclusion in the Cabinet was perhaps at the instance of Nuri Pasha. He is refreshingly active and energetic, and from what I have seen of him has the right views. His brother is the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mohammad Mahdi Kubba, who is the Minister of Supply, is the leader of the Independence (Istiqlal) Party. He looks sinister, is probably able and, from our point of view, dangerous. The remaining member, Mohammad Habib al Amir, who is one of the biggest tribal leaders in the country, holds no portfolio and seldom comes to Bagdad. I have not yet seen him.

4. The above ill-assorted Cabinet has been conducting its business without any support from the Regent and without even much sign of interest in their proceedings from His Royal Highness. They are bound by the programme which they hastily issued

on coming into office. In accordance with it they have repudiated the Treaty of Portsmouth, instituted an enquiry into the disturbances of January last, and decided to hold new elections. In regard to the treaty, I found on my arrival almost all the Ministers on the defensive and somewhat apprehensive lest my instructions should be to secure the early ratification of the Portsmouth Treaty. At the same time almost all assured me that friendship between Great Britain and Iraq and the Arab world was a vital necessity. The Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances has been proceeding slowly, but it is now clear that the Director-General of Police for Bagdad, Alwan Pasha Hussein, an excellent man, is not to be victimised and that the changes which will be recommended will not be of first importance. It took a long time for the Cabinet to come to a decision about elections, and when they put their proposal to hold them to the Regent, His Royal Highness insisted that if he approved the holding of elections, which he did not want, the Cabinet must remain in office to hold them.

5. The more pressing needs of the country have so far been completely neglected. The Cabinet's time seems to be entirely taken up by non-essentials. This, I fear, cannot be helped with any Government in this country, where even a minor decision has to be referred to the Departmental Minister. In all my conversations with Ministers—and I have had long talks with all of them with one exception—I have made the following points: (a) that His Majesty's Government have no desire to initiate discussion of the treaty, that they only agreed to negotiate last year at the request of the Iraqi Government and that they are quite satisfied with the 1930 treaty; (b) that the first duty of the Government is to restore order and security in the country; (c) that the Government should press on with development schemes and in particular should constitute a Central Development Board to co-ordinate schemes and get them going as rapidly as possible; such a board, which would be independent of party, would not be affected by the constant changes of Government which unfortunately occur in this country; (d) that strenuous efforts should be made to improve social conditions and thus remove a fertile breeding-ground for communism; and (e) that in these critical days all peace-loving countries should declare that they intend to

stand together to maintain the peace of the world.

6. On the question of restoring order and security, I regret to say that nothing has been achieved. The agitators in Bagdad have learnt that demonstrations can be effective and up to the present the Government has made no effort to stop them. The new Minister of the Interior, Nasrat al Farisi, has told me that he must first get his organisation right and that he will then take action. The Prime Minister and the other members of the Cabinet, having come into office on the backs of the agitators, have felt that they were in a weak position to deal with them, and they have allowed the life of Bagdad to be held up for an hour or two at least on most days, while the police stand aside. I have hopes that the Regent will, as a result of my conversation with him on 24th March, take a hand and insist on action by the Government. If he does he will certainly enhance his popularity in the country, since the people are definitely sick and tired of demonstrations in Bagdad.

7. The tribal leaders, who have been coming to see me in satisfactory numbers and have all expressed their loyalty to the British connexion, are an important element in the situation. Most of my visitors have expressed their shame at the events of January. I do not suppose that any of them have read either the 1930 Treaty or the Portsmouth Treaty, but they say that whichever was good enough for His Majesty's Government was good enough for them. They are loyal to the Regent and they supply the majority of the members of the Majlis. Some of them recently told His Royal Highness that, if he wished, they were prepared to march into Bagdad and put an end to the demonstrations. They have already scored one victory over the Government by insisting that the elections should be held on the old census and not on the new, which would have given them reduced representation. The tribal leaders are not united, but a number of the more important Sheikhs have recently met in Bagdad and have decided to band themselves together in opposition to communism and in support of the Regent.

Situation in the Provinces

8. Provincial towns tend to follow Bagdad and indeed events there are usually directly inspired by Bagdadi agitators who make special journeys for the purpose. Demonstrations against the Portsmouth

Treaty would probably never have taken place in the provinces without this direct pressure. The present paralysis of Government in the capital is faithfully reflected in the provinces where administrative officials receive no support from Bagdad and stand by powerless to take action against the few agitators known to be responsible for trouble. In the tribal south the Sheikhs can, I think, be relied on to see that no outbursts take place: Basra is more commercial than political-minded and remains calm; Mosul is by nature turbulent and has had its troubles, as has Erbil; Kirkuk, under the control of a strong Mutasarrif, has, I am glad to say, been relatively quiet; at Sulaimani the situation is worst. There, Communist agitators have gained a strong foothold, but I am not without hope that they can be dislodged.

The Army

9. The Army has been built up to a relatively efficient force. I am confident of its loyalty to the Regent, but that must not be taken to mean that in every eventuality it could be used to quell public disturbances. The use of troops against their countrymen is a chancy business at best, but I think that in any major crisis His Royal Highness could count on the Army's support.

Finance

10. Cabinet Ministers are unable to conceal their anxiety about the financial position of the country and, as a matter of course, blame their predecessors. Their concern is mainly with the budgetary position which, if only the country were not backward and the administration were not influenced by those who should carry much of the burden of taxation, would be easy to adjust by a more efficient collection of taxes and a slight increase in the incidence of taxation on the wealthy classes combined with short-term internal loans. Generally it is true that owing to the inflation of the war period and continued shortage of staple imports the costs of administration have risen while Government revenue has not increased in proportion. The former Government under Saleh Jabr frequently expressed confidence in their ability to increase taxation and not only to balance the budget but to provide a separate budget for development purposes. The present Government have, however, adopted a weak line and an extremely gloomy view and say they are having to borrow to make ends meet. It is difficult to get any clear picture as no figures of income and expenditure

have been produced since August, 1947. I am informed that a Cabinet Committee is investigating the problem and that Ibrahim al Kabir, the Inspector-General of the Ministry of Finance, who had absented himself on continuous leave, has been persuaded to return to office. I therefore hope that in the near future I may be able to present a more comprehensive report on Government finances.

The Economic Situation

11. Since the end of the war the economy of the country has deteriorated. This is due largely to the effect of war-time inflation and the inability of the Government to maintain war-time controls for fear of internal political repercussion. As in most other Middle East countries the drought of 1947 seriously affected the grain crops. Iraq normally relies on her own production of wheat (and to a small extent rice and millet) for the staple food of the people. The export of barley is a large item in Iraq's balance of payments. Owing to the drought the Government, towards the end of 1947, belatedly realised that they must stop the export of barley and seek to import wheat in order to prevent famine. Disaster was only narrowly escaped by the allocation by the International Emergency Food Council to Iraq of some 25,000 tons of Australian wheat. Thanks to your intervention the first 7,000 tons of this wheat has just arrived in time to prevent considerable distress in the large cities. If the further shipments arrive without undue delay the position will improve but the cost of the wheat will be a further adverse factor in Iraq's balance of payments.

12. Towards the end of 1946 procurement of goods from abroad (unfortunately mainly in the luxury or semi-luxury class) became easier, while owing to popular and political clamour controls were relaxed and large orders were placed. After the Anglo-Iraqi Financial Agreement was concluded in August, 1947, a new import and exchange control was imposed. Nevertheless, imports for the last twelve months appear vastly to have exceeded exports with the result of a considerable drawing down of the war-time accumulation of sterling balances which, but a few months ago, it was hoped to preserve for use on major economic development projects. Figures of trade for the last nine months are still not available.

13. Work on the approved Habbaniya scheme for the control of the River

Euphrates continues with a view to completion early in 1951. The Haigh Commission continues its investigation of schemes for the control of the River Tigris and expects to produce a decisive report and recommendations before next September.

The Immediate Future

14. The above is the gloomy background against which elections will be held. All the legal parties will be allowed to take part in them and have announced their intention to do so. If, however, they find that they are not to be given what they consider a reasonable number of seats they may decide to boycott them as they did last year. Of the three parties the Istiqlal is the only one which is represented in the Cabinet. It is essentially anti-British, but there are signs that the leaders are now beginning to woo us, and Mahdi Kubba has disclaimed to me any anti-British feeling. The party is also anti-Regent and may try to work for the return of Rashid Ali. The Liberals (Ahrar) have some good men who are worthy of our support, but they have no desire to enter the present Government. The party as a whole seems to be moving slightly further to the left. The Democrats have fewer able men. They appear to be trying to keep clear of communism. The suppressed parties are unquestionably dangerous and are working hard underground, encouraged by recent events. One satisfactory feature, however, is that it is comparatively easy for us to run a strong campaign against communism in the press and elsewhere; the local press, bad as it is, is of its own initiative taking the right line. We are maintaining the pressure in every possible way.

15. I regret that I have been able to report little that is encouraging in the situation. The most that we can hope for in the immediate future is that the Government will take the question of order and security, both in Bagdad and in the provinces, in hand. Mere appeals to stop demonstrations have been shown to be completely fruitless. Police action is definitely required and the police and the Mutasarrifs must be supported throughout the country. The press is becoming more and more scurrilous and irresponsible and some measure of control will have to be imposed. Unless strong measures are taken soon it is difficult to see how it will be possible for the elections to be held without serious disorders. My insistence with

members of the Government on the need for economic development has at least led the Cabinet to discuss the question more than once, but no conclusions have been reached. It is a sad reflection on thirty years of independence that in a country so potentially fertile as this there should be such a shortage of food that wheat has to be imported from abroad. I propose to continue to press vigorously for action in this field, but the restoration of order and

the re-establishment of authority come first. The rest must, I fear, wait until we see what Government is formed after the elections. There are signs that the Regent is beginning to realise that he must play a more active part. I have hopes that he may do so.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

E 4652/618/93

No. 11

BRITISH ADVISORY MILITARY MISSION TO THE IRAQI ARMY

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin (Received 14th April)

(No. 108)

Bagdad,

2nd April, 1948

Sir,
In amplification of my recent telegrams on the termination of the British Advisory Military Mission to the Iraqi Army, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of my Note to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 17th March, 1948, proposing the withdrawal of the Mission, together with copies⁽¹⁾ in Arabic of the Acting Minister's reply of 21st March and the Arabic version of the joint communiqué⁽¹⁾ which appeared in the Bagdad press on 23rd March. An English translation of the Acting Minister's reply was contained in my telegram No. 315 of 22nd March.

2. When I made my communication to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Minister for Defence, Saiyid Arshad el Umari) on 17th March, His Excellency expressed his appreciation of His Majesty's Government's proposal, which he promised to lay before the Council of Ministers as soon as possible. Explaining himself in Arabic parables, he added that the looser the visible ties of Anglo-Iraqi friendship, the stronger that friendship would become. He then paid a warm tribute to General Renton, the Head of the Mission, and said that the Iraqi Government would doubtless wish to retain some of the members of the Mission as instructors to the Iraqi Army. It was probable, however, that fewer military and more air force instructors would be required.

3. The Acting Minister then proposed that the two Governments should issue a joint communiqué about the withdrawal of the Mission. I agreed to this on condition that the communiqué should make it

clear that the initiative had come from His Majesty's Government. I also expressed the hope that the communiqué could issue for publication on 20th March, before General Renton left the country. In the event this proved impossible, for, with the intervention of Friday, the approval by the Council of Ministers of His Majesty's Government's proposal and of the text of a joint communiqué could not be secured in time.

4. On 18th March, the text of the communiqué contained in my telegram No. 306 was agreed with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency's agreement was only obtained after much argument, for he found it difficult to give up the idea of a communiqué beginning "The British and Iraqi Governments have agreed, &c." in favour of one which made it clear that the proposal had come from His Majesty's Government. On 20th March the same difficulty arose again, for the Council of Ministers suggested the transposition of the first two paragraphs of the communiqué and the replacement of the formula which obscured His Majesty's Government's initiative. I accepted the transposition of the paragraphs but insisted on the retention of the words "His Majesty's Government has proposed and the Iraqi Government have agreed." In the Arabic text of the final communiqué, the English text of which was contained in my telegram No. 309 as amended by your telegram No. 281, the initiative of His Majesty's Government received special emphasis.

5. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me on 22nd March and brought the Iraqi Government's reply to

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

His Majesty's Government's proposals. He said that the reply contained no mention of instructors and courses as this was all covered by the provisions of the 1930 Treaty of Alliance. It was interesting to hear His Excellency invoke the 1930 Treaty thus, and I did not then complain of the omission in the reply. I have, however, asked the Regent to see that the Iraqi Government make up their minds in good time about the instructors they wish to retain, and I will revert to this matter with His Royal Highness as opportunity offers.

6. The joint communiqué was duly published in all the Bagdad newspapers on 23rd March. So far only one moderate newspaper, *Al Akhbar*, has commented favourably on the withdrawal of the Mission, mentioning its great services to the Iraqi Army. Comment in the extremist press has been unfavourable and often scurrilous. One newspaper sees in the withdrawal of the Mission a trick to get Iraq to accept a Joint Defence Board: four others have accused the Mission of ruining the Iraqi Army, two of them singling out General Renton for personal attack. I protested to the Prime Minister and other Ministers against these articles and have been assured that every effort will be made to give me satisfaction.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

Enclosure in No. 11

Sir H. Mack to Saiyid Arshad al Umari.

Bagdad,

Your Excellency. 17th March, 1948.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the future of the British Advisory Military Mission to the Iraqi Army.

Major-General Renton, the present Head of the Mission, has reported to His Majesty's Government that, in his opinion, the Iraqi Army has now reached such a state of efficiency that a Military Mission in its present form has become unnecessary. In view of this report, which they have noted with great satisfaction, His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the time has come when the Military Mission can be withdrawn. If the Iraqi Government should agree with this view, His Majesty's Government would propose not to nominate a successor to Major-General Renton on the completion of his contract on 16th May. They would suggest that the services of the other members of the Military Mission should be terminated by the Iraqi Government under Clause 11 of the existing Mission contract.

I am instructed to state that, if the Iraqi Government should wish for the services of any British naval, military and air force officers after the withdrawal of the Mission as instructors with the Iraqi forces, His Majesty's Government would be glad to provide them.

His Majesty's Government wish to emphasise that they are at all times most anxious to do everything in their power to assist the Iraqi Government to maintain the efficiency of the Iraqi forces. In particular they are prepared to continue to provide facilities for courses for Iraqi officers and n.c.o.s in the United Kingdom, to hold staff talks and to assist in the direction of large-scale exercises, for example by the provision of training teams or umpires, whenever the Iraqi Government so desire.

I avail, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

E. 4968/51/93

No. 12

ACTIVITIES OF RASHID ALI IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 22nd April)

(No. 73. Secret.)
Sir.

Jedda,

18th April, 1948.

I have the honour to forward herewith the English text of the letter which I wrote to His Majesty King Ibn Saud concerning Rashid Ali on 12th April, and a translation

of his reply which was received here on 16th April.

2. It will be seen that the King denies that Rashid Ali could possibly have intrigued against the Iraqi Government, as he had been under close surveillance. The

King, however, wishes to be rid of his guest, in the first place in order to avoid any accusations that he is acting against the Hashemites, and in the second place because he does not feel obliged to retain him.

3. He then accuses the Iraqi Government of carrying on intrigues against him, and suggests that His Majesty's Government might advise the Iraqi Government to cease such intrigues.

4. It appears at any rate that the King is ready to retain Rashid Ali here for the present.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12

Mr. Trott to King Ibn Saud

Jedda,

12th April, 1948.

Your Majesty,

After compliments.

Your Majesty will remember a letter written by my predecessor to Your Majesty in April of last year, No. 606/5/47 of 19th April, 1947, in which Mr. Grafftey-Smith referred to the report that Rashid Ali al-Gailani had arrived in Jedda as assistant to Shaikh Fuad Hamza in the Ministry of Finance, and also Your Majesty's reply thereto, in which Your Majesty assured Mr. Grafftey-Smith and the British Government that Rashid Ali al-Gailani "is at liberty to reside in any of our territories as long as he engages in no propaganda against Britain or any friendly State."

In the light of this assurance, and of Your Majesty's repeated declarations of friendship towards His Majesty's Government—a friendship whose sincerity His Majesty's Government has never doubted—His Majesty's Government have been well content that Rashid Ali should reside in Your Majesty's territories, since only so long as he is resident in Your Majesty's Kingdom can His Majesty's Government be sure that he will be restrained from activities hostile to His Majesty's Government.

Nevertheless His Majesty's Government are very concerned at reports that some part of the recent agitation in Iraq may have been due to the influence of Rashid Ali's supporters there. His Majesty's Government have no irrefutable proof that Rashid Ali is organising activities in Iraq directed against the Government of that

country and His Majesty's Government, but nevertheless they have received several reports to this effect. His Majesty's Government therefore hope that Your Majesty will take steps to assure yourself that this old enemy of His Majesty's Government and friend of Hitler, who has already once in his life proved himself a traitor to his king and country, is not, unknown to Your Majesty, using his influence against those who are Your Majesty's best friends. His Majesty's Government do not for one moment suggest that Your Majesty should deny to Rashid Ali that protection which is customary in the Arab lands. Indeed, under the present circumstances His Majesty's Government would deplore his departure from Saudi Arabia, since only when he is resident in Your Majesty's territories can His Majesty's Government be certain that he will remain under Your Majesty's effective supervision.

May I beg Your Majesty, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12

King Ibn Saud to Mr. Trott

(Translation)

Riyadh, 6th Jumadi II, 1367

(15th April, 1948).

To continue: Your letter of 12th April, 1948, about Rashid Ali Gailani has reached us and we have taken note of all that is in it.

2. We assure the British Government that what has happened and is happening in Iraq has nothing to do with Rashid Ali. For the latter is living among us and has no connexions with anyone. He has no relations with anyone. It is impossible that Rashid Ali, being in Riyadh, under surveillance, should be considered responsible for what people are doing in Iraq.

3. We have confined Rashid Ali through all this time and he has refrained from any political intervention in Iraq, but unfortunately our action in this matter has not been met by any satisfaction or by any similar action by the Government of Iraq. They have considered the existence of Rashid Ali among us as though it were action unsatisfactory to them. For that reason we have asked Mr. Rodgers to tell your Excellency that the residence of Rashid Ali in our country is not in accordance with our desires, because that is

interpreted as being against the wish of the people of Iraq; that is one side; in the second place there is nothing which obliges us to confine him in our country.

4. If the British Government consider that the matter is important and is apprehensive about his leaving our country, then it is possible to postpone his departure from our country till another opportunity.

5. The British Government, in consideration of the interests of their friends the Iraqi Government, have asked us this matter concerning Rashid Ali; but they have not considered what the Iraqis have done and are doing to us. Rashid Ali came alone, by himself; but two persons of the Bani Rashid fled from Riyadh owing to the intrigues of someone in Iraq, and received a warm welcome, receiving all assistance; the Iraqi Government began to

surround them with all the criminals and opponents to us, whether from the Shammar or from elsewhere, to incite them with all manner of incitements—does not the British Government see any difference between our position and that of the Iraqis in this question? Do they not think of advising the Iraqis to revise their policy which is the reverse of our policy of forbidding Rashid Ali to take any action against them?

6. However that may be, we, in spite of our desire that Rashid Ali shall not be obliged to reside in our country, await the views of the British Government concerning the situation in our country in relation to the Iraqi Government, in this matter.

Receive our respects,
(Seal)

E 9744/9744/93

No. 13

IRAQ: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, 1948

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 20th July)

(No. 209)

Sir,

Bagdad, 6th July, 1948.

I have the honour, with reference to Mr. Busk's despatch No. 266 of 25th July, 1947, to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions at this post.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

Enclosure in No. 13

Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Bagdad, 1948

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Afghanistan

Sardar Ghulam Yahya Tarzi, minister (20th June, 1948).

The amiable Abdur Rahman Khan returned to Kabul in May after nearly seven years here. His ambition is to be appointed to London. His successor had been Minister of Communications in Kabul before coming here. His previous diplomatic experience had been in Berlin many years ago and German is his only European language. He seems friendly, but he gives the impression that he is finding it difficult to settle down in Bagdad. His wife is related to the Afghan Royal family and they have seven children.

Egypt

Mohammed Yasin Bey, minister (11th October, 1945).

*Also accredited to Transjordan in 1947, but continues to reside in Bagdad. An agreeable and more

than usually hospitable colleague. He appears to be genuinely well disposed towards us and he and all his secretaries are members of the chief British Club, where they are often seen. (Written in 1947.)

I endorse the above. Yasin Bey does not like Bagdad. He only spends about six months in the year here, which he devotes to the very successful cultivation of roses. His other hobby is the *protocole*. He has shown himself most friendly to me since my arrival.

France

Georges Balay, minister (3rd January, 1948).

M. Balay came here from Rome, where he had been chargé d'affaires for a considerable period. He is proud of having joined General de Gaulle towards the end of 1942. A bachelor of 45 years of age, M. Balay pines for the delights of France and Italy and openly expresses his dislike for Bagdad, which he describes as the city of *mille et un ennuis*. He has had some unfortunate experiences with prominent Iraqis who accepted invitations to dinner and either did not turn up or excused themselves at the last moment. Like many Frenchmen, he feels acutely the reduced influence of his country. He has a pleasant staff, but seems to me always to be somewhat lonely. We are on the best of terms and he often drops in informally to see us. He is clearly counting the days until he can get away from here and I do not think he will ever play much of a rôle, even if he wished to do so. M. Balay speaks English well.

Holy See

M. de Yonghe d'Ardoys left in July 1947 for Batavia to open an Apostolic Delegation and has not yet been replaced.

Mgr. du Chayla, the Latin Archbishop of Bagdad, who acts as Apostolic Delegate, is a cultured and charming cleric, most friendly and agreeable. It is always a pleasure to meet him. His diplomatic position has not yet been regularised.

Lebanon

Kadhim al Solh, minister (9th August, 1947).

Kadhim al Solh is brother to Taki ed Din Solh, formerly counsellor at the Lebanese Legation in Cairo, and a cousin of Riad Solh, Prime Minister of the Lebanon, and of the present Syrian Minister in Bagdad. Aged about 45, and a Sunni Moslem of Beirut, he is a graduate of the Damascus Law School. He started life as a journalist, until his paper was suspended by the French. Subsequently he organised a small but influential nationalist (but not anti-British) political party, the Nida al Qawmi. He speaks good French and some English.

Persia

A new minister, Mohamed Shaista, has been appointed but has not yet arrived.

Saudi Arabia

Abdullah al Khaiyal, minister (9th February, 1947).

*After a period in the legation as a secretary and then as secretary-in-charge, Abdullah al Khaiyal was appointed minister in February 1947. He is friendly and intelligent, a genuine Saudi from Riyadh and, since being in Bagdad, has taken the trouble to learn to speak some English. He frequently consults me on Saudi-Iraqi relations. (Written in 1947.)

The Saudi Arabian Legation is strongly suspected by the Iraqis of acting as an intermediary between Rashid Ali and his friends in Iraq. Abdullah al Khaiyal has not been home for many years, but hopes that Ibn Saud will allow him to return on leave during this summer.

Soviet Union

Grigori Titovitch Zaitzev, minister (14th February, 1945).

M. Zaitzev absented himself from the dinner which the Iraqi Government gave in our honour shortly after our arrival, but was careful to explain to me when he called on the following day that he had been really ill the evening before. I have seen little of him since. The Iraqis much regret having allowed the Soviet Government to establish a legation here and I have the impression that, if the Soviet Government had been the first and only Power to recognise "the State of Israel," the Iraqi Government would have tried to close down the legation.

M. Zaitzev speaks English quite well and makes himself pleasant on the rare occasions when we meet, but, like all Russian diplomats, he will not express a view on any subject of any importance. The legation's underground work is, as usual, done by a member of his staff.

M. Zaitzev is married. His wife is unattractive and knows only a few words of English. They have recently left for Moscow.

Spain

Juan Manuel de Aristegui, minister (11th February, 1948).

Formerly Spanish Consul-General in Jerusalem and at present accredited both to Amman and Bagdad, Señor de Aristegui arrived here at the beginning of this year and presented his credentials on the same day as myself. He is accompanied by his attractive daughter and one secretary. He told me that he intends to divide his time between Amman and Bagdad, according to the weather. He is stout and amiable, and speaks passable English. He left for Amman in the spring as soon as the weather began to get warm.

Syria

Afif al Solh, minister (25th April, 1947).

Afif al Solh and I exchanged calls after my arrival, since when I have not seen much of him. He prefers

to spend the greater part of his time in Syria and the real work is done by his counsellor, Baha Edin al Bakri. The latter and his Iraqi wife have an excellent position and their impending departure for Cairo will leave a definite gap in our small Diplomatic Corps.

Transjordan

Mohammed Ali al Ajlouni Bey, minister (20th September, 1947).

Mohammed Ali al Ajlouni was transferred to Bagdad from Beirut, where he was replaced by his predecessor in Bagdad. He is a friendly little man, but he speaks neither English nor French.

Turkey

M. Nebil Bari, minister (17th March, 1945).

M. Bari is a friendly and intelligent colleague. He keeps in touch with me and I have no doubt that such influence as he may have here is exerted in a manner friendly to us. He has recently succeeded in getting the Iraqi Government to ratify the Iraqi-Turkish Agreement which was negotiated and signed by Nuri Pasha, but only after constant pressure.

United States

Mr. George Wadsworth, ambassador (15th February, 1947).

*Mr. Wadsworth, who presented his credentials as first American Ambassador to Iraq on 15th February, 1947, is a 2-handicap golfer and a bridge player of considerable skill. Born in 1893, he joined the staff of the American University at Beirut in 1914, but transferred into Government service in 1915. He has had great experience of the Middle East and speaks both Arabic and French. Has been twice married and twice widowed. He is a great talker and something of a bore who is more interested in his own opinions than in those of others. He has not so far succeeded in making himself very popular with the Iraqi Government. (Written in 1947.)

I knew Mr. Wadsworth in Constantinople in 1921. He always says that he wishes to keep the closest touch with me and that he is a firm believer in co-operation between our two countries. I have found him frank and forthcoming and our relations are easy and cordial. His excessive volubility is, however, a definite danger as well as a considerable handicap to himself. Mr. Wadsworth is an avowed arabophile and openly expressed his disapproval of Mr. Truman's recognition of the State of Israel. Since Mr. Truman's declaration Mr. Wadsworth has been ignored by most Iraqis and he describes himself as ostracised. On account of Arab feeling, the State Department decided to cancel the usual celebration of 4th July in Arab countries this year and Mr. Wadsworth tactfully went off to the Lebanon for a week.

Mr. Wadsworth enjoys being doyen of the Diplomatic Corps.

Representatives Accredited to the Iraqi Government but Resident Elsewhere

Belgium

Count Geoffrey d'Aspremont-Lynden, minister (June 1947).

The minister resides in Beirut and has not visited Bagdad since my arrival. M. Laurent Janssen, who now resides here permanently, continues as chargé d'affaires. He is effusively friendly.

China

*There is at present no minister accredited to the Iraqi Government, but Mr. Lee Ginfa, who has been chargé d'affaires since July 1946, continues to show himself perfectly capable of performing the duties required of him. He has an attractive wife, is a

member of the English Club, where he is frequently seen, and is deservedly known and liked. (Written in 1947.)

Czechoslovakia

M. Miroslav Kudrat, minister (11th December, 1946).

The minister resides in Tehran and there is no Czech representative in Bagdad.

Denmark

There is no Danish Minister accredited to the Iraqi Government at present. Count Schack replaced Dr. Fensmark as chargé d'affaires, residing in Tehran, in May 1947, but has not so far appeared in Bagdad. Carl Gustav von Sternann is chargé d'affaires.

Greece

M. Hajji Vassiliou, chargé d'affaires (27th November, 1947).

He is also chargé d'affaires in Beirut, where he resides. He has paid one short visit to Bagdad since my arrival. He is rather boisterous, and did not impress me altogether favourably.

Netherlands

M. W. A. A. M. Daniels, minister (15th December, 1947).

M. Daniels resides in Angora. He called at the embassy after presenting his credentials.

Poland

*In July 1946 M. Eugeniusz Jan Miltukiel announced that he had been accredited to the Iraqi Government as chargé d'affaires and would reside at Tehran. He does, in fact, reside at Tehran, but the Ministry for Foreign Affairs state that he has never presented his credentials and that there is no Pole accredited to the Iraqi Government. He called on me last year when he appeared friendly. He speaks moderate English. (Written in 1947.)

Sweden

M. Pousette having been recalled, M. Bengt Ohdner is acting as chargé d'affaires. He lives in Tehran and I have never met him.

Switzerland

M. Daniel Secretan, minister (1st May, 1946). M. Secretan resides in Cairo.

E 9086/27/93

No. 14

ELECTIONS FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 7th July)

(No. 198)

Bagdad,

Sir,

23rd June, 1948.

I have the honour to report that elections for the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies were completed on 15th June and that the twelfth Iraqi Parliament duly met on 21st June. His Royal Highness the Regent, who opened the session, wearing military uniform, announced the resignation of the Sadr Cabinet in the Speech from the Throne, and went on to say that the new Government would shortly be submitting their programme to Parliament.

2. It cannot be said that the new Chamber of Deputies is a gathering of marked character. It is true that of its 138 Deputies only fifty were members of the last Chamber; but this has not the significance of a similar shift in a Western election, for most of the tribal Deputies take turn and turn about in representing what are essentially the same interests, their inclusion or exclusion being determined by their personal affiliations to the politicians who happen to be in power when the elections are conducted. The avowed members of the political parties have gained eight seats between them—four Istiqlal, two National Democrats and two Liberals. Shi'a representation has fallen from sixty-two to fifty-two. The constitutional bloc, which formed the effective opposition to Saleh Jabr in the last Chamber, has maintained its numbers at

approximately the same level, whilst none of Saleh Jabr's Ministers has retained his seat. Perhaps the most significant change is the Istiqlal Party's return to the Parliamentary fold, for their influence in the Chamber is likely to be reinforced by a number of supporters who stood as independent candidates in the elections.

3. In theory the Sadr Government had every reason to attempt to carry through elections as free as the standard of political education of the Iraqi electorate permits. It dissolved the previous Chamber as unrepresentative and promised free elections. Its own rise to power and early popularity should have provided it with a convincing demonstration of the dangers of excluding politicians of the recognised parties from their legitimate means of expression. That it has repeated the electoral errors of the Government of Nuri Said is perhaps typical of Iraqi politics. But the immediate cause of this unhappy result was the disunity of the Cabinet who found themselves quite unable to agree on an election policy. In general they allowed the primary elections a considerable measure of freedom because at that stage they had not yet settled their own differences. When finally a compromise list of Government nominees had been produced and agreed with the Regent, it therefore became necessary to resort to intimidation and chicanery on a considerable scale in

order to make sure that the right people were elected. It is doubtful whether this would have been possible without the aid of martial law. Dissension continued within the Cabinet even after their grudging agreement on the Government list, and deep distrust of the Acting Minister of Interior led to the attempted resignation of four of his colleagues and threatened to break up the Government within a week of election day.

4. A few examples of the conduct of the elections may have a somewhat melancholy interest. In Basra the National Democratic Party, which had leaned far to the Left and accepted the support of the illegal Union of Port Workers as well as that of a number of Jews, scored a considerable success in the primary elections and were thought to have thereby made certain of three seats. The Mutasarrif opposed them strongly, and twice arrested their local president who was in each case promptly released by the President of the Courts. With the imposition of martial law the position of the Mutasarrif was strengthened and at the third attempt the party president and several of its leading members were sentenced by the military courts to varying terms of imprisonment. This was sufficient to warn the secondary electors that it would be unwise to continue to support the party, and with one exception the Government nominees were returned throughout the liwa. In Hillah the Mutasarrif showed a member of my staff a list of the successful candidates a fortnight before election day, and complained that the Government had travelled from free elections via "direction" to selection. He

was able to secure the return of the Government nominees by a policy of refusing the deposits of all others, though in one case he too was obliged to resort to the military courts. In Sulaimania town the primary elections were a straight fight between the illegal fellow-travelling Party of National Liberation and the supporters of feudal reaction in the person of Shaikh Latif al Shaikh Mahmud. The party scored a sweeping success in the primary election, but, nevertheless, the two Government candidates—who belonged to neither side—were duly returned after a minor police action which resulted in a number of arrests.

5. The broad result of these elections as of the last is that the old régime has obtained a new mandate. They have obtained it by methods much less adroit than those which earned Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr such bitter condemnation from the men of the parties, and it appears only too probable that this chamber in its turn will be swept away when a suitable opportunity arises for fomenting a popular agitation. The Regent will escape much of the blame which was attached to him after the last elections, for he was absent from Iraq during the closing stages, and it will be much more difficult to blame the British, whose influence is generally supposed to be exercised through the palace. Other than this there is little comfort to be derived from this essay in Oriental democracy.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

E 12641/27/93

No. 15

SITUATION IN IRAQ

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 28th September)

(No. 969)

Bagdad,

(Telegraphic)

28th September, 1948.

The following is my appreciation of the present internal security situation in Iraq:—

The establishment of the Jewish State by the United Nations and the return of a disappointed army from Palestine will

give an opportunity for dissident elements in Iraq, particularly in Bagdad, to work up a campaign against the Government if the Government are not strong enough to prevent it. The extreme Left who have recently staged demonstrations in Sulaimaniya and Kadhima are now demanding cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the army from Palestine. They are not

therefore likely to initiate any subversive action on this occasion though they would make what use they can of any disturbances that might occur. The extreme Right have been working up a campaign against Iraqi Jews and aim at gaining power through penetration of their political ideas into the army at a time when the army will be suffering from a sense of grievance and failure. There is as yet no evidence that they have much influence above some junior officers or that their ideas have penetrated far even amongst them, and the Regent professes to be satisfied with the army's morale and loyalty though he asserts that they are resentful against the British for not providing arms. The Prime Minister is somewhat more doubtful about effective withdrawal from Palestine and King Abdullah has warned the Regent after a visit to the Iraqi forces in Palestine that he must be very careful in his handling of the army. I have had independent reports that inactivity and bad administration in Palestine have produced discontent amongst the Iraqi troops and a senior officer has described them as "ripe for political agitation." It is obviously important that there should be no large concentration of troops in Bagdad on the army's return, and if a suitable opportunity occurs I shall [group undecipherable ? recommend] this to the Prime Minister. However, transport difficulties are such that it will probably be impossible to move back large numbers at one time.

2. The police, who are traditionally opposed to the army from internal jealousy, are likely to be loyal to the Government and to be a reliable force for the maintenance of security provided the Govern-

ment support them. The Director-General who probably exaggerates the danger of the situation for his own purposes professes to believe that there will be a combination of the returning army and extreme Right against the Government and Hashimite House. He has asked the Prime Minister for the arrest of the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, but the Government has as yet taken no action against them.

3. The Government is suffering from internal dissensions largely centred on Sadiq Bassam, Minister of Defence, who is in sympathy with the extreme Right. The Prime Minister still talks of removing him from the Ministry of Defence. The sooner he acts the better. If he can strengthen the Cabinet and centralise administration of martial law in Bagdad as he wishes, he should be able to keep control of the situation. The continuation of [group undecipherable ? martial law] for the present is necessary, though moderate opinion is genuinely perturbed at its administration. It is being used irresponsibly and oppressively against the Jews and even some Moslems, the result being temporary paralysis of trade.

4. Police profess to be satisfied that no trouble is to be expected in Kurdistan on the ground that the most influential Kurdish leaders are on the side of the Government. Probably no serious trouble will start there; but Kurdistan is likely to become unstable. We are not expecting to be affected should conditions in Bagdad trouble from Arab tribal areas.

5. I am telegraphing separately on arms question.

E 12768/27/G

No. 16

CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. BEVIN AND SAYID NAJIB AR RAWI

(1) Portsmouth Treaty; (2) Palestine.

Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Mack (Bagdad)

(No. 245)
Sir,

*Foreign Office,
29th September, 1948.*

The head of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Sayid Najib ar Rawi, came to see me in Paris this morning in order to discuss certain points which the Iraqi Prime Minister had

instructed him to raise with me. Before beginning, Sayid Najib conveyed to me a personal message of greetings and goodwill from the Prime Minister, stating that the latter much regretted that owing to pressure of work in Bagdad he was unable to attend the Assembly.

2. His Excellency then went on to say that the Prime Minister wished to make it clear that the Iraqi Government and people were most anxious to maintain and strengthen the traditional close ties of friendship between Iraq and Britain, and that they sincerely desired a treaty with Britain based on mutual friendship and respect. The situation which had arisen in Iraq as a result of the abortive Portsmouth Treaty negotiations was not due to any feeling against Britain, but to public dissatisfaction with the way in which a certain group of Iraqi politicians had handled the matter. There were no parties in Iraq, only personalities with their cliques, and the clique responsible for dealing with the proposed Treaty had deliberately concealed its terms not only from the public but from their own colleagues in the Cabinet as well. At the outset the Regent had called a meeting of former Prime Ministers and Cabinet Ministers, together with the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, at which the Treaty was discussed. The Prime Minister, when asked what the terms of the Treaty were, feigned ignorance although all the time he had the terms "in his pocket." As a result suspicion had been created among his colleagues and particularly among the people, and this opposition was intensified by the latent feeling in Iraq against those political cliques which have ruled the country for the last twenty-five years. Sayid Najab insisted that Iraq sincerely desired the friendship of Britain, and that the events which followed the repudiation of the Treaty were not inspired by feelings against her friend and ally Britain.

3. I asked what was wrong with the Treaty that made it unpalatable to Iraqis. His Excellency, who said that he had studied it, stated that the military clauses were too vague, particularly those regarding the use of Iraqi armed forces outside the frontiers of Iraq in time of war. Public opinion was very sensitive on this point, and would not accept the wording as it stood at present. Would it not be possible to amend the text so that it was made quite clear that Iraqi forces would only be used outside Iraq for the defence of Iraq? Such an alteration would not prejudice the essential purpose of the Treaty. I replied that there had never been any intention, either now or at any other time, of Iraq's anybody else's forces being used for aggression, and that the whole scheme for the Middle East was based on the defence of that area. The point his Excellency had

raised was a military one, which could best be settled by consultation between the military experts of both countries. I said that I would gladly ask our experts in the Middle East to consult with the Iraqis, and Sayid Najib undertook to inform the Prime Minister accordingly. In view of this development I should be grateful if you would sound the Prime Minister as to whether the Iraqi Government is, in fact, willing to begin a study of the military clauses on the lines of the above.

4. Speaking of the rôle of the Iraqi forces in the Middle East defence scheme, I went on to say that circumstances might very well arise when Iraqi forces would be called upon to fight against an aggressor in the territories of limitrophe countries, for it was clearly unrealistic for the Iraqis to sit tight in Iraq and wait until they were attacked on their own frontiers. The defence of the Middle East should in my opinion be based on the dovetailing of the defence schemes of the individual countries. Moreover, under the Portsmouth Treaty provision had been made for Iraqi pilots to be trained by the British outside Iraq, i.e., in North Africa and elsewhere; this was essential because of the widely varying conditions of modern warfare. I concluded by telling his Excellency that I was quite happy to agree to any minor amendment or alteration in the text of the military clauses of the Treaty which the Iraqis might feel it necessary to make in order to appease public opinion, but I could not, of course, commit myself in advance. It was up to the military experts to work it out. The Treaty itself was like an umbrella; the important thing was what was underneath it. If the Iraqis wished to add a few touches of colour to the umbrella to make it look more attractive, then they were welcome to do so. Sayid Najib undertook to inform the Prime Minister of our discussion.

5. The next point he brought up was, inevitably, Palestine. The Arab countries were, he said, deeply concerned with this vexed problem, and, until my speech before the Assembly supporting the Bernadotte Plan, had always retained some hope that Britain would help them. Had not His Majesty's Government declared that they could not agree to a solution which was not accepted by both Arabs and Jews? Now, Britain had come out definitely on the side of partition and the Arabs were all but lost. They were at the cross-roads, and needed desperately some sign of help and reassurance. As for the Americans, they

therefore likely to initiate any subversive action on this occasion though they would make what use they can of any disturbances that might occur. The extreme Right have been working up a campaign against Iraqi Jews and aim at gaining power through penetration of their political ideas into the army at a time when the army will be suffering from a sense of grievance and failure. There is as yet no evidence that they have much influence above some junior officers or that their ideas have penetrated far even amongst them, and the Regent professes to be satisfied with the army's morale and loyalty though he asserts that they are resentful against the British for not providing arms. The Prime Minister is somewhat more doubtful about effective withdrawal from Palestine and King Abdullah has warned the Regent after a visit to the Iraqi forces in Palestine that he must be very careful in his handling of the army. I have had independent reports that inactivity and bad administration in Palestine have produced discontent amongst the Iraqi troops and a senior officer has described them as "ripe for political agitation." It is obviously important that there should be no large concentration of troops in Bagdad on the army's return, and if a suitable opportunity occurs I shall [group undecipherable ? recommend] this to the Prime Minister. However, transport difficulties are such that it will probably be impossible to move back large numbers at one time.

2. The police, who are traditionally opposed to the army from internal jealousy, are likely to be loyal to the Government and to be a reliable force for the maintenance of security provided the Govern-

ment support them. The Director-General who probably exaggerates the danger of the situation for his own purposes professes to believe that there will be a combination of the returning army and extreme Right against the Government and Hashimite House. He has asked the Prime Minister for the arrest of the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, but the Government has as yet taken no action against them.

3. The Government is suffering from internal dissensions largely centred on Sadiq Bassam, Minister of Defence, who is in sympathy with the extreme Right. The Prime Minister still talks of removing him from the Ministry of Defence. The sooner he acts the better. If he can strengthen the Cabinet and centralise administration of martial law in Bagdad as he wishes, he should be able to keep control of the situation. The continuation of [group undecipherable ? martial law for the present is necessary, though moderate opinion is genuinely perturbed at its administration. It is being used irresponsibly and oppressively against the Jew and even some Moslems, the result being temporary paralysis of trade.

4. Police profess to be satisfied that no trouble is to be expected in Kurdistan on the ground that the most influential Kurdish leaders are on the side of the Government. Probably no serious trouble will start there; but Kurdistan is likely to become unstable. We are not expecting to be affected should conditions in Bagdad trouble from Arab tribal areas.

5. I am telegraphing separately on arm question.

E 12768/27/G

No. 16

CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. BEVIN AND SAYID NAJIB AR RAWI

(1) Portsmouth Treaty; (2) Palestine,

Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Mack (Bagdad)

(No. 245)

Foreign Office.

Sir,

29th September, 1948.

The head of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Sayid Najib ar Rawi, came to see me in Paris this morning in order to discuss certain points which the Iraqi Prime Minister had

instructed him to raise with me. Before beginning, Sayid Najib conveyed to me a personal message of greetings and goodwill from the Prime Minister, stating that the latter much regretted that owing to pressure of work in Bagdad he was unable to attend the Assembly.

2. His Excellency then went on to say that the Prime Minister wished to make it clear that the Iraqi Government and people were most anxious to maintain and strengthen the traditional close ties of friendship between Iraq and Britain, and that they sincerely desired a treaty with Britain based on mutual friendship and respect. The situation which had arisen in Iraq as a result of the abortive Portsmouth Treaty negotiations was not due to any feeling against Britain, but to public dissatisfaction with the way in which a certain group of Iraqi politicians had handled the matter. There were no parties in Iraq, only personalities with their cliques, and the clique responsible for dealing with the proposed Treaty had deliberately concealed its terms not only from the public but from their own colleagues in the Cabinet as well. At the outset the Regent had called a meeting of former Prime Ministers and Cabinet Ministers, together with the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, at which the Treaty was discussed. The Prime Minister, when asked what the terms of the Treaty were, feigned ignorance although all the time he had the terms "in his pocket." As a result suspicion had been created among his colleagues and particularly among the people, and this opposition was intensified by the latent feeling in Iraq against those political cliques which have ruled the country for the last twenty-five years. Sayid Najib insisted that Iraq sincerely desired the friendship of Britain, and that the events which followed the repudiation of the Treaty were not inspired by feelings against her friend and ally Britain.

3. I asked what was wrong with the Treaty that made it unpalatable to Iraqis. His Excellency, who said that he had studied it, stated that the military clauses were too vague, particularly those regarding the use of Iraqi armed forces outside the frontiers of Iraq in time of war. Public opinion was very sensitive on this point, and would not accept the wording as it stood at present. Would it not be possible to amend the text so that it was made quite clear that Iraqi forces would only be used outside Iraq for the defence of Iraq? Such an alteration would not prejudice the essential purpose of the Treaty. I replied that there had never been any intention, either now or at any other time, of Iraq's or anybody else's forces being used for aggression, and that the whole scheme for the Middle East was based on the defence of that area. The point his Excellency had

raised was a military one, which could best be settled by consultation between the military experts of both countries. I said that I would gladly ask our experts in the Middle East to consult with the Iraqis, and Sayid Najib undertook to inform the Prime Minister accordingly. In view of this development I should be grateful if you would sound the Prime Minister as to whether the Iraqi Government is, in fact, willing to begin a study of the military clauses on the lines of the above.

4. Speaking of the rôle of the Iraqi forces in the Middle East defence scheme, I went on to say that circumstances might very well arise when Iraqi forces would be called upon to fight against an aggressor in the territories of limitrophe countries, for it was clearly unrealistic for the Iraqis to sit tight in Iraq and wait until they were attacked on their own frontiers. The defence of the Middle East should in my opinion be based on the dovetailing of the defence schemes of the individual countries. Moreover, under the Portsmouth Treaty provision had been made for Iraqi pilots to be trained by the British outside Iraq, i.e., in North Africa and elsewhere; this was essential because of the widely varying conditions of modern warfare. I concluded by telling his Excellency that I was quite happy to agree to any minor amendment or alteration in the text of the military clauses of the Treaty which the Iraqis might feel it necessary to make in order to appease public opinion, but I could not, of course, commit myself in advance. It was up to the military experts to work it out. The Treaty itself was like an umbrella; the important thing was what was underneath it. If the Iraqis wished to add a few touches of colour to the umbrella to make it look more attractive, then they were welcome to do so. Sayid Najib undertook to inform the Prime Minister of our discussion.

5. The next point he brought up was, inevitably, Palestine. The Arab countries were, he said, deeply concerned with this vexed problem, and, until my speech before the Assembly supporting the Bernadotte Plan, had always retained some hope that Britain would help them. Had not His Majesty's Government declared that they could not agree to a solution which was not accepted by both Arabs and Jews? Now, Britain had come out definitely on the side of partition and the Arabs were all but lost. They were at the cross-roads, and needed desperately some sign of help and reassurance. As for the Americans, they

had turned the rest of the world against the Arabs and had helped the Jews to power. The Arabs were most anxious to delay discussion of the Bernadotte Plan in the Assembly, and we could help them by not pressing for a quick decision. They fully appreciated our difficult position over the Palestine question, but just a small sign of help from us would be sufficient to change their feelings towards us and create an atmosphere in which our mutual problems could be solved. Sayid Najib went on to stress the importance of public opinion in the Arab countries and the decisive part it played in major issues.

6. I replied that we could not hold up a decision on Palestine. The Bernadotte Plan was the best solution for the Arabs in view of the circumstances. What had happened? Fighting had broken out in Palestine and His Majesty's Government had done much to bring about the truce. I said that I wished to speak frankly; it seemed to me that the truce had saved the Arabs from defeat. Sayid Najib interrupted to say that the Arabs had not lost any battles (here I remarked that there had been no major battles) and that what areas they had lost had been due to bad leadership. As regards the Americans, I said that it was unfair to pretend that America was wholeheartedly behind the Jews; Mr. Marshall was being violently attacked by

the Jews for his support of the Bernadotte Plan and the Arabs should realise that he was a good friend of theirs. We ourselves had done our best under extremely difficult circumstances; we had little thanks for what we had tried to do in the past, and we had not received very friendly treatment from our Arab friends over the last two years or so; perhaps this was so because friends quarrel more easily than strangers.

7. Before leaving, his Excellency referred briefly to two other matters. He said that he had been instructed by the Prime Minister to enquire what progress had been made over the request of the Iraq Government for financial assistance. He said that he understood that the matter had been referred to the Treasury, and I promised to ascertain what the position was. He also raised the question of arms, which Iraq urgently needed, not for fighting in Palestine, but for internal security and for defence against "the enemy when he comes through Persia." I told him that the sooner the Palestine problem was settled the sooner would we be able to lift the embargo on arms.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jeddah, Beirut, Amman and B.M.E.O.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

No. 17

E 13330/2357/93

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ, 1948

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th October)

(No. 296)

Bagdad,

4th October, 1948.

Sir,
With reference to Mr. Busk's No. 301 of 22nd August, 1947, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the leading personalities of Iraq as on 1st August, 1948.

2. Last year's report has been brought up to date and the names of three newcomers to Cabinet rank have been added.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in Iraq, 1948

Royal Family

1. King Faisal II

Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Ilah.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum (Arbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a bright, intelligent child, though somewhat delicate with a tendency to asthma. His Majesty visited Egypt in April 1943, proceeding and returning via Palestine and Transjordan. In 1944 he again spent the summer at Alexandria. In 1945 he did not leave the country.

In June 1946 the King paid his first visit to England. He was present at the Victory celebrations on 8th June and afterwards was the guest of The King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He was accompanied by the Queen-Mother and the Princesses. Early in 1946 an English tutor was appointed to succeed the governess who had previously been in charge of his studies. The Regent decided that, on his return from England, the King should start to learn Kurdish.

In 1947 it was decided that His Majesty should continue his education in England, and he has now completed a year at Sandroyd preparatory school where his health has improved and he has shown promise.

2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir

Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria.

He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and grand-daughter of Amin Yahiya Pasha of Cairo.

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He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding Iraq army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfal, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past five years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public and is painfully shy. Like all weak men he suffers from too much advice and is apt to believe the last person he has spoken to.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943. He caused a Cabinet crisis in September 1943 by injudicious interference in the choice of Government candidates for the General Election. He has, however, shown sound sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general condition of the country. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom in December 1943. For three days he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted with the hospitality shown to him and much impressed by Britain's war effort.

During 1944 the Regent toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the

army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July. In September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In the spring of 1945 he was much discouraged by Mr. Churchill's failure to invite him to join King Ibn Saud and others for talks in Cairo. This led to a threat of abdication.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic before returning to Iraq in September. While in the United States he displayed irresponsible extravagance, spending over \$200,000 on jewellery. He has also invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Bagdad. All this is generally known and has markedly decreased his prestige, and may give rise to serious political complications.

The Regent was created G.C.M.G. in 1942 and G.C.V.O., with the award of the Royal Victorian Chain, in 1943.

The Regent visited London in the summer of both 1946 and 1947. In 1946 he attended the victory celebrations on 8th June, and in 1947 he paid official visits to France and Belgium as well as to London. He and Nuri Pasha held informal discussions with the Foreign Office in September 1947 about the Iraqi Government's desire to replace the 1930 Treaty. He was, therefore, to some extent committed personally to the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and was placed in a very difficult position by the popular demonstrations against it in Bagdad in January 1948. He did not extricate himself from this position with unimpaired credit.

He has since made use of the prolonged Palestinian crisis to restore his prestige which now stands as high as it has ever done as a result of his diplomatic moves towards Arab unity and his untiring solicitude for the Iraqi army in Palestine. It must be admitted however that his prestige still stands on very insecure foundations.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army. Made a G.B.E. for his services in the war of 1914-18.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Bag Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy

in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man. A shrewd and somewhat cynical observer. He likes his easy private life in Istanbul and is reluctant to assume official responsibilities. He speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1938 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. She is agreeable and flamboyant with artistic pretensions. She is never seen in Iraq. This *misalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and remained for some time living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942. Accompanied by his wife, he came to Bagdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdul Ilah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

He returned to Iraq in 1945 to act as Regent during the Amir Abdullah's absence in America and Europe.

In 1946 he acted in a similar capacity. When, in 1946, agreement was reached that the Iraqi Mission in London should be raised to the status of an embassy, he was nominated as the first Iraqi Ambassador.

4. Hussein Nasir

Cousin of the King and Regent with the style of "Highness."

For a time held an appointment at the Palace. In 1945 married a daughter of the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. In 1946 appointed Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem. A good-humoured, genial person without pronounced personality.

It is now rumoured that he will be seconded to Transjordan to take a position in the household of King Abdullah.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha

Chieftain of the Pishder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. Abbas Mahdi

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfal's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet

in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfal in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality. Returned to Iraq in June 1945 and appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow.

Proceeded in November 1945 full of gloom. After a holiday in Stockholm, returned to Bagdad in October 1946 ostensibly on leave. He has since returned to his post.

3. Abdul Amir al Uzri

Shia, born Kadhuma in 1899. Educated Bagdad and United States, where he graduated from Michigan University as D.Sc. (S.E.). He returned to Iraq in 1920 and was appointed engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, in which he rose to the post of Assistant Director-General in 1941. He acted as Director-General on several occasions.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pashachi's Cabinet in June 1944. Was Minister of Supply in August 1944, returning at the end of the month to his former Ministry. Resigned with Cabinet in February 1946. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation in May 1946. Speaks English well and is pleasant, intelligent and friendly.

4. Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Kasabah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Kasabah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Sawaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements. As director of Iraqi Manufacturing and Trading Company was interested in the erection of a wax match factory in 1944.

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5. Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade 1, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfal in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Tawfiq-al-Sawaidi.

Deputy for Bagdad March 1947. Member of the Council of Regency summer 1947.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies December 1947, he was re-elected President of the new Chamber after the elections of June 1948.

He took some part in the political organisation of the disturbances of January 1948 and tendered his resignation from the Chamber, together with a number of other Deputies as a protest against police action in firing on the demonstrators.

6. Abdul Fettah bin Ibrahim

Born Bagdad 1906. Educated in Basra and Bagdad he was appointed as a teacher in 1924. He was sent to the American University, Beirut, whence he graduated B.A. in 1932. On returning to Iraq he was given an appointment as translator in the Port Directorate and in 1933 was transferred in the same capacity to the Ministry of Justice. In 1934 he returned to Education as a teacher and served in Bagdad and Nasiriyah. In 1939, on account of his Leftist political views, he was transferred to Anah but succeeded in getting re-transferred to Bagdad in 1940. He taught in various schools in Bagdad until 1943, when he was appointed "Specialist Inspector" in which capacity he was undoubtedly an evil influence. In an endeavour to reduce the growth of communism in the capital he was transferred as Director of Education, Basra Liwa, in 1945. He refused to take up the appointment and resigned on 11th June, 1945. After quitting Government service he became director of the Habibah Printing and Publishing Company, which prints and publishes most of the Leftist literature. He still holds this post.

Undoubtedly he was infected by communism while in Beirut. After his return, he was reported as openly teaching communism to his students. All efforts to curb him failed, as will be seen by his frequent transfers. During the war he worked hard against "the Nazis" but at the same time worked equally hard with the "underground" campaign against the Government and made preparatory propaganda against the British. He was the founder of Hizb el Ittihad el Watani (Party of National Unity) and the chief instigator of Hizb el Sha'abi e-Watani (Popular National Party).

He is sympathetic to communism but his name was not connected in any way with those tried during 1947 for underground Communist activity.

7. Abdul Hadi Chalabi

Shi'ah. Born in Bagdad in 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner who was several times Minister of Education.

Chalabi was first elected a Deputy for Bagdad in 1934. In March 1935 he was arrested in connexion with the Kadhimain riots and deprived of his political rights until the amnesty of November of that year. He became a Deputy again in 1938. He attended the Atlantic City Economic Conference in August 1945. He is one of the most important corn brokers in the country and has large dealings with Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co., consequently better known in business than in political circles; this is his first Cabinet post. In the past he has supported Nuri al Said and Jamil Madafai. Speaks only Arabic and Persian. He has a wife who appears in public.

Minister of Communications and Works in the al Umuri Cabinet of June 1946.

Senator 2nd July, 1947.

He increased his already considerable fortune during the summer of 1947 by the export of large quantities of barley at the inflated prices then obtaining in Italy and Greece. He was able to obtain more than his share of export licences owing to his friendship with Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. For this he was bitterly attacked in press and party circles and indeed it can be fairly said that his personal greed for profit was a contributory factor to the bread grain crisis of the winter of 1947-48.

8. Dr. Abdul Hadi al Pachachi

Born in 1894, the son of a former Rais Belediya of Bagdad. He was educated in Bagdad and Istanbul and qualified as a doctor in France. He entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital and has recently been a lecturer at the Medical College. Together with two Bagdadi Jews he is responsible for the direction of the Sa'adun Clinic and Hospital. Fat and smiling he does not appear a forceful personality and until now has played no part in politics; he is, however, a cousin of Hamdi and Muzehim al Pachachi. Is married to a very charming White Russian wife who is well known in British society in Bagdad. He speaks fluent French and a little English.

Became Minister of Social Affairs in the al Umuri Cabinet of June 1946. Resigned with the Cabinet in November 1948.

Appointed Mayor of Bagdad by the Sadr Cabinet in April 1948.

9. Abdul Hadi Dhahir

Shia. About 60. Former Deputy for Hilla, dabbles in law and has had considerable administrative experience. Appointed Director of Tribal Affairs, February 1943, and Mutasarrif of Hilla later in the same month. Appointed Judicial Adviser, Ministry of Finance, August 1944. Too rich to have to work, his intellectual vitality is such as to prevent his sitting in idleness, hence his legal activities. His governmental work may be partly ascribed to the same cause. More of a student than man of action, but not afraid to assume responsibility and take decisions. Like Sa'ad Saleh, a bitter opponent of Saleh Jabr. In view of his wealth, unlikely to be corruptible. Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suweidi's 1946 Cabinet.

10. Abdul Ilah Hafidh

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhl, who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1936 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Bagdad. Again elected Deputy in 1938. In 1935 he was

appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1938-39; Consul-General, Bombay, 1939-40; Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fat, genial personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis. Speaks fluent French and fair English.

Appointed Minister of Education in June 1943 and was well spoken of by his British advisers. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Joined Arshad al Umuri's Cabinet in September 1946 as Minister of Supply, acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs during Dr. Jamali's absence in London.

Deputy for Mosul in 1947 elections.

Minister of Supply in Saleh Jabr's 1947 Cabinet and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Dr. Jamali's absence.

Resigned with the Cabinet in January 1948.

11. Abdul Jabbar al Chalabi

Born Bagdad about 1906. Graduate in Agriculture, University of California and in Education, Columbia Teachers' College. Formerly Director of Elementary Education, February 1943. Promoted Chief Inspector of Education, February 1946. Has had the difficult task of reorganising the Iraqi educational system. Member of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco Conference, and of the delegation to the United Nations Educational Conference in London, has also represented Iraq at the cultural conferences of the Arab League. Quiet, sober, of a studious turn of mind, his brain is one of the best in Iraq at the moment. Backed by sound administrative experience he is not afraid to take decisions or responsibility. As a result of his fairly extensive travels is a sincere Nationalist and convinced Shi'a, but is yet the reverse of narrow-minded. Convinced of the need of British aid for Iraq and has many British friends. Dislikes Saleh Jabr and Fadhl al Jamali. His name has never been linked with any suggestion of corruption. His English is perfect.

As Minister of Supply in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946 he was an outstanding success. In September 1946 was appointed Director-General of Communications and Works.

12. Abdul Latif Nuri

Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *aqid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *saim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir faa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Bagdad on his pension.

13. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)

Shi'ah of Shufia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqtah). Deputy for Kerbala

in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (*Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani*).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942. Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Taha Ali, the Minister of Education. He was politically active and verbose in the summer of 1945, protesting against French policy in the Levant and in favour of treaty revision.

A violent Shia and Nationalist and a staunch supporter of Saleh Jabr. He remained loyal to the latter when many of his friends deserted him during the agitation against the Portsmouth Treaty. During the Palestine crisis of the summer of 1948 he was a focus of intransigence in the Senate.

14. Abdul Majid Alawi, C.B.E.

Born 1898 of a large Shia family of Bagdad. Graduated in law at Bagdad and for some time practised as a lawyer. Elected a Deputy in 1928 but was not returned in 1930. Is a founder member of the Iraqi Bar Association. In 1932 was appointed Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs but was sent at once as vice-consul to Khorramshahr. Transferred to Tehran 1933 and to Tabriz in 1934, where he remained for four years and where he co-operated closely with His Majesty's Consul. Became Director of Oriental Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1938 and Acting Director-General and Director of Political Affairs in 1941. He was much upset when Dr. Fadhl Jamali was made Director-General in 1944, leaving him merely as Director of the Political Department of the Ministry. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi as Minister of Social Affairs. He talks English well, if rather pedantically, and has always been consistently pro-British. He has recently married a second wife who appears in public, which is surprising for a Shia. Created C.B.E., for war services, 1946.

After February 1946 he held no post in the public service until his appointment as Mutasarrif of Kerbala in the spring of 1948.

15. Abdul Qadir al-Gilani

Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Bagdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with his cousin Rashid

Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraqi internees for trial in April 1944. Tried in August 1944, he was found guilty of having, in May 1941, insulted the Queen Mother on the telephone. Although he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, the Regent intervened and he was detained in the Police School, Bagdad, and later transferred to Amara. Released in October 1944. Has been described as arrogant and selfish, he certainly gives the impression of being a *faux bon-homme*.

During 1946 and 1947 he and his wife made determined and unsuccessful efforts to re-enter Bagdad social life. He was reappointed to the Iraqi Foreign Service in June 1948 and sent to Karachi to establish Iraqi representation there.

16. Abdul Qadir al-Rashid

Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1939. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933 and is now well received in British business circles.

His Turkish wife is one of the most accomplished women in Bagdad and one of the chief hostesses of the capital.

He was awarded the King's Medal for service in the cause of freedom in 1946.

17. Abdul Razzaq Hussein

Born in Bagdad 1893. Sunni Moslem of a poor family. Educated in Bagdad and received his military training in Istanbul. Appointed as officer in Machine Gun Corps of Turkish army in 1912. Was captured by the British in 1915(?) and imprisoned in Cairo Citadel, where he learned to speak English and, as he says, to appreciate the English. Took no part in Arab revolt. Joined Iraq army on the 15th February, 1924.

Is very pro-British. On the 17th May, 1943, he, along with eleven other Iraqi officers, went on a tour of the battle areas of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East. As a brigadier he was Director-General of Defence Affairs, and in November 1944 he was promoted Amir Liwa, which rank he now holds as Officer Commanding 3rd Division of the reorganised Iraq army.

Led the Iraqi contingent in the London Victory Parade in June 1946. Is jovial and fond of gay parties.

18. Abdul Razzaq al Uzri

Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A Bagdad lawyer. Deputy 1931-32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutasarrif of Kerbala and Diyala. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found.

Lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in December 1943. Appointed Mutasarrif of Hilla in August 1944 as a result of Saleh Jabr's intrigues. Mutasarrif of Bagdad March 1945.

Director-General of Tapu, October 1946.

Transferred from Director-General, Tapu, to Mutasarrif, Bagdad, in March 1948.

19. Abdul Wahab Mahmud

Sunni. Born Basra 1909. Brother of the late Muhammad Zaki Mahmud, a former Minister of Justice, who was at one time President of the Chamber of Deputies. Brother-in-law of Ismail Namiq. Educated Basra and Baghdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. Reported during the thirties to hold decided Communist views and to have distributed Communist propaganda; his house was raided in 1934, but it was believed that his brother's influential position saved him from arrest. Engaged in anti-Madfa'i Government propaganda in 1938; toured the Diwaniya tribes in an attempt to unite them against the Government. Arrested December 1938 on the orders of Jamil Madfa'i and despatched to *residence forcée* in North Iraq. Released shortly afterwards when Nuri became Prime Minister. Deputy since 1939 and rapporteur of the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies during 1943. Minister of Finance in the 1945 Sawa'idi Cabinet.

20. Abdul ul Wahhab Murjan

Born about 1910 of a Shi'a land-owning family of Hillah. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he was appointed a judge at Suwayra about 1935 and resigned after a short period because his judgments were very frequently upset by the appeal courts.

He was a leader of the National Democratic Party in Hillah in 1946 and 1947 but left the party owing to his exclusion from the Higher Committee and to his being taken up by Salah Jaber who secured his election to Parliament in the elections of March 1947. Salah Jaber is said to have considered appointing him to the Cabinet but to have rejected the idea on the grounds of his youth.

He was again elected Deputy for Hillah in the 1948 elections and was appointed Minister of Economics in the Pachaqli Government of June 1948. He speaks no English.

21. Abdul Wahid, Shaikh

Chief of the Fahlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikh on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivated extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his followers.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwanisah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samarra.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwanisah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the autumn of 1942. He was released in 1944 and lived in *residence forcée* in Mosul till April 1945, when he was allowed to reside in Samarra. The compulsory economy of his exile leaves him the richest tribal leader in the Euphrates. His influence is still probably greater than that of any other chief of the Fahlah tribe.

22. Abdullah-al-Damloji

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hama in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Baghdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1920, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fudal Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damloji came to Baghdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Baghdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damloji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jeddah in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damloji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1943.

From then until 1947 he left politics and devoted himself to business. In the autumn of 1947 he was appointed a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations Organization meeting which made the decision to partition Palestine. Elected Deputy for Mosul and was widely talked of as a possible Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of Muzahim Pachaqli formed in June 1948. In the event Muzahim took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs himself. Speaks good English.

23. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Shaikh, Abbas Amin-al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qassab, q.c. Educated in Baghdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Katmakam of Samarra in 1930 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kerbala in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwanisah a month later. Did well as a Mutessarif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1943. Quiet and efficient with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in March 1944.

A strong and capable administrator. He initiated and worked hard at the Conferences (Der ez Zor, June 1944, Baghdad, May 1945) to settle Shanawar-Ageidas disputes.

In June 1946 joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, but resigned in August owing to a difference with the Premier. He has since been appointed Director-General of the Date Monopoly. Awarded King's Medal for service in the cause of freedom 1946.

24. Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan

A chieftain of the Kurdish Barzan tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chini-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Baroshi and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Baroshi and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Anadiyeh. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Agra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled and he was permitted to continue in unobscured control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalid Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Baghdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. After the escape of Mulla Mustafa from Sulaimani in the

autumn of 1943 Sheikh Ahmad was removed to Hillah and remained there until a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944. Thereafter he was permitted to return to Barzan. He is now heavily overshadowed by Mulla Mustafa in local tribal affairs. His own home-made religion, which is tolerant to Christianity and which brought him into conflict before with Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, led him to arrange for the liquidation of various Mullas in 1944-45. There is evidence that he is mentally unbalanced and his "dervish" influence is so strong that Mulla Mustafa dare not directly oppose him and resorts to flattery and cunning to get his way. Throughout 1945 he was opposed to the moderate course pursued by Mulla Mustafa and expressed his disapproval by announcing his intention of retiring into the background; but his feud with the Reikan tribes has never died and in July 1945 he came forward again and ordered his tribe to overthrow the local Government. Disorder has spread and the Barzanis, with Mulla Mustafa, are committed to wholesale resistance to the Government's intention to crush them, for the fourth time in 25 years.

Despite warnings, disorders started and a campaign was necessary to crush the Barzanis. Aided by lavish bribery, which the Minister of the Interior administered, the Iraqi army operations were brother fled to Persia. At first they were well eventually successful. Shaikh Ahmad and his received and courted by the Russians, but in September 1946 it was reported that Ahmad was seeking to return to Iraq as a suppliant.

He returned to Iraq in February 1947 and surrendered with a number of followers, including the Kurdish officers Ezzat Aziz and Mustafa Khoshnav. He is now in prison at Basra under sentence of death.

25. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabinet was re-formed in December 1943, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice. He kept the same Ministry in Hamdi Pachaqli's Cabinet of June 1944. Has held acting portfolios of Finance and Foreign Affairs in the absence of the respective Ministers. Not a brilliant man, he steers clear of political intrigue.

Minister of Social Affairs February 1946; resigned April 1946. In the autumn of 1946 he was appointed head of the Royal Diwan.

26. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896. Sunni of Baghdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Madfa'i and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

In 1943 Amir Abdullah of Transjordan created him a Pasha. Appointed Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in June 1941. The unprecedented number

of farewell parties to Ahmad Pasha reflected the popular esteem in which he is held. A good sportsman, with a keen sense of humour, he is intelligent and though not sufficiently forceful to administer with successful results, he may have found his *métier* in this new appointment.

In August 1940 he was also appointed as first minister to the King of Transjordan, but returned to Baghdad during September to take up the post of Director-General of Foreign Affairs. He has twice been asked, by Hamdi Pachachi at the end of 1943 and by Arshad al Umari in September 1945, to join the Cabinet, but prefers not to do so until he can join one which has some chance of durability. Is a brother of Najib al Rawl (q.v.). Crowned K.B.E., for war services, 1946.

He represented Iraq at many of the meetings of the Arab League Political Committee occasioned by the Palestine crisis of the summer of 1948.

27. Ahmad-i-Tanfiq

A Kurdish notable of Sulaimani, born 1899, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Sulaimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Sulaimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but these chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1943) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizher tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935. Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

28. Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat

Shihab Baghdadi. Born 1890. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places. Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937. Was instrumental in placing important telephone contract with British firm against keen foreign competition.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda in August 1944, in which position he co-operated well with the British.

Appointed Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem, May 1945. Appointed consul at Jeddah 1946, but resigned the service rather than proceed and took up practice as a lawyer. A feeble individual. Speaks quite good English.

Deputy March 1947. Has an interest in the company which has the Rootes agency in Iraq.

29. Akram Mushtaq

Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (q.v.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commissioned and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud in spring of 1940. Member of Iraqi delegation

to International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in November 1944, and to meetings of the Communications Committee of the Arab League in summer, 1946.

Has a thorough knowledge of the intricacies of civil aviation and is an intelligent and likeable person. Speaks excellent English.

30. Ali Haidar Sulaiman

Ali Haidar Sulaiman was born at Rowanduz in 1905 of a well-known Kurdish family, he was educated at Mosul and the American University, Beirut. He represented his university at the 1929 meeting of the International Students' Union in Geneva. On his return to Bagdad he was appointed a lecturer in the Higher Teachers' Training College where he taught modern history. In 1933 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior where he remained until 1937 when he was transferred to the Iraqi Foreign Service. He served as a secretary in the Iraqi Legations at Rome and Cairo between 1937 and 1939.

He does not appear to have taken an active part in the Rashid Ali movement, but as a brother-in-law of Yunis Sab'awi he was duly interned. His political sympathies appear to be rather left than right and he is friendly with Abdul Fattah Ibrahim (q.v.) and Nadhim Zahawi.

After his release from internment he was in business partnership with Ali Kemal in the New Bagdad Project.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Muzahim Pachachi Government in August 1948.

31. Ali Jaudat

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sheriff. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by under-estimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1935.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941. Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

Has interested himself in conducting propaganda in the United States to make better known the Arab side of the Palestine question.

He returned to Iraq in the spring of 1948 after a serious illness and he will not return to his post.

He speaks some English.

32. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali

Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1939, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1939. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutessarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Kuwait. After holding this appointment for about a year he was transferred to Bagdad to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutessarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fled to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

33. Ali Muntaq

Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1923. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi

overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Minister of Communications and Works in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1940. When this resigned he was partly responsible for the calculated leakage to the press of a Cabinet memorandum advocating drastic revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He is efficient but has not shown himself very straightforward.

A member of the Liberal Party formed in 1945 which withdrew at the last moment from the 1947 elections alleging undue interference by the Regent and the Government of Nuri Pasha.

Speaks good English.

He resigned from the Liberal Party after a disagreement with Sa'ad Saleh on election tactics in the spring of 1948. Minister of Finance in Muzahim Pachachi's Cabinet 1948.

34. Ali Shukur

President of the Railway Labour Union (now illegal). An ex-engine driver of radical outlook who was dismissed from the Iraqi State Railways at the end of 1944. Became President of the Union in November 1944 and was active in promoting the Railway labour strike, which lasted from the 15th April to the 1st May, 1945, and was the biggest labour movement which has been seen in Iraq since the formation of the Trade Unions. He appeared willing to stop the strike after a few days and to discuss terms with the Minister of Social Affairs, but the majority was in favour of continuing. Was arrested during the strike when the Union was closed and made illegal.

The Union has not yet been allowed to function again, despite the strenuous efforts of Shukur, who has been sending petitions to all the Ministers concerned with great regularity.

35. Alwan bin Hussein, C.B.E.

Sunni Arab, born Bagdad 1899, of good middle-class family. Married, 1923, daughter of Nawaf Beg, a relation of Sharif Pasha. He was educated at the English Protestant School, Bagdad, and would have gone to the United Kingdom but for the outbreak of the First Great War. On the formation of a Civil Police Force after the occupation of Bagdad in March 1917 he was amongst the first Iraqis to be enrolled, having been appointed Station Clerk Sub-Inspector on 11th May, 1917. Here, working with experienced police officers he learned rapidly and when Mosul was occupied in November 1918 he volunteered and accompanied the police party as inspector. He did outstandingly good work, both before, during and after the rising of 1920. He was one of the first three Iraqis to be promoted to gazetted rank in 1920 when he became Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mosul Town. He remained in Mosul until 1924 when he was promoted Commandant of Police and posted as C.E., Central Criminal Investigation Department. In 1930 he went to the United Kingdom. He was attached

to the Birmingham City Police and later attended the "Senior Officers' Course" at New Scotland Yard. Returning to Baghdad he gradually took over the C.I.D. and its allied departments from the British D.I.G. Police and by the time Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations had assumed complete charge. However, he did not find favour with the late Yasin Pasha el Hashimi and Rashid Ali el Gailani, and it was not long before he was removed. When Nuri Pasha came in in 1939 he immediately put Aliwan back into the C.I.D. and there he remained until the "Golden Square" and Rashid Ali gained control when he was pushed out again, first to Diwaniyah and then to Kirkuk at both of which places he was under the open constant surveillance of the Iraq army. After the collapse of the rebellion he was brought again to Baghdad headquarters and became Assistant Director-General, Political and Criminal Investigation Branch. For "Security" and other reasons he retained control of the C.I.D. itself as ex officio Director. He remained as A.D.G.P. until his promotion to Director-General on 28th September, 1946. Created C.B.E. for war services, 1946.

He was subjected to strong attacks by the political parties and the newspapers for the alleged undue severity of police action against the demonstrators against the Portsmouth Treaty. He lost his nerve under these attacks and suffered a minor nervous breakdown. He was transferred to the post of commandant of the Police Training School in April 1948.

36. Amin Zaki Suliman

A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Baghdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1925 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwaniyah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1935. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C., the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

In 1940 he was 53 years old and was the senior officer serving in the Iraq army. A staunch supporter of Taha-al-Hashimi, he was considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but was generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men.

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Ahwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

37. Arshad-ul-Umari, K.B.E.

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament

and supporter of Abdul Muthsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

In June 1944 he joined Hamdi-al-Pachachi's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Supplies. Rushing at supply problems, he soon met difficulties and had to relinquish his portfolio in August 1944. He headed the Iraqi delegation to the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo, signed the Protocol and returned to Iraq in October 1944. As leader of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco, he failed to substitute the ideal of independence for that of trusteeship (with Palestine in mind) and refused to sign the Charter. Returning to Iraq in July 1945, after discussions in Cairo, he was coolly received and resigned in August 1945.

In June 1946 he formed a Cabinet. It was to be a caretaker Government for the express purpose of holding speedy elections. It developed, however, into a headstrong dictatorship which threatened to bring into disrepute not only the Cabinet and the British connexion but also the Regent and the Royal House. Resigned November 1946 very reluctantly.

He played an important part in the organisation of the political opposition to the Portsmouth Treaty and the Government of Saleh Jabr, and he was prominent in the war of nerves directed against the Regent before the return from London of Nuri Pasha and Saleh Jabr.

He became Minister of Defence in the Sadr Cabinet which succeeded that of Saleh Jabr and was perhaps the most discordant element in that very inharmonious team. He probably hoped to succeed Muhammad as Sadr as Prime Minister.

His opinions change with bewildering rapidity and he is obstinate and impatient of criticism but he has an attractive personality and capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi.

Created K.B.E. for war services, 1940.

38. Asim-al-Naqib, Saliyd

The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1930. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

39. Ata Amin

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angola.

* In the summer c. 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, a younger brother of King Faisal I. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires. Returned to Bagdad, and was appointed Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1943. Was appointed Iraqi Minister at Angola in August 1944. He speaks good English.

A weak and ineffective individual.

40. Aziz Sheriff (Abdul Aziz bin Sheriff bin Abdul Majid)

Born Anah, Delaimi Liwa, 1904. Sunni Muslim. Lawyer.

Educated up to middle school at Anah he entered the Secondary School Teachers' Training College and the Law College, Bagdad. He graduated from the Law College in 1931 and set up practice in Basra. He practised before the Basra Courts until 1941 when he was appointed to the Judicial Service and posted as judge at Hillah. Later he was transferred to Bagdad. In 1945 he resigned and returned to practice in partnership with Nadhim al Zahawi.

He always has been anti-British and anti-Government but came to particular notice as a Communist only some ten years ago. During the war years he did good work in combating "the Nazis," but always with an anti-British bias. After the Rashid Ali rebellion he, with other extremists including Muhammad Salah Bahr el Ullum, tried to form a society Hizb el Wahidah el Wataniyah el Demokratiyah. Owing to its combination, particularly the association of the latter individual, the good intentions of the proposers were doubted and sanction was not accorded. They continued to work and eventually the Hizb el Sha'ah was formed with Aziz Sheriff as the first President. Previously he had worked for a time with Kamil al Chadarchi (q.v.) but the views and policy of al Chadarchi were not sufficiently advanced for him and his associates, most of whom were employed in underground activity, and in the publication of secret Communist literature, e.g., *El Shararah*, *El Qa'idah*, *El 'Aami*, &c., and in forming Communist "Cells" all over the country. Working with this group were many capable men and the publications, always published at the right moment, had considerable effect. Throughout they were extremely critical of Britain, belittled her efforts and praised anything and everything Russian. Aziz Sheriff himself owns the very strongly Leftist paper *El Waftan*, which openly publishes in a milder form matter formerly published in the "underground" press.

The Communist trials of 1947 did not produce any evidence to link Aziz with the underground organisations. Nevertheless, it is probable that his party, the Sha'ah, is to some extent penetrated by Communists properly so called.

After the closing of his party he fled to Syria in June 1947 where he remained until after the January disturbances in 1948. This action did not increase his prestige in Leftist circles.

41. Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmud

Son of the well-known Shaikh Mahmud (q.v.). Spent much of his early life in Persia while his father was engaged in his various rebellions. After Shaikh Mahmud's surrender to the Iraqi authorities in 1927, Baba Ali was sent to school by the Iraqi Government in Bagdad and later at Victoria College, Alexandria.

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In 1933 he went to America and studied political economy at Columbia for five years. On his return he was given a minor post in the railways, but resigned after a short time as he did not like the life of a Government official. In 1941 he was ill in Sulaimaniyah and did not join his father, who escaped from Bagdad. His open criticism of the Administration led to his arrest and exile in July 1943. After his release in November he settled down to the improvement of his agricultural property, but again in February 1945 openly attacked the shortcomings of the Mutesarrif of Sulaimaniyah. This incident almost led to his arrest again.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive though not very forceful personality. Is very keen on improving the tobacco situation in Kurdistan and on preserving the remaining Kurdish forests. He has considerable practical knowledge of and enthusiasm for agriculture and if not blocked by bureaucratic methods may achieve something as Minister of Economics.

Resigned with whole of Nuri Pasha's Government in March 1947. Attacked the Government of Saleh Jabr on frequent occasions for their alleged anti-Kurdish policy, signs of which he distinguishes in the most improbable matters.

He failed to retain his seat in the 1948 elections.

42. Babekr Agha

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Sulaimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Sulaimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

Operated on at I.P.C. Hospital in Kirkuk early in 1947 which may keep him alive a few years longer.

43. Darwish al Haidari

Born in 1907, graduated from an American agricultural college and entered Iraq Government service in 1930. The greater part of his career has been spent in the Department of Agriculture, and for a long time he was manager of the Abu Ghurab experimental farm. In 1942, however, he became Acting Director-General of Grain. He was successful on the whole, but his term of office was marred by a quarrel with the then Mutesarrif of Bagdad, Ja'afar Hamandi (q.v.), as a result of which he appeared before the Officials' Disciplinary Committee on a charge of illegally disposing of sixty sacks of grain belonging to the Supplies Department. He was transferred back to the Department of Agriculture.

In June 1943 he went to America as a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference, and in July 1946 he was appointed to his present post, that of Director-General of Agriculture.

His political views have generally been regarded

as pro-British. He has, in the past, been considered a "Leftist" and a "Nationalist"; he now claims to be a "Democrat." He is not politically active, but in August of 1946 he was associated with Talir and Nadim al Pashachi and others in an attempt to found a "United Nations Society," the aims of which were stated to be the enlightenment of the people on U.N.O. and the putting forward to the U.N.O. of suggestions in the Arab cause.

Thanks to the period spent in the United States, he has acquired many American ways. He speaks excellent English, as does his British-educated wife, who is the sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir al Gailani.

Represented Iraq at the F.A.O. conference at Geneva in August 1947. He showed commendable energy in directing the successful anti-locust campaign in the spring of 1948.

Though apparently jovial he is reported to be overbearing with his subordinates among whom he is most unpopular. His conduct of his Department does not arouse enthusiasm among British experts who have inspected it.

44. Daud-al-Haidari

Sunni of Baghdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. His English is fluent. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Baghdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umma (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shah and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Tawfiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Baghdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942, but was squeezed out of the Cabinet in June 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister Grade I in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1943. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England, where he experienced the war at first hand, the Iraqi Legation being damaged by a bomb. His two daughters are emancipated and, after a successful debut in London, are now in Baghdad. Of very doubtful financial reputation, but a firm friend of the Royal House and a shrewd observer who can on occasion play a useful rôle.

Minister of Social Affairs in the Sadr Cabinet January to June 1948.

45. Daud-al-Sa'adi, Saiyid

Sunni of Baghdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1938 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Baghdad by Jamil-al-Midfai in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of

Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Brought back to Baghdad for trial in March 1944.

He succeeded in obtaining his release on medical grounds and is now the doyen of the ex-internees and a leader of the Independence Party.

Became a Deputy for Baghdad in the 1948 elections.

46. Dhia Ja'far

Born in 1911. He was educated in England where he spent nine years studying mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, and where he obtained a B.Sc. degree in 1934 and Ph.D. in 1936. After completing his studies he had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railways. On returning to Iraq he was appointed assistant mechanical engineer, Iraqi State Railways in 1937. He was subsequently promoted to mechanical engineer.

During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies. He became Deputy for Baghdad in the 1947 elections and was appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr's Government of March 1947.

His family enjoys an extremely doubtful financial reputation, and so does he. He is, however, well educated, speaks excellent English and may in the future render the State some service.

47. Fadhil Jamali Dr.

Born Kadhima in 1902. Shi'ah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University, New York, 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the Embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington in January 1943, but at the end of May he was still in Baghdad hoping to contrive somehow to return to a post in Education. A year later he was still in Baghdad as transport by air could not be found to take him and his family to the United States. He has a Canadian wife, and is on friendly terms with the United States Legation. Appointed Director-General for Foreign Affairs in 1944. Member of Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Returned to Iraq August 1945. Still desirous of returning to Education. Is outwardly zealously pro-British nowadays, and professionally always obliging and helpful.

In June 1946 joined Arshad al Umari's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he attended the Palestine Conference in London in September.

He is a self-made man and the first of the type to reach a prominent position. He is intensely ambitious, but has to feel his way carefully and is therefore something of a "Yes-man." No one has ever been able to accuse him of corruption. He is rabid on the subject of Zionism.

He has remained Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Governments of Nuri Pasha 1946-47 and Saleh Jabr March 1947 but has spent much time outside Iraq, at U.N.O. on the Palestine question and later in London leading Iraqi delegation for Sterling Balance talks.

His trips abroad have brought him greater self-confidence but he does not pay enough attention to the internal political situation. He is, therefore, apt to underestimate the difficulties of the policies he urges.

Resigned with the Cabinet in January 1948 but managed to avoid much of the stigma attaching to signatories of the Portsmouth Treaty. Visited Persia in the spring of 1948 and made an extensive tour in the course of which he did some propaganda for the Arab case in Palestine. Like all Saleh Jabr's Ministers he failed to be re-elected to the Chamber in June 1948. He is now (1948) in political partnership with Arshad al Umari.

48. Hanna Khalyat

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Baghdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy, October 1943. Became an invalid in April 1944.

49. Hashim Jawad

Born Baghdad 1911. Muslim. Shi'ah. Educated in Baghdad schools and at Beirut and London Universities. After graduating he returned from London in 1936 and shortly afterwards was posted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and nominated as Iraq's representative on the permanent International Labour Office at Geneva. In that capacity he took part in several conferences. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and has been employed on labour affairs in one capacity or another ever since. In 1946 he was transferred to the Ministry of Social Affairs, as Director-General of a newly created Labour Department, in which capacity he attended the I.L.O. Congress at Montreal in September.

A very quiet, serious and studious man; well balanced and moderate of speech. He holds strong views on the rights of "Labour" and undoubtedly tries to act up to his principles. Since the Trades Union Movement and Labour questions have come more to the fore in Iraq he has gained much valuable practical experience in the settling of disputes and labour conditions generally, and there seems reason for hoping that in time he might be able to do something tangible to better the working and social con-

ditions of the Iraqi working classes. He is not lacking in personality, but is more of a quiet, solid plodder than an enthusiast, such as is really wanted for the task. As might be expected, in politics his conversation indicates an inclination to the Left, but he is neither a member nor an associate of the members of the Political Leftist Parties recently established in Baghdad.

He was removed from his position as Director-General of Labour by Arshad-al-Umari in 1946. After his removal the Department of Labour has sunk into a powerless desuetude.

In Geneva at International Labour Organisation Conference July 1947.

50. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni. Born 1896. Director of Education in Baghdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1935, and from Chamber in November 1935. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Baghdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He became a flourishing farmer and took no further political part until 1947 largely because of his unpopularity with the Regent and Nuri Pasha. During 1947, however, he began to organise opposition to Saleh Jabr's Government and with Arshad al Umari and Nasrat al Farisi took part in the political intrigues which combined with the street demonstrations to cause the fall of Saleh Jabr and the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty. He continued to

be politically active behind the scenes during the life of the Sadr Cabinet and was tipped by some observers as a possible successor to Mahammad as Sadr. After the formation of the Muzahim Pachaohi Government he left Bagdad to spend the summer in Turkey.

His wife is a Daghistani, a sister of Mrs. Najib-al-Rawi (q.v.).

51. Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgium, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

52. Ibrahim Akif-al-Alosi

Sunni. Born Bagdad 1894. Educated Bagdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College, Istanbul, 1916, and came to Iraq, where he served in several places under the Turks. Joined Iraqi Health Service, and served as Director of Health, Basra and Bagdad, with considerable success.

Was Director-General of Public Health in May 1939 and afterwards Inspector-General of Health Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946.

53. Ismail Namiq, K.B.E.

Sunni, originally from Mosul. Born 1892, son of an officer in the Turkish army. Educated at Military College, and gazetted an officer in the Ottoman army in Istanbul in 1912. Joined Amir Faisal in 1917 and commanded the Hashimi Cavalry. After becoming an officer in the Iraqi army in 1921 he attended various courses, including one of six months at Tidworth, where he did well. Became Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in 1931 and Commander of the Iraqi air force in 1933. Commanded the Cavalry Brigade 1936 and the Third Division 1937. Was appointed Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of Defence in 1941, becoming a lieutenant-general the same year. Became Acting Chief of the General Staff in November 1941 and as such accompanied the Regent to England in October 1943. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Defence. Became a Senator in May 1945. He is generally considered to be pro-British. He is a man of sound sense. He has not, until 1944, mixed in politics, and disapproved of Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'état*. His venality has been the subject of comment, but he is quiet and temperate. Speaks good English.

He is at present in retirement, but may well return to the Cabinet later. The Regent likes and trusts him.

Created K.B.E. for war services, 1946.

54. Ibrahim Saleh el Kabir, O.B.E.

Born Bagdad 1885.

Jew. Married to Renee Sha'ul Elias. His son Jamil, born 1926, is now in England (Nottingham University). Has a daughter, Aida, born 1936. Has three brothers, viz: Salman el Kabir, lawyer, Bagdad; Hesquil el Kabir, merchant, London; Yusuf el Kabir, lawyer, Bagdad.

Educated at the Alliance School, Bagdad; he entered business in the office of the merchant Hesquil Toweg, but continued his studies by attending occasional lectures at other institutions. Some time before the occupation of Bagdad in 1917 he went to Persia, having by then been admitted as a partner to Hesquil Toweg. He remained in Persia for some time, but after the fall of Bagdad he returned and found an appointment in the Ministry of Finance, Accounts Department. He remained in this Department and by gradual promotion became Accountant-General. Later he was transferred to the Directorate-General of Railways in the same capacity. He held this appointment for some years, but has now returned to his former post.

Ibrahim el Kabir has never been a politician; he is a typical civil servant. Absolutely trustworthy but extremely guarded in his speech. He, however, is known to have a very bitter tongue on occasion. He is not very popular, on account of a rather sneering expression and manner, possibly due to somewhat weak eyesight. A sound, reliable public servant, but too timid ever to make a mark for himself. In 1946 he gave evidence before the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine.

Awarded the O.B.E. for war services, 1946.

Speaks good English.

Was chief negotiator in the Iraqi delegation to London for Sterling Balances talks, where he won golden opinions from the British delegation.

He again went to London in the summer of 1948 on the Iraqi delegation sent to discuss the taking over of the Iraq Currency Board.

55. Jafar Hamandi

Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became *kaimakam* of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939, to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Bagdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hilla liwa. Saleh Jabr as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this. In October 1943 was elected Shia Deputy for Hilla. Visited Palestine in early 1945.

Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in 1947 he has been active in Opposition in the Chamber to the Government of Saleh Jabr.

Failed to secure re-election in June 1948.

56. Jaial Baban

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed *kaimakam* in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nusriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1946, but resigned in October of the same year.

Minister of Communications and Works in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948 and held the same portfolio in the succeeding Government of Muzahim al-Pachachi (June 1948).

57. Jamil Baban

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Idnaw. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

Minister of Justice in Saleh Jabr's Government of 1947 and appointed Senator on 2nd July, 1947. He has been the object of adverse criticism in his capacity of Minister of Justice both for venality and for influencing judges, particularly in the Communist trials.

He acted as Prime Minister during Saleh Jabr's absence in London for the signature of the Portsmouth Treaty. He handled the admittedly difficult situation created by the demonstrations with marked ineptitude, but in his defence it must be

said that Saleh Jabr had inexorably kept him completely in the dark over the course of the negotiations. He resigned with two other Ministers before Jabr himself gave up hope and resigned.

58. Jamil-al-Rawi

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Sherrefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jeddah, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Tugaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimid Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December 1942.

Returned to Bagdad in 1945. Appointed Director-General of Public Works 1946.

Speaks some English.

Appointed Minister at Amman in May 1947.

59. Jamil-al-Madfai

Of Mosul, born about 1880. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sherref. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a coup d'Etat at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan-Arab movement.

Elected President of the Senate in December 1943, in which position he used his influence against Nuri Pasha's Government. Superseded as president in December 1944 and resigned from Senate in February 1945.

His name was widely canvassed in May and June 1947 as a possible leader of an anti-Government bloc to be composed of the Left and Reformist Parties together with a few old-time politicians; this bloc appears to have come to nothing.

Is now very rich. Has much land in favourable positions and is interested in many commercial ventures whose success is at least partly due to his influence.

Became Minister of Interior in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948 but resigned shortly afterwards for reasons of health which were partly genuine. His main motive was, however, his disagreements with his colleagues and his desire to avoid the burden and the blame of holding the Interior during parliamentary elections.

60. Jamil al-Wadi

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal (q.v.).

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932, resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat

Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

61. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Born about 1900 of a comparatively unimportant family, he was able to contract an alliance with a niece of Nuri Pasha al-Said and it is to this influence that he probably owes any political distinction that he has obtained. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he was for some time a judge. A keen political intriguer, he was at one time arrested and deported by Jamil Madfai. His attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous, nevertheless he was elected Deputy for Diyala in October 1943 and became president of the Lawyers' Association in March 1946. His first ministerial appointment was in Nuri Pasha al-Said's coalition Government of November 1946, in which he was Minister of Social Affairs. He retained this portfolio in the succeeding Cabinet of March 1947 under Saleh Jabr. He appears to devote any talents that he may possess to political intrigue and was said to take practically no interest in his Ministry. He is personally spiteful, ambitious and untrustworthy. He speaks a little English.

62. Jebran Malkon

Was at one time associated with Rafael Butti in the publishing of *Al Bilad*. In 1940 he refused German Legation offers made by Dr. Grabba to publish anti-Jewish articles. Malkon is now proprietor of *Al Akhbar*, although he does not write the articles as he himself does not write good Arabic. Malkon comes from a large and wealthy family in Mardin. He and his sister were the only two who escaped a family massacre in 1917 when the remainder of the family was wiped out by the Turks and the Germans. Malkon and his sister found refuge in Deir-az-Zor. After the British occupation he was appointed a director of customs and excise.

He is a man of a mild and affable disposition but he has more courage than his meek appearance suggests and has always resisted pressure to publish articles unfriendly to Britain. He has, in fact, resolutely kept clear of all political controversy, a very creditable achievement for any editor in Bagdad. *Al Akhbar* is now generally accepted as the leading vernacular newspaper and has the largest circulation. Malkon is scoffed at by his fellow-editors but has no real enemies. He visited Britain in 1945 with a delegation of Iraqi journalists and came back full of wonder and admiration for all he had seen. He has a large happy family.

He speaks a little English.

63. Kamil al Chadirchi

A Moslem (Sunni) born in Bagdad in 1901. His brother is Raul al Chadirchi who was Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in London. Kamil was educated locally and graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He obtained a minor post in the Ministry of Finance but soon gave up this job for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha al Watani* (National Brotherhood) which paper was suppressed for its attacks on the Government of Nuri Said. In May 1934 he was convicted for publishing false news in *Sawt al Ahali*, and in September of the same year he was arrested for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi, but was released for lack of evidence. He was at that time well known for his Left-wing views. The coup d'Etat of Hikmat Sulaiman in 1936 gave him his first Cabinet post as Minister of Economics and Communications in

October of that year—a post which he resigned in June 1937 because of a difference of opinion on the Cabinet's policy regarding the Euphrates. He left the country for a few months, returning after the Bekr Sidqi incident, and from that time he has been an active leftist politician. He formed the Democratic Party, described as "left of centre," which includes among its members Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Given the right conditions his party might expect strong support from the middle classes, particularly the younger professional men.

Kamil al Chadirchi was asked to enter Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in 1943 but refused to do so on the ground that he could only take office if he could head a Government formed of his own party. In the autumn of 1946 he fell foul of the Government. He was arrested, tried and imprisoned for attacking the Government in his newspaper *Sawt al Ahali*. His sentence was subsequently quashed and a re-trial ordered (October).

The trial made a considerable stir which his party exploited, but the affair showed that he is no leader. He has progressive ideas but is unable to co-ordinate them or to form any stable or consistent policy. Chadirchi is a rich landlord, cultivated, and a pleasant dinner-party companion. He is no Communist and has had little personal contact with the working-classes whose cause he champions in the clubs and drawing-rooms of Bagdad. His English is weak but his Turkish is good. He is friendly to us and has just sent his son to study at an English university.

As the leader of the National Democratic Party he has given expression in his newspaper to strong views against various aspects of the policy of Saleh Jabr, notably the Turkish and Transjordan treaties. This again led to his trial on press law charges in 1947.

64. Khalid Sulaiman

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhain Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaidi. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

65. Khalid Zahawi

Sunni. Born 1899. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1903. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal I. Promoted to colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College, Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C., R.I.A.F., in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in February 1939. Appointed Mutesarrif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutesarrif of Bagdad, but was relieved of his appointment in June. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

66. Khalil Ismail

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the

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Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutesarrif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Director-General of Finance, August 1943.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

Transferred to the more lucrative post of Director-General of Customs and Excise in March 1945. Chairman of the Import Committee of Ministry of Supply formed in July 1947.

67. Khushaba, Malik

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urmia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village. Now resides in Mosul.

68. Mahmud Abdul Karim

Aged about 32. Reuters correspondent in Iraq. Worked as a secretary in the Royal Bilal from 1932-38. Started a daily newspaper called *Al Diyar* in 1945 but it was not a success and folded up in July 1946. Karim is very friendly to us. He went to London with the Iraqi press delegation in 1945 and remained in England for some time working in Reuters head office. He returned to England in January 1946 as press attaché to the Iraqi Delegation to U.N.O. He was a follower of Ibrahim Kemal (q.v.) but has taken no active part in politics. He was well-liked by Hamdi Pachachi but is disliked by Nuri Pasha and has fallen foul of Arshad. He is a good writer but is inclined to be careless in checking his facts. While in England he fell in love with a London solicitor's daughter whom he married in the summer of 1946. He speaks fluent English.

69. Mahmud Subhi Daftari

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more

attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet. Made a Senator in 1940.

Made Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943, a post which he obviously enjoyed unreservedly. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

70. Mahruq-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh

Chief of the Amarat, Anniza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Baghdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Baghdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate at Rinza, near Kerbala, has been expropriated for the Abu Dibbis reservoir and Mahruq has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

He is now (1947) trying to get the pre-1941 division of labour and guards on the pipe-line restored. This division divides these lucrative services between the Amnat and the Dulaim tribes on a geographical basis.

71. Mahmud, Shaikh

Of the family of Barzanja Sayyids. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Shaikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Baghdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Suleimani in December 1935 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has the chance to do so.

His properties in Suleimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Baghdad, and in company with Abbas-i-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (q.v.) he raised a tribal force to attack

Suleimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Durikella, one of his villages in Barzan. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and unreliable, and a source of anxiety to the Mutasarrif of Suleimania.

72. Majid Mustafa

A Kurd of Suleimani, born about 1894. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army, and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Kut liwa. His administrative ability was soon apparent. In 1928 he became Qaimaqam of Nasiriyah, and in 1935 he was promoted to be Mutasarrif. Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained until 1941.

His attitude in the Rashid Ali disturbances of 1941 was equivocal, but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather than that of the Regent. Rashid Ali did not, however, trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Baghdad at the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in Turkey.

He returned in September and was then suspended for four years on account of his compliance with the orders of the Rashid Ali régime.

Nevertheless, in December 1943 he joined Nuri Pasha's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzan area and of redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

Majid succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and remained in the Cabinet, without Portfolio, but charged specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Has gone into business but has not abandoned politics. Made a vigorous and impressive speech on Kurdish needs in the Chamber in January 1945. By the Kurds he is not trusted as they consider he is only interested in the fruits of power. Has been careful to advertise on the surface his dissociation from events in Barzan.

Not a member of the 1947 Chamber, he is concentrating on business, he has business connexions with the war millionaire Shibly Bishara of Transjordan.

73. Mar Shimon

Eshni, Mar Shimon, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholics of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimon has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1933, he was

given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surina joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraqi army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimon persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1930 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

Since 1940 he has been living in the United States. His 1946 Christmas message to his flock, though innocuous enough, roused the suspicions of the Iraqi Government.

74. Maulud Mukhlis

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Baghdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraqi army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Baghdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1925 he was appointed Mutasarrif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulama. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *majtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's coup d'Etat and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected president of the Chamber November 1939 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

75. Mualliq-al-Alousi

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Baghdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Baghdad in 1920. Was appointed a

professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-ul-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Baghdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as chargé d'affaires. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

76. Mudhdhafar Ahmed, O.B.E.

Born Hilla, 1898. Sunni Muslim. Married. His wife (who appears in public) is of the Partaw family and a sister of the wives of Ibrahim Kemal and Tahnin Askari, to which family, and to that of Nuri al Said, he is related through his mother.

Educated in Baghdad he served in the Turkish army as an officer. He was among the first direct officer-appointments to the police after the formation of the National Government having been Gazetted Assistant Commandant on 10th December, 1921. He received his initial training under various British officers and by the mid-1920s had established a good reputation in the Diwanayah Liwa. He was promoted commandant in 1932 and was one of a group of officers sent for training in the Birmingham City Police School. After completing this course he returned to Baghdad and was appointed Principal of the Inspectors' Training School, which post he held for some years. Thereafter he became Director, Passport, Residence and Nationality Department, Director, C.I.D., and held other posts on the headquarters staff. After the 1941 rebellion, working under the orders of Saiyid Ahmed Al Rawi, as Director, C.I.D., he was most energetic in clearing up the chaos remaining after the collapse of the Rashid Ali régime. He hunted out and deported foreign Arab "Nazis," and was equally active in regard to Iraqis of the same type. In September 1941 he was appointed Director-General of Civil Defence which post he retained until appointed Mutasarrif, Basrah, on 12th August, 1944. Here he distinguished himself by his cordial co-operation with the British forces, but he was equally popular with all shades of Iraqi opinion and classes. Since then he has served for a short while as Mutasarrif, Mosul Liwa, and in October 1946 became Mutasarrif, Baghdad Liwa.

Mudhdhafar Ahmed has matured slowly. In his younger days he did not show outstanding promise, although he always was looked upon as being steady and reliable. Always keen on sport, he was a keen "soccer," polo and tennis player and did much to foster keenness for the first and third (polo had always been played) in the police, and later in the Royal Olympic Club, Baghdad. He has developed into a sound steady public servant and in the normal course of events, being still under fifty, should go far in the service.

Awarded the O.B.E. for war services, 1946. An attractive personality. He speaks excellent English and some French, as does his agreeable wife.

He was allotted some of the blame for police action against the demonstrations of January 1948 and was made an administrative inspector on 12th March.

77. Muhammad Ali Mahmud

Sunni. Born 1893. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tax and Judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Baghdad in 1933 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

Sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Released in July 1947.

78. Muhammad Amin Zaki

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill-health. Made a Senator December 1943.

79. Muhammad Hassan Kubba

Shiah of Baghdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1929 he entered the service of the Ministry of Justice. Served as a judge in many parts of the country and also held posts in the Ministry. In December 1943 he joined the Cabinet as Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said. Retained this position in the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi which followed Nuri's resignation in June 1944, but became President of the Chamber of Deputies on the resignation of Muhammad Ridha al-Shabibi in December 1944.

Joined the Al Umari Cabinet in June 1946 as Minister of Justice. The Prime Minister's interference with the Courts however soon caused him uneasiness and he wanted to resign in August, only remaining in office at the Regent's request. Senator 2nd July, 1947.

Vice-President of the Senate December 1947.

Minister of Justice in the Pachachi Cabinet June 1948.

80. Muhammad Hussein el Hadid

Born Mosul 1906. Sunni Muslim. Merchant.

Muhammad el Hadid was educated at Mosul Mutawassit School until 1924, when he went to Beirut. He returned from Beirut in 1928 and almost immediately went to England to continue his education at the London School of Economics. After returning to Iraq in 1931 he was appointed to a post in the Ministry of Finance which he held until 1937, when he was elected as a Deputy for Mosul. He then went into business with Kamil el Khedeiri, Muhammad Ja'far Abu Timman and others and formed the "El Sherikat el Ziyat Wal Nabitiyyeh" and engaged in a considerable export trade. He is still (1946) a partner in that company. His father, Haji Hussein, is reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in Mosul, while Muhammad el Hadid himself has married the daughter of the man who, by common talk, is probably the richest in the Liwa, if not in the whole of Iraq.

Through his friendship with Kamil el Chadarehi, and possibly through contacts while in England, he became interested at an early date in the "Progressive" Movement and was one of the signatories to the application for the founding of the Hizb el Watani el Demokrati, of which he is the vice-president.

He has made many heated speeches attacking "colonisation" and professing to support "Progress," all with a strong anti-British bias, but it is stated that he has always opposed violence and was against the general strike of July 1946. He has many British friends, to whom his frankness appeals. His son is being educated at Victoria College.

Is generally looked upon as being a pleasant, shrewd man. In September 1946 he wrote an article on Iraq in the *New Statesman and Nation* which attacked the Umari régime, as a result of which the paper was excluded from Iraq.

He was defeated in the 1947 elections, owing to Government pressure, but he appears less embittered than others who underwent the same experience. Unconfirmed reports state that he is not unconnected with the Russian Legation.

Went to India on a business trip in March 1948 but returned in time to win a seat for Mosul in the 1948 elections.

81. Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid)

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahmad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao, but was released in August 1944.

82. Muhammad Mehdi Kubba

Born about 1900 of the well-known Baghdad Shiah family of Kubba, he was educated in the religious seminary at Nejed in grammar, Persian and theology.

After the first world war he engaged in quite a humble way in the textile trade in common with other members of his family. He never held Government office of any kind until 1948, although he was once a Deputy for Baghdad in 1937.

He was a member of the Nationalist Muthanna Club from its foundation and was helped into politics by a fellow member Dr. Jamali (q.v.). He developed his pro-Axis sympathies during a visit to Germany in the late '30's but took no active part in the Rashid Ali movement.

Was made president of the Istiqlal Party on its formation in 1945, probably owing to his Shiah origin and well-known name. His claims to the presidency of the party are not strong and his voice in its councils is less effective than those of Fuq Samarra'i and Siddiq Shenshal.

Minister of Supply in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948, he resigned in June over the conduct of the elections.

An untidy-looking man, with a reputation for honesty. He is not very intelligent and only speaks Arabic and Persian.

83. Muhammad Ridha al-Shabibi

Shiah of Baghdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Baghdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil al-Madfa'i in December 1938.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943 and again in December 1944, but resigned almost immediately.

A genial old bigot determined to have nothing to do with anything modern. Speaks no English.

Took a leading part in debates of Parliament during spring session 1947, criticising the Government and getting in some shrewd blows at the British.

Minister of Education in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948 and resigned with the Cabinet in June 1948.

84. Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz

Baghdad mechanic. Born about 1898. At one time came into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he used to thrust himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and was especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign

companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1939.

During the premiership of Yasin al-Hasbani he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1938 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

85. Muhammad al-Sadr, Saiyid

Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Faisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality with an acute and sometimes embarrassing idea of his own importance. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil al-Madfa'i.

An overpowering figure familiarly known as "God" from his resemblance to Byzantine representations of a bearded deity.

Appointed a member of the Council of Regency during the Regent's absence in the summer of 1947.

He formed a Government after the disturbances of January 1948 which brought down Saleh Jah and secured the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty. His Cabinet contained no less than three former Prime Ministers but was one of the weakest in the history of Iraq and signally failed to bring the country back to normal. For several months Baghdad was the scene of almost daily demonstrations. These were made easy for the organisers by the shortage of bread and the collapse of police morale. Government authority throughout the country was flouted with impunity. It was only the introduction of martial law on the entry of the Arab armies into Palestine which restored order to the streets and enabled Muhammad to carry out the elections and to resign.

86. Muhammad Salim el Radhi

Born Bagdad 1890. Muslim. Public servant and landowner.

Educated in Bagdad primary and secondary schools, he graduated from the American University, Beirut, and later went to the United States, where he studied at Texas and California Universities, from which he took doctorates in Agriculture and Science. He returned to Iraq in 1926 and joined the Department of Agriculture, in which he has continued until he became the Director-General, which post he has held for several years.

A quiet, capable man, with many friends in all communities. He has shown no pronounced political tendencies or attachments and this, perhaps, explains his undisturbed service as Director-General of a Department. However, owing to the fact that he is connected to the wealthy Shabandar family—Ibrahim al Shabandar being his cousin—and that he himself is a considerable landowner, it is unlikely

that he holds any "advanced" views, in spite of his associations in the United States.

He was made Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs in November 1946 and appointed minister at Tehran in June 1947.

He and his attractive wife speak excellent English.

87. Mulla Mustafa

Born about 1898. Brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Was the fighting leader of the Barzans in the troubles of 1931-32. He surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimani. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1948 he bolted back to Barzan and a few months later became involved in skirmishes with the police. The fighting gradually developed, and Mulla Mustafa successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with his own position, but later on he began to put forward political demands and to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism. He won a good deal of Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was promised a pardon after paying a formal visit to Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Thereafter he returned to Barzan, but he remains restless and untamed, and the Government have not yet been able to re-establish control over the Barzani tribal area. Was formally pardoned in April 1945 by the Barzan Amnesty Law, and the Government embarked on a programme of improving security and of developing agriculture in his area. However, he became impatient in the summer and took up arms against the Government again in August 1945.

He was eventually defeated, more by the agility of the Minister of the Interior in distributing gold than that of the army in occupying his country. He fled with his brother to Persia, whence photographs of him have since found their way back to Iraq showing him as General Mulla Mustafa in a uniform strangely reminiscent of that worn by Generalissimo Stalin.

Recently his fortunes seem to have declined and many of his followers have returned to Iraq.

After the collapse of the Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammad, he was forced to return to Iraq retiring before the Persian forces. His brother Shaikh Ahmad surrendered with his forces to the Iraqi authorities. Mulla Mustafa with about 500 men attempted to come to terms with Iraqi Government, who demanded unconditional surrender. The Mulla thereupon returned to Persia via Turkey and made his way through Azerbaijan to Soviet territory where he and his men surrendered to the Russian authorities.

88. Musa Shabandar

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899. Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as chargé d'affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to stand his trial with internees in March 1944. Sentence was finally passed on him, in August 1944, of five years hard labour and sequestration of all his property. Now an invalid.

He returned to Iraq in December 1947, but has not resumed political activity.

89. Muzahim-al-Amin Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimahi. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrato's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1943 he appeared to be living in Rome. Later he went to Geneva and sought but was refused facilities to return to Iraq.

Eventually returned in November 1946.

He was asked to form a Government somewhat unexpectedly in June 1948 after the completion of the elections and the resignation of the Sadr Cabinet. He succeeded in putting together a moderately capable team but complained of Royal interference in his freedom of choice. He was immediately caught up in the Palestine crisis. He has taken an intransigent line on this question, at any rate partly for internal political reasons. He has had little leisure for internal affairs.

He is very deaf, but speaks good English.

90. Mustafa-al-Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the

following: kaimakam in several districts. Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntadq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. Since then he has been a prominent speaker in the debates of the Senate, and has been a constant critic of Nuri Said's Administration. Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi formed in June 1944.

He has the reputation of being corrupt, but he is certainly an able administrator and has a comprehensive knowledge of the north as anyone. He put this to good use during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery made possible the victory of the Iraqi army.

Minister of Economics in the Sadr Cabinet of 1948 and Acting Minister of Interior for the last part of the life of the Cabinet. His conduct of the 1948 elections were the object of criticism from press and public and more than one of his Cabinet colleagues threatened to resign on this account. He became Minister of Interior in the immediately succeeding Cabinet of Muzahim Pachachi, who has said that this appointment was forced on him by the Palace.

91. Dr. Nadim bin Shakir al Pachachi

Born Bagdad 1914. Muslim, Sunni; nephew of Hamdi al Pachachi, late Prime Minister, and of Muzahim al Pachachi, late Iraqi Minister in Paris (q.v.).

Educated at Bagdad and London School of Economics. Returned to Bagdad in 1938 on completing his studies and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics, of which he is now Director-General. He has a civil service outlook and has never figured in politics.

Went with the Iraqi delegation to the General Assembly of U.N.O. in London, where he took the opportunity of searching for British experts to advise his Ministry in certain matters (e.g., co-operative farming) in which he is anxious to see reforms and progress—less perhaps from a disinterested love of the working classes than because he believes that to raise their standard of living is the best defence against discontent and communism.

Speaks excellent English.

He had already left Bagdad as a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Sterling Balance talks in London in June 1947 when he was recalled from Cairo. No reason was given officially but some connected his recall with his recent divorce of his wife and marriage with a cabaret artiste. His position as Director-General of Economics remains outwardly unaffected but his conduct has done him no good.

92. Dr. Naji-al-Asil

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hijaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq

he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammarah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1933.

In June 1939, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

Appointed Director-General of Antiquities in 1944. A pleasant man of considerable intelligence who speaks excellent English. He is violently anti-Zionist.

He worked very well with the Adviser to the Antiquities Department, but has lately been in personal financial difficulties which have had an adverse effect on his work. There are few of the leading politicians with whom he is on really friendly terms and this too obstructs him.

Appointed permanent Iraqi delegate to U.N.O. by the Sadr Cabinet early in 1948. Recalled by the Muzahim Cabinet in July of the same year and returned to the Antiquities Department.

93. Naji Shaukat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Shurif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928. Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Mushin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taffiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsurance with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941,

but was appointed Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried in absentia by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

In 1942 he found his way to Europe and moved between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In 1943 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine. In the summer of 1943 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

Paroled by the Regent in May 1948.

94. Nadjif Shawi

Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-18. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and fought at Mutasul, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1936 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

95. Najib-al-Rawi

Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad-al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected president of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being in too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister. He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943. He represented Iraq at the Arab Lawyers' Conference at Damascus in August 1944.

He has performed useful services for us, but it is difficult to say how trustworthy he is. He and his wife speak good English. She is a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*).

Minister of Education in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946.

Returned to presidency of Lawyers' Association as soon as the former president had become Minister for Social Affairs in the next Government but one.

Minister of Justice in the Sadr Cabinet (January 1948) and Minister of Education in the Pachachi Cabinet (June 1948).

96. Nasrat-al-Farisi

Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February

1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in April 1943, but did not proceed.

In June 1943 he became Foreign Minister. Resigned in October 1943, as a protest against the Regent's interference in the choice of Government candidates for election to Parliament.

Went to San Francisco in 1945 as a member of the Iraqi delegation. Speaks excellent English, but still takes lessons to keep himself up to date.

In the Parliament of 1947 he has spoken much on financial questions for the Opposition.

He became first Minister without Portfolio then Minister of Interior and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Sadr Cabinet (January to June 1948). The leader of the so-called Constitutional Bloc in the Majlis.

97. Nishat-al-Sunawi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1928. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

98. Nureddin Mahmud

Born 1889. A Kurd. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917. Intelligent, resourceful and ambitious. Director of Military Operations. Graduate of Chamberley and Quetta. Good man both in administration and in the field. One of the few Iraq army officers with modern military knowledge. Has done several courses in England. Command over men is good, and influences on the army high— as witness his behaviour on the flight of Rashid Ali when he took over command of the army and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Does not dabble unduly in politics but sympathises with the Allied cause and was heartily against—and worked against—Rashid Ali. His only strong feeling is apparently for the Kurds, and as long as there is friendship between the Kurds and the British his support can be taken for granted.

Attractive personality. Has been military attaché in London. Was Officer Commanding 2nd Division at Kirkuk and was transferred to Bagdad as Assistant C.G.S. He visited the battle-fields of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, in May 1943.

Was promoted Amir Liwa in November 1944 and later became Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, in the reorganised Iraq army.

He is said to enjoy the confidence of the army to an eminent degree.

He commanded the Iraqi Forces in Palestine in the summer of 1948 and was involved in the inter-Arab jealousies which prevented the establishment of an effectively unified Arab High Command.

99. Nuri al Qadhi

Born 1889, joined Iraq Government service in 1921 and has held the following appointments: Vice-President Bagdad Courts 1925, Vice-President Mosul Courts 1937, Director-General of Waqfa 1931, Head of Legal Drafting Department, Ministry of Justice, 1936, Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers 1941. Of the old school, he has excellent manners and considerable charm, but he has hitherto played no part in politics and little is known of his character and abilities.

Minister of Education in the al Usuri Cabinet of June 1946. Dean of the Law College November 1946.

100. Nuri-al-Said, G.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahl in 1913 and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jadda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri-al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha-al-Hashimi and Hussein Fauzi overthrew Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri-al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited Egypt to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943, but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his ninth Government on the 25th December, 1943.

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an unedifying brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest. Accompanied the Regent on his travels in America and Europe during the summer of 1945.

In July 1945 he was elected President of the Senate.

In April 1946 he negotiated a treaty between Iraq and Turkey covering economic and commercial matters but the Tawfiq Suwaidi Cabinet which had come into power during the negotiations wished to recall him on the ground that he had gone too far. When he returned he contrived, with his usual ability to have all his actions sanctioned retrospectively, and the treaty was accepted.

During the summer he went to London with the Regent and then returned to Syria and Turkey in the hope of arranging an understanding, and perhaps a treaty, between the two countries.

He refused to represent Iraq at the Palestine conference partly through jealousy of Azzam and partly because, having been one of the negotiators who obtained the 1939 White Paper, he feels it beneath his dignity to attend a conference whose *point de départ* is its abrogation.

Nuri Pasha is still amazingly youthful and vigorous, both in mind and body, and is likely to remain for some years one of the few Arab statesmen with an international outlook and an international reputation.

He again became Prime Minister after the collapse of the Cabinet of Arshad-al-Umari in the autumn of 1940. In this position he missed no opportunity to declare that the long-postponed elections would be free and neglected no step to ensure the return of his and the Palace's nominees. Still incomparably the ablest Iraqi politician, he has gained no affections from the others by this display of his superiority in intrigue and manipulation.

He refused to form the new Government himself on grounds of health, but was thought by many, not altogether correctly, to be the real power in Saleh Jabr's Government.

He accompanied His Royal Highness on his European trip and was selected to represent Iraq at the U.N.O. General Assembly on Palestine.

He was a member of the Iraqi delegation which signed the Portsmouth Treaty and shared with Saleh Jabr the Nationalist rage which this treaty inspired. He spent the first six months of 1948 in Turkey. He has not forgiven the Regent for his part in the events which led to the rejection of this treaty but remains a loyal supporter of the House of Hashim.

101. Rafi' Petrus Butti

Born Mosul 1901. Christian. Journalist and editor. Educated at the Syrian Orthodox School, Mosul, and at a secondary school in Baghdad, he graduated from the Law College after extra-mural studies in 1929. He entered Government service as a clerk in the Ministry of Interior on the recommendation of Razaq Ghannam, for whose paper *El Iraq* he contributed articles. He himself also published a weekly magazine *El Huriyah* which was violently anti-British but which also criticised the Administration for subservience to the British Advisory and Inspectorate staffs. There is no doubt that he received encouragement and support for this as part of the general propaganda campaign for the termination of the Mandate. He over-stepped the mark in 1927 when, after a particularly venomous attack on the British Inspector-General of Police, British policy and the Government, he was dismissed. Within a few weeks, however, he was given a better job in the Ministry of Interior as Translator. Here he was comparatively safe. He remained so employed until he graduated from the Law College when he resigned and in partnership with Jehrun Malkun published *El Bilad*. Until the conclusion of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty he backed his patron, Nuri el Said; then he switched over to Nuri Pasha's chief opponent, Yasin Pasha el Hashimi and the Hizb el Ikha al Wata'ul and became a constant and bitter critic of Nuri and his pro-British policy. This was his first change of raiment; there were others, viz., 1921-23, Nuri el Said, 1923-29, mainly Nuri el Said, but occasionally el Hashimi. 1930-35, Yasin el Hashimi and Rashid Ali, 1936-37, Bakr Sidki. 1937, he toddled to Jamil Madfal after the murder of Bakr Sidki, but el Madfal would have nothing to do with him and, when his paper became abusive, suppressed it for a year. 1938-42, Rashid Ali, 1942-43, Interned. 1943-45, Rashid Ali when he dared. 1946, anti-British.

He has been a Deputy on two occasions, first in 1935 for Mosul and secondly in 1939 for Basra. He

was rabidly anti-British both in Parliament and in his paper but his seat in Parliament protected him until July 1942 when in a clear up of probable Fifth Columnists he was interned. Within a short time he whined, said he repented his folly and asked for release. In spite of every opposition he was released in July 1943, but on conditions. These he respected, more or less, and in January was permitted to restart publication of *El Bilad*. Censorship prevented a good deal, but the cloven-hoof showed occasionally and called forth reprimands. As soon as the war ended and the internment camp was cleared, he came forth with all his old-time venom. Recently, for reasons at present unknown, he suddenly removed himself to Egypt whence he wrote saying that he intended to take up permanent residence in that country. His wife sold up the house and furniture and has joined him. He still owns *El Bilad* although he has for the moment leased it at a monthly rental of ID. 25 or ID. 30.

Butti is probably the most capable of the Iraqi journalists and is curiously fearless in his comments. Since he first came to notice he has been bitterly anti-British and anti any Government or Politician whom he considers to be in any way favourable to Britain or British policy. It has been suggested that this is a phobia the result of extreme disappointment at not obtaining preferment as a Christian on the occupation by British forces. This has been observed, although in a lesser degree, in other Christians—particularly of Mosul—of about his age.

The real reason for his presence in Egypt is as yet unknown, but it has been suggested that it is not unconnected with Iraqi interests in the Arab League.

It is probable that he could be induced to support any policy for a consideration.

He returned to Iraq early in 1948 and became a Deputy for Baghdad in the June elections of that year. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Rome Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 1948.

102. Rashid Ali-al-Gilani

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidki's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfal's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfal as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military coup d'Etat on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Shuraf Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq. It is now known that the struggle for predominance between him and the Mufti led to a split in the ranks of the Arab traitors. When in London the Regent reiterated his determination that when caught he would be executed.

When the Germans realised that the end was near they offered to fly him to Egypt. He said he preferred Saudi Arabia but the Germans said they could not fly him so far. He therefore was taken through the German lines in a car and went to the Tyrol, thence through Austria to Prague where two Syrian friends gave him a passport. Apparently with the unwitting assistance of American, British and French military transport he finally arrived at Marseilles and thence sailed to Beirut. On the morning of the 24th September, 1945, he arrived in Riyadh in disguise. When he declared himself Ibn Saud gave him asylum. This at once precipitated a crisis in Saudi-Iraqi relations and there were many acrimonious and futile interchanges between Ibn Saud and the Regent. The Prime Minister, Humdi Pachachi, insisted on regarding it as a personal matter and not a political one involving the two countries. The Regent was finally persuaded to accept this view and seems now overtly reconciled to Rashid Ali's continued presence in Riyadh. Covertly, however, there

is no doubt that he harbours this additional grudge against Ibn Saud.

There has been a press campaign recently in his favour in Egypt and various requests for his pardon have been forwarded to the Regent. Reports indicate that he is recognised by the Iraqi Istiqlal Party as their leader.

Ibn Saud is now anxious to be rid of his presence at Riyadh, but a proposal by King Abdullah for his removal to Transjordan has been vetoed by the Regent.

103. Rashid-al-Khojah

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Abd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabriji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-General, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General at Jeddah, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shawkat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shawkat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfal. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfal's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfal's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfal. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

104. Rauf-al-Bahrani

A Shia of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944 and in August 1944 condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of all his property.

105. Raul-al-Chadirchi

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and

subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the Law School August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930 and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937. Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man. He spent a few months in Bagdad in the winter of 1947-48.

106. Rauf-al-Kubaisi

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimukam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Aqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Aqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Aqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

107. Razzaq Ghannam

Doyen of Bagdad journalists. Owner of *Al Iraq*. A Christian. Pro-British; backer of Nuri Said. He is a Deputy for Bagdad. At one time he employed Rafael Butti, but soon fired him when he realised his true feelings. Pan-Arabist. According to a speech he made while a Deputy, he had no time for those who supported the merchants and landowners at the expense of the people. "Parliaments were not collected for the protection of the profiteers and opportunists." Invited to visit Britain as one of the delegation of Iraq journalists, autumn 1945, but refused on the grounds of ill-health. He holds rather woolly views on political theory, but is sincere and means well. Speaks good English. Recently his newspaper has been losing ground. It comes out only two or three times a week and circulation is said to be only about 300. He apparently does not depend on his journalism for a living as he has a large house and his daughters, who are progressive and modern, take a prominent part in the social life of Bagdad.

108. Sa'ad Salih, C.B.E.

Shia. Born about 1898. Of a poor family from Najaf. Kurdish grandfather. He was one of the young Shias chosen by King Faisal I to study at the Law College (where he graduated in 1927) prior to receiving an administrative appointment. Served as Deputy in the early thirties and was posted to Diwaniya as administrative inspector in 1936. Appointed Mutassarif of Kut 1940 and thereafter of Basra, Hillah, Dulaim and Amara. During the 1941 rebellion kept his Mutassarifiyah (Kut) free from trouble. Bitter enemy of Saleh Jabr, who displaced him from Amara (Sa'ad Salih had annoyed him whilst at Hillah). Deputy for Diwaniya since 1944. An efficient administrator, he is less biased than many Shias, and his name is comparatively free of any hint of corruption. An able writer and impressive speaker. In December 1945 he led the attack in the Majlis on the Pachachi Cabinet which finally brought about its fall. Minister of the Interior in the succeeding (Suweidi) Cabinet.

Created C.B.E. for war services, in 1946.

Now, since the resignation of Tawfiq Suweidi, the leader of the Liberal Party, Sa'ad was very disgruntled with the conduct of the elections of 1947 and roundly accuses the Regent of bad faith with him and his friends.

He was elected Deputy for Nefes in the 1948 elections. His health has now failed completely and his recovery is doubtful. He left Iraq for Switzerland for medical treatment in June 1948.

109. Sabih Najib

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syro-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfa'i Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rostam Haider, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey. Was retired from the service in August 1944.

110. Sadiq-al-Bassam

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939. Became Minister of

Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

A Senator since February 1941, he was one of Salih Jabr's principal critics in the Upper House in the Extraordinary Session of 1947.

He joined the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948 as Minister of Finance and was also a member of the succeeding Cabinet of Muzahim Pachachi, this time as Minister of Defence. He accompanied the Prime Minister to the Arab League meeting which accepted the cease-fire order of the Security Council in June 1948.

111. Said Haqqi

Born 1883. A Kurd from Sulaimaniyah and a former Turkish army officer, commissioned from the Constantinople Military School in 1903. He joined the Iraqi army on its formation and became at one time Director of Administration in the Ministry of Defence. He reached the rank of colonel, resigning from the army as a result of a disagreement with Taha Pasha al Hashimi, then Chief of General Staff. He has subsequently held posts as Director-General of Jails, Director of Civil Aviation and finally Keeper of the Privy Purse at the Palace. He leads a quiet life and politically and socially is almost unknown. Appears friendly disposed to the British, but speaks no English.

Became Minister of Defence in the al Umari Cabinet of June 1946 while retaining his post as Keeper of the Privy Purse.

112. Salih Saib, al Fariq

Has served as chief of the Iraqi army General Staff since 1941. He began his military career in 1916, when he was commissioned an infantry officer. He became instructor in the army's small arms school in 1921 and later pursued staff college work in both England and Iraq. Following a period of inactive service during which he served as assistant director-general of the Iraqi State Railways, he was recalled to active service, became a Zaim in 1940 and al Liwa three years later. In August 1944 he was appointed commanding officer of the First Division of the Iraqi army. His promotion to the rank of al Fariq took place in November 1945.

A stupid man and basically anti-British. He is nevertheless popular in the army, but not with the Regent, who would like to see him go, if only because he was a member of Beltr Sidki's staff. He attended the Victory celebrations in London in 1946 and came back slightly more reconciled to the British, though full of complaints about his accommodation. So long as he is Chief of Staff, he will be a potential danger to Britain and to the ruling House. Speaks good English.

He spent part of the summer of 1945 with the Iraqi forces in Palestine and held various more or less honorary commands.

113. Salman-al-Barrak

Shiah and a tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942.

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Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943, but returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

114. Salman-al-Shaikh Daud

Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government. Arab News Agency representative for which he is very well paid. Visited Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945.

Wealthy, generous and good company, but a lightweight politically. Speaks French, but almost no English.

115. Salih Jabr, K.B.E.

Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfa'i November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfa'i formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1939. Elected for Diwaniyah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutessarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up to expectations and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Finance in June 1944. Took on portfolio of Defence in August 1944 when Tahir Ali refused to dismiss senior officers as part of the scheme for reorganising the army, but in this reshuffled Cabinet he took up Supplies, only to hand them over in December 1944, and return to Finance. During the absence of Hamdi Pachachi, the Premier, he acted for him. When the Pachachi Cabinet fell it was expected that Saleh Jabr, who was one of the Ministers who accompanied the Regent to the Amman Conference, might become the first Shia Prime Minister. He was not chosen, however. He spent much of the summer of 1946 in England, where he had gone for treatment for an arm which had been broken in a motor accident on his return from Amman.

He is undoubtedly the leading Shia statesman and has shown himself to be a good friend of Britain, though a hard bargainer for the interests of his country. Unfortunately, Shia opinion is by no means all behind him, particularly the tribes from the Middle Euphrates. This is largely due to his wife, who is a strong-minded tribal woman of Hillah who causes her husband and others much trouble by interfering in politics.

Created K.B.E., for war services, in 1946.

He formed a Government after the elections of March 1947 and presented an ambitious programme, largely concerned with economic development, to the Majlis on 10th April.

As Prime Minister he showed himself capable, energetic, dictatorial and secretive. He fought stoutly for Iraq's interests in the Portsmouth Treaty negotiations but his handling of his own colleagues and of the internal situation in Iraq was inept.

He tried hard to persuade the Arab League to impose oil sanctions on the Americans as a reprisal for their pro-Zionist policy, his failure to do so lost the Arabs their last chance of preventing a Zionist solution in Palestine.

He failed to take sufficiently seriously the steady deterioration of the economic situation in Iraq during his term of office. He directed his energies to foreign policy and to economic long-range planning, while neglecting the very necessary short-term economic measures required. It was shortage of bread and rising prices more than anything else which enabled his enemies to unseat him and reject his treaty.

116. Sami Fattah

Has been in command of the Royal Iraqi Air Force since June 1941. He is a graduate of the Higher Teachers' Training College (1922) and served several years as an instructor in Iraq schools. Turning to a military career in 1926, he attended the Military College at Bagdad and later studied at Sandhurst in England. Shortly after his appointment as a second lieutenant in the Iraqi army in 1929 he became air-minded, joining the Iraqi air force and later training with R.A.F. units in England. In 1932 he flew an Iraqi air force plane from England to Iraq. He joined the Iraq Staff School and graduated from it in 1937.

He has shown himself determined to clean up the R.I.A.F. and to prevent its dabbling in politics, and in this he has had considerable success. During the summer of 1948 he was in London where he attended the Victory celebrations and also visited a number of aircraft factories.

117. Sami Shaukat

Born Bagdad 1898. Sunni. Brother of Najib Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He did much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have had pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denied these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to

eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1948.

Resigned and started the newspaper *Baath al-Qaumi* ("National Resurrection") in the autumn of 1945. It was extremely nationalistic, anti-Communist and anti-British. In tone it somewhat resembled *Die Stürmer*. Fortunately it kept falling foul of the Government and was suspended for a year in the summer of 1948. Since then little or nothing has been heard from Shaukat and his followers.

Speaks Arabic and Turkish but no English. A buffoon, but potentially dangerous through his influence on young fanatics.

118. Selim Terzi, O.B.E.

Born Bagdad 1899. Jew. Educated at the Alliance School, Bagdad, he entered the Posts and Telegraphs Department and has remained there until he became acting Director-General. Presumably his religion has prevented his permanent promotion, as twice or thrice completely unfitted incumbents have held the post, e.g., an eye specialist, London-trained, and an unwanted official from the Royal Bilal.

Like most Jews in Iraq he has never been involved in any form of politics, nor has he expressed any strong political convictions. Is a quiet, decent and capable man and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British forces (for which he was made an O.B.E. in 1946). It was the Government policy that this should be, but he added the personal touch which made the co-operation successful.

He and his wife speak good English.

119. Shakir-al-Na'ama

Editor and owner of *Al Thaghr*, a Basra paper. A quiet intelligent man with no liking for the Iraqi methods of administering the supply situation and its attendant corruption. He was, in 1943, involved in a little trouble with the Mutasarrif of the Basra Liwa for publishing articles in his paper criticising the local supply distribution methods. He was told to cease such publications but he asked for such instructions in writing—presumably he would have taken the matter further. The instructions in writing were not forthcoming, but from that time he has been the subject of persecution by the Mutasarrif. A good friend of Britain. Visited Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945, and wrote several glowing articles for his newspaper, *Al Thaghr*, the only regular daily newspaper in the south, has always been pro-British. He speaks good English.

120. Shakir-al-Wadi, M.V.O.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi (q.v.). Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Faisal. He was on King Faisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, but

permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941. Transferred to London in October 1944 as first secretary in order to take charge of the Iraqi Legation during Daud-al-Haidari's absence in Iraq.

Return to Bagdad in October 1946 to become Master of Ceremonies at the Palace.

Minister for Defence in Salih Jabr's Government formed in March 1947. He owed this position to his close personal friendship with the Regent.

He headed a delegation to London in September 1947 to discuss the supply of arms and equipment to the Iraqi army. Resigned with the Cabinet in January 1948.

121. Dr. Shawkat al Zahawi

A Kurd, born in 1898, son of a Turkish army officer by the name of Colonel Abdul Hakim al Zahawi. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. In the latter place joined the Military Medical College, and graduated about 1919. He returned to Iraq, and in 1922 joined the Iraqi Health Service. For some time worked as assistant to Dr. Mills; specialises in pathology, has produced several articles on that branch of medicine, and also lectures in the Medical College. He is a cousin of Khalid al Zahawi, Iraqi Minister to Afghanistan, and is related also to the late Jamil Sidqi al Zahawi, famous Iraqi poet. He is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghistani, and through this marriage therefore has connexions with Hikmat Sulaiman and Najib al Rawi.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in April 1948 but resigned with the rest of Tawfiq Suweidi's Cabinet a month later.

122. Sufuq-al-Ajl

Of the Shammur Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammur in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1923), is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased undesirably Shammur influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammur arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ahmed about the division of their

inheritance from their father Ajil. A settlement was made in May, but its terms were so ambiguous that it is not likely to endure for long. An attempt was made to murder him in June 1944 by putting locust bait in his food. His brother Ahmad was suspected of being the author of the plot and while Sufuq was convalescing in Palestine he increased his prestige with the tribe by issuing free the Shakh's reserves of corn, ghee and sugar to grateful tribesmen. Ahmad has lost no opportunity to undermine Sheikh Sufuq's influence. Flashy, engaging and plausible, he has made himself acceptable to authority, more especially the Regent. Sufuq, who is flabby, selfish and incapable, has with his persecution complex proved a sore trial to the Mosal authorities, who have attempted to sort out his quarrel with Ahmad over the inheritance. Sufuq was detained in August 1945 with the rest of the Shammur Shaikhs in Mosul, for failing to assist the Government effectively to control his tribesmen near the Syrian frontier.

Of the younger brothers, Mish'al, though only 19, is sturdier than either Sufuq or Ahmad.

Sufuq was again arrested in August 1946 for aggression against the Alu Muteiwit.

He was replaced as paramount Shaikh of the Shammur by Mish'an al Faisal in June 1948 on the orders of Mustafa al Umari.

123. Taha-al-Hashimi

Brother of the late Yasin-al-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed Chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of Chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed Chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *feriq* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fawzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfa'i resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break

the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

There were rumours during 1946-47 of his being appointed Chief of General Staff of the Syrian army. These have so far, August 1947, not materialised.

124. Tahnin Ali

A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussein of the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Faisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sabunchi faction and transferred to the Dulaim area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutassarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutassarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his *coup d'Etat* in May. Was restored when the Madfai Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yacidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Transferred to the Palace as Rais of the Royal Diwan in June 1943. Became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi in June 1944, where he proved obstructive to the reorganisation of the army. Transferred to Works and Communications in August 1944 and finally dropped from the Cabinet altogether at the end of that month and later became Director-General, Awqaf.

Retired August 1948.

125. Tahnin Qadri, K.C.V.O.

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Faisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qurtas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1932. Accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the Palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without

protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

In September 1943 he was appointed chargé d'affaires at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January, 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at Beirut, where he has been active in Arab Unity affairs, at the same time maintaining close touch with His Majesty's Minister. Recalled early in 1945 and appointed Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Fadhl-el-Jamali at San Francisco. Appointed minister in Tehran, June 1945, but in September was still in the Lebanon.

In 1946 appointed Iraqi Minister to Paris.

July 1947 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Royal Diwan.

126. Talib Mushtaq

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

He was appointed manager of the Bagdad branch of the Arab Bank in 1945, in which capacity he sought, vainly, for embassy co-operation.

127. Tausiq-al-Suwaidi

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935 and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the legality of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister. Went to San Francisco Conference. On his return appointed Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Arab League.

Became Prime Minister in February 1940. Resigned May 1946.

Is intelligent and very good company but sly as his nickname ("the red fox") shows. Appointed Senator 2nd July, 1947.

A member of the Iraqi delegation which signed the Portsmouth Treaty, he has since been lying low.

128. Tausiq Wahbi Maroof, C.B.E.

Kurd, born Sulaimania 1887. Educated Sulaimania and Turkey. Graduated from Turkish Military College in 1904, and thereafter served in many military stations in European Turkey. During the war 1914-18, he held a regimental command, and later a staff appointment with the 13th Corps, commanded by General Ali Ihsan Pasha.

After the war he returned to Iraq, and entered the Iraqi army. He was appointed Military Advisor and Staff Officer to Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimania in 1923, but left him when his attitude became pro-Turkish and his conduct impossible. He returned to Bagdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of colonel became Commandant of the Military College, Bagdad. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

In April 1930 he was appointed as Mutassarif of Sulaimania, but lasted only until July, when as the result of election troubles he was removed.

For several years he remained unemployed, but ultimately obtained appointment to the post of Director-General of Surveys. After the conclusion of the operations against Rashid Ali, Tausiq Wahbi resigned from Government service, took pension and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor for the British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet, in which capacity he has toured the north to investigate possible relief and developments. It was largely owing to his initiative that the Director of the Sudan

Forestry Service was engaged to prepare a comprehensive survey of the economic possibilities of forestry in Kurdistan. To the young Kurdish nationalists and hot-heads he pleads moderation and gradualism, but his influence on them is not effective.

Tausiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture, and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Information Department of the embassy in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

A charming and cultivated man who speaks good English, Persian and Turkish. Created C.B.E. for war services, in 1946. Minister for Education in Sabih Jaber's 1947 Cabinet.

Resigned with the Cabinet in January 1948.

129. Thabit Abdul Nur

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he helped in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

He is now living in retirement at Lausanne and has shown no sign of wishing to return to Iraq.

130. Umar Nazmi

Kurd. Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khantqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Erbil 1925; President, Civil Courts, Diala; Mutassarif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927; Mutassarif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutassarif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in

March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Minister of Justice in the Suweidi Cabinet of 1946. An amiable, unimpressive man.

Minister of Justice in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948 but resigned shortly after its formation.

131. Yahya Qassim

Age 39. Advocate; ex-Iraq State Railway employee. Is the editor and proprietor of *Al Sha'ab* newspaper. He is a Muslim and is married to the daughter of Haidi Effendi, the brother of the ex-chief of the general staff, Amin Zaki Sulaiman. He is a prominent leader of a growing Socialist movement. Secretary of "Biyout-al-Umma" (House of the Nation) Society. He was interested in the publishing of a secret Radical paper called *Al Sharara*, which ceased publication some time ago.

As a result of his political activities—including the distribution of pamphlets, for which he was arrested and released on bail—the Iraq State Railways Board dispensed with his services. Owing to his discharge from the railway directorate, which, while being an Iraqi Department, has a British director, he was somewhat unbittered against the British. He is an active member of a group of advocates known to have advised the Railway Union to strike. He was for a time a member of Kamal Chadirchi's Democratic Party, but resigned following personal differences. He visited Britain with a party of journalists in autumn of 1945, and stayed on in Britain for several months. He was greatly impressed by what he saw, and had the courage to say so when he returned to Iraq. He has become more balanced and mature in the past year. He is personally very friendly with us and has not published any anti-British articles or comments for some time. He is outstanding among the young Socialists. His English is rapidly improving.

The mouth-piece of Salih Jabr, he accompanied the delegation which went to London to negotiate the Portsmouth Treaty.

132. Yunis Bahri

Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhranaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

Broadcast from Berlin in connexion with the Lebanese crisis of November 1943.

In the autumn of 1946 he was living in Paris, under the name of B. Jabouri, and was in correspondence with former friends in Bagdad.

133. Yusuf bin Saiyid Abdullah el Gailani

Born Bagdad 1907. Muslim, Sunni. Educated Bagdad and at Balliol College, Oxford. After taking his degree he returned to Bagdad in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Is now, October 1946, Director of the Political Section.

A quiet, well conducted gentleman. Has always been friendly. Has never been reported as being in any way concerned with politics.

Married to Masoodah, daughter of the late Asim al Gailani, who speaks some English and good French and appears, modestly, in mixed society.

134. Yusuf Ghanimah

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as rapporteur of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941. In July 1944 appointed Director-General of Supplies and President of Post War Planning Committee, and he became Minister of Supplies in November 1944, since when the country has settled down to accepting supply controls and rationing has become more effective in reaching the consumer at the end of the supply line.

Speaks good French and fair English.

Minister for Finance in Salih Jabr's 1947 Cabinet. An unimpressive "Yea" man, in poor health.

Resigned with the Cabinet in January 1948.

135. Yusuf Iz-al-Din

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

RECOGNITION OF THE GAZA GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th October)

(No. 1023. Secret)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad,

13th October, 1948.

Palestine.

It was stated in the local press of 12th October, that Council of Ministers had decided on previous day to recognise the provisional Gaza Government in accordance with agreement reached between the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Egyptian Prime Minister.

2. Prime Minister defended the above action to me on the following lines: Gaza Government was a shadow Government of no account whatever. What standing could a Government have when the Egyptian Government were able to remove its leading figure, the Mufti and his followers from Gaza to Egypt. Prime Minister assured me that the Egyptian Government would continue to take a very strong line in regard to the Mufti and that there would be no danger from the latter and his followers in future. Gaza Government would die in due course. Meanwhile it could do no harm. He thought most Arab States, including Egypt would recognise it if only as a lightning conductor. It must be admitted that the Arab States had failed in Palestine. The only result of their intervention had been that there were 750,000 refugees. They had let down the Palestinian Arabs and if the latter wanted to have a Government why should anyone object. It was a pity that King Abdullah had not shown more tact with Jamal Husseini and other moderate Palestine Arabs. Prime Minister said he could not understand why His Majesty's Government took such a strong view about the recognition of Palestine Arab Government. I repeated the reasons of which he had already been informed in Cairo.

3. Prime Minister went on to say that the Bernadotte Plan would certainly be approved by the United Nations and that

the chief question before the Arab States was how they could extricate themselves and their forces from Palestine. He was quite sure from his talks with Nokrashy that this was the Egyptian Government's view and that they did not want to hold any Palestinian territory. All they wanted to do was to clear out. Negeb and the rest of the territory allotted to the Arabs would go to King Abdullah, but he would have to use tact.

4. Prime Minister again asked how the Bernadotte Plan was to be enforced on the Jews. I replied on the lines of your telegram No. 1023.

5. I saw the Regent immediately after the above conversation. He said he was annoyed with the Prime Minister. He had sent him to Egypt with instructions to ascertain the Egyptian Government's attitude to the Gaza Government and then to ask for a meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League to consider the league's attitude. Prime Minister had not done this and he himself did not know what Egypt's attitude was. His Highness had seen Nokrashy several times during his recent visit but had not discussed politics with him. He had not seen King Farouk as the latter was concentrating on yachting. Prime Minister had acted improperly in letting the press know that the Iraqi Cabinet had decided to recognise the Gaza Government without informing him in advance. He had not yet given his approval.

6. Regent said that he and the Prime Minister had lunched with King Abdullah at Amman on 10th October. No serious discussions had taken place and King Abdullah would only throw out a word now and then at lunch to keep the conversation going. An awkward meal.

Obituary

Haidi Pachachi. Died March 1948.

Tahsin al Askari. Died in Cairo September 1947.

FINANCIAL SITUATION IN IRAQ

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 21st October)

(No. 304)
Sir,Bagdad,
14th October, 1948.

I have the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 1013 of 9th October to submit the following further observations upon the financial situation of this country as it appears to us in Bagdad.

2. The underlying cause of the present financial difficulties is the weakness and impermanence of Governments in Iraq and the low standard of administration. The situation is aggravated by the inflation resulting from the war, the loss of oil revenue through the closing of the Haifa pipe-line, the extra expenditure on the forces in Palestine, and generally by the feeling of insecurity resulting from the tension between the Great Powers, the Palestine situation and the campaign of extremist political parties against the Iraqi Jews. Business is slack, customs revenue is not coming in, and the Government has not sufficient credit to enable it to raise internal loans. One cannot blame the present Government for the legacy which it has received from the past; nor expect it to perform miracles immediately. I am satisfied that the present Finance Minister is doing all that he can to remedy the situation, and that he realises what is necessary to achieve the restoration of confidence and solvency. His reluctance to reduce the currency cover even to 100 per cent. shows the importance which he attaches to confidence in the currency. (This is the answer to your telegram No. 1066.) As I have reported, he is making a real effort to increase revenue, reduce corruption and achieve economy in expenditure. The recent centralisation of martial law administration and the Prime Minister's firm statement in Parliament on the Jewish question, have done much to restore confidence; but any real improvement must take time, and no feeling of stability is possible until the Government of the day has managed to survive the return of the army from Palestine.

3. The Finance Minister has not given up hope of getting Mr. Waight to agree to join the Iraq Government as member of the Development Committee and adviser to himself. He agrees that a permanent Development Board constituted by Parliament and composed of men outside active politics, appointed for fixed periods, is very desirable; but he has doubts, as I have

reported in my telegram No. 1007, whether in present conditions in Iraq it is possible for such a board to be formed and to function successfully. As an example of the difficulty which would arise, he cites the fact that he is at present unable to find a suitable Iraqi to act on a high salary as governor of the new bank, since the suitable candidates are not willing to bind themselves to withdraw from the political arena for three years. There can be no doubt about his keenness to push development schemes, and to earmark special sources of revenue for them; but he realises that new development schemes cannot be put into operation unless the Iraq Government can first satisfactorily finance its normal administration and the schemes now in operation. The half-built bridges, half-built railway extensions and half-completed irrigation projects must be finished, and at the moment, since the railways cannot raise a loan in the City of London, there is no money even for the projects now being carried out. I wish to emphasise this particularly, since we are perhaps apt to look at the development problem as if it were something wholly in the future. In fact, numerous schemes of development are already being carried out through the normal machinery of government, and what is hindering their completion and the initiation of new schemes is not so much the failure of the Iraq Government to constitute a particular type of development board as the Government's temporary bankruptcy.

4. It is true that there is a crying need for strengthening the Ministry of Social Affairs, and in particular its Department of Labour, but such conditions are not peculiar to Iraq, and it is doubtful whether anything useful can be achieved by drawing up regulations for co-operatives, social insurance or even sound trades unionism unless a reasonably efficient administration exists to apply them. Although, therefore, we must continue to press for such advances in this field as are obviously desirable, the emphasis must be placed on fundamentals such as the improvement of internal security, the collection of sufficient revenue, the reform of the system of taxation and the honesty and efficiency of the public service. However much we may desire to increase the number of experts

with the Iraq Government, it is no good our pressing them too energetically on the Government at a time when our advice should be principally directed towards economy and the improvement of the financial situation. The quality of experts is another important consideration. Here I am referring not only to their technical qualifications but also to their ability to work with enthusiasm under the most frustrating conditions of apathy and incompetence among their Iraqi colleagues.

5. There is probably no politician in Iraq who does not believe that His Majesty's Government could perfectly well help the Iraq Government by a loan, but will not do so because the Iraq Government will not agree to their views on the Palestine situation. The Prime Minister has told me that the general view is that His Majesty's Government's refusal to a "retaliation" for the Iraqi attitude on Palestine. For whatever cause, the Iraq Government have the impression that money will be forthcoming from His Majesty's Government to help them in their difficulties, if only they agree to accept His Majesty's Government's political views; though even with this belief they show no signs of modifying their line on Palestine. We have done our best to make it clear to them that the reasons for refusing a loan are economic and not political. We shall be putting ourselves into a false position if we suggest that a more moderate political line would enable them to get financial help from His Majesty's Government when in fact it will not. We have no political lever of any value, so long as we are not able to do more than arrange short-term advances. In any case, even definite premises of financial aid would not be likely to have any material effect on the political situation, since, as I have reported, no Iraqi Government could hold the internal situation if it took a more moderate line in Palestine. Some politicians would like to take such a line, but dare not; others are fanatics who would

subordinate everything to a continuation of the new counter-crusade.

6. In conclusion, I must refer to oil. The only hope of getting the Iraq Government to agree to the flow of oil through the pipe-line to Haifa in present circumstances is to ensure that it is impossible for the Jews to seize or hold up any of it. Otherwise, whatever the financial advantages, no Government here could agree to resumption of the flow. What will influence them is only whether they can prove to public opinion that the Jews cannot get a drop of it. Promises of a long-term loan by the I.P.C. on condition of a resumption without such guarantees will not be effective. Although they would no doubt accept such a loan if offered without conditions, the attitude of the Government (and the press, inspired by the Government) is that the Iraq Government has for a long time been underpaid by the I.P.C. concession and that they should be getting three times as large royalties as a matter of right. The press is now engaged in attacking the oil companies on these lines, presumably in order to prepare the atmosphere for the forthcoming talks with the I.P.C.

7. In this country patience is an essential. We should not try to combine and rush our different objectives, financial, economic, social and political, despite their general interdependence. We shall gain more by pressing them independently and carefully choosing our time for action in each field. For the present since we cannot help the Iraqi Government financially we must tactfully assist them to improve the administrative and financial foundation on which development must be built. I do not think that we shall find them unresponsive. The present Finance Minister, at any rate, is anxious that Mr. Waight should visit Bagdad once a month.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

IRAQI-SOVIET RELATIONS

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 9th December)

(No. 1163. Secret) *Bagdad,*
(Telegraphic) *8th December, 1948.*

Iraqi relations with Soviet Russia.

Nuri Pasha, who went to Basra with the Regent on 2nd December, returned unexpectedly on 4th December with head of Royal Diwan. Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was also a member of the party, returned the following day. Nuri Pasha asked to see me urgently on 7th December, and told me that the Regent had sent him and the head of the Royal Diwan back to Bagdad in order to keep in touch with the situation in view of developments in Syria and in Egypt. The Prime Minister has also cancelled his proposed visit to the Regent at Basra.

2. Nuri Pasha said that the Director-General of Police had the situation here in hand. He, himself, was, however, very apprehensive lest the disturbances which had taken place in Damascus and in Cairo might spread to Beirut. He had no doubt that the Communists were responsible and it was unfortunate that other Arab countries had no such stringent legislation against communism as Iraq.

3. Nuri then spoke about the necessity to close down the Soviet Legation. It was absurd that anyone in Iraq who had declared himself a Communist was liable to seven years' imprisonment while the Soviet Legation was free to foment subversion and organise Communist activities. The Legation was implicated by evidence which had been given in the enquiry which was still proceeding into the Communist nest which had recently been exposed. Nuri then recounted the history of the establish-

ment of the Soviet Legation which he himself and other Iraqi politicians had always opposed and to which the Iraqi Government at the time (1945) had only agreed under British pressure. In the present state of affairs it was too dangerous for Iraq to allow the Soviet Legation to stay, and Nuri proposed therefore to urge the Prime Minister to close it down.

4. I put a number of questions to Nuri which elicited the following replies. Members of the legation were implicated by name, and evidence against them could and should be given to Parliament. It would be useless to ask the Soviet Government to withdraw those implicated since they would only be succeeded by worse. Iraq had no frontier with Russia and no trade. She should deal with Russia on international level only and not bilaterally. The Iraqi Minister in Moscow had returned to Bagdad some time ago as he could not stand the place. The legation was in charge of a junior secretary and its maintenance was a waste of money. If other Iraqi diplomatic missions were being abolished for economy there was no reason why the Moscow mission should not be abolished, but Nuri, himself, would prefer to ask the Russians to go, and publish the reasons. This was a matter in which Iraq might well give a lead to other Arab States and not ask for a decision of the Arab League.

5. Nuri asked me to think over what he had said since he anticipated that the Prime Minister would consult me. I should be grateful for any guidance which you may wish to give me.

ARAB POSITION IN PALESTINE

Sir H. Mack to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th December)

(No. 340) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *8th December, 1948.*

I have the honour to report, with reference to my telegram No. 1141 of 29th November, 1948, that a joint meeting of both Iraqi Houses of Parliament was held on 24th November, 1948, to discuss Palestine.

2. Opening the debate, the Prime Minister first gave a short review of the whole history of the Palestine question. He stigmatised the Balfour Declaration as a British crime, complimented His Majesty King Hussein of the Hejaz who, he insinuated, lost his crown for the sake of Palestine, and blamed the Arab States for their

lethargy during the mandatory period, when instead of concentrating on the salvation of Palestine they were pre-occupied by internal dissensions and personal ambitions. Only the Palestine Arabs had fought the injustice, and they had been silenced by the oppressive methods of the Mandatory Government.

3. The Prime Minister went on to lament that even after the United Nations had decided on the partition of Palestine, the Arab States had continued to glory in conferences and propaganda instead of awakening to action. When, on the termination of the mandate, the Arab armies had finally invaded Palestine, proper military plans had not been made. Yet when the first truce was accepted, the Iraqi army was only 12 kilometres from the Mediterranean. The Egyptian army was near Jaffa, and the Arab Legion had already occupied Ramleh and Lydda and was threatening Tel Aviv. But for the truce, the Arabs would undoubtedly have driven the Zionists out of Palestine. The acceptance of the first truce was the cause of all the ills the Arabs have since suffered, for whilst the Arab States had loyally observed the conditions of the truce, the Jews had brought in armies of fighting men and large quantities of military equipment of all types, including aircraft. Some said that the truce was accepted under foreign pressure, and others denied this: he did not know. He only knew that the acceptance of the truce had been fatal. At this point the Prime Minister went out of his way to praise Sadig al Bassam, the former Minister of Defence, for his consistent hostility to the truce.

4. The Prime Minister then came to his own term of office. He said that his first aim had been to achieve unity of command of the Arab armies, but he had failed because one army had refused to command or be commanded. (The Prime Minister was clearly referring to the Egyptians—see my telegram No. 1117 of 18th November, 1948.)

5. At a meeting in Aley the Arab League had accepted the second truce, but this time Iraq's attitude had been beyond reproach. However, Iraq could not carry on the fight alone and had therefore been forced to observe the majority decision. He personally had submitted his resignation at that time, but it had not been accepted.

6. After the Aley meeting the Prime Minister had realised that the Arab League

could not achieve the ends which had been hoped from it, but was rather a means whereby each State member escaped responsibility. He had, therefore, come to the conclusion, which he now re-emphasised, that the only hope for the Arabs was a full alliance between Iraq and Egypt. His efforts to achieve this had been frustrated. Egypt had wished to exclude military matters from the understanding and had suggested that no agreement should come into force until after the settlement of Palestine. Syria alone was prepared for unity of command.

7. Both sets of the mediator's proposals had been rejected, the second in spite of British and American pressure, because they implied partition. The aim of the Arabs was to exterminate the Zionist menace.

8. The Prime Minister then dealt with the accusations that the Iraqi army had not supported the Egyptians in the recent fighting in the Negev. The Iraqi army had, in fact, helped the Egyptians to the utmost, but it was further from its base than any other Arab army, and its flanks were exposed to Zionist attack. The Iraqi army was the largest Arab force in Palestine, and Iraqis could be proud of its work: all else was Zionist propaganda.

9. The Prime Minister ended by admitting that the present situation was very serious: the United Nations were trying to enforce on the Arabs an unjust solution on which, for the first time in the history of the United Nations Organisation, America and Russia were agreed. However, the Arabs still had an opportunity of saving Palestine through co-operation, unity of command, and a determination to fight to the last breath.

10. Senator Sayid Abdul Mahdi, a supporter of Saleh Jabr, who spoke next, also began with the "British crime" of the Balfour Declaration, and added that Zionism was incomparably more dangerous to the Arabs than the Crusades: Zionism and communism were "twins." He contrasted Arab victories before the first truce with their present plight, and British declarations that they would not support any solution not acceptable to both sides with His Majesty's Government's present policy. Still, the calamities of Palestine had come about through the Arabs' own fault, for they had let local ambitions stand in the way of the execution of the Bludan secret decisions.

11. Deputy Nasrat al Farisi (Bagdad) defended the acceptance of the first truce

by the Sadr Government (of which he was a member) on the grounds that Iraq had had to fall in line with the other Arab Governments in order to preserve Arab unity.

12. In a speech lasting two hours Senator Saleh Jabr defended the Iraqi Government's policy on Palestine during 1947, when he was responsible, and described his efforts at the conference at Sofar in September 1947, and Aley in October 1947, to get the Arab States to execute the secret decisions taken at Bludan in 1946. He quoted at length from his speeches and memoranda to the Council of the Arab League and deplored the unwillingness of the Arab States "to employ a weapon, which, although peaceful, was yet the strongest: namely, the power of oil which God has given to the Arabs." Iraq had been prepared to stop the activities of the oil companies, but Saudi Arabia had not. Again, in December 1947, he had warned the Arab League that guerrilla bands would not be sufficient to defeat the Zionists, and had drawn attention to the recommendations of the Military Committee, headed by General Ismail Sofwat, that the regular armies of the Arab States should prepare to intervene. Again, the attitude of the Arab States, except Transjordan, had been unsatisfactory. After referring to the plans he was maturing when his Cabinet fell in January 1948, and attacking the instigators of the agitation against the Portsmouth treaty as friends of the Zionists, Saleh Jabr ended: "It is too late; the opportunity has been lost."

13. After speeches by Deputies Abdul Majid Abbas (Muntafiq), Abdul Razzaq Hamud (Basra) who bitterly attacked His Majesty's Government as the cause of all the ills which had befallen the Arabs, Mohammad Ridha al Shabibi (Bagdad) and the leader of the Istiqlal Party, Mohammed Mahdi Jubba (Bagdad), who spoke of British pressure as responsible for the acceptance of the first truce, the President of the Senate, Nuri as Said, spoke of the evil effects of passion on Arab foreign policy. The "demon of passion" must be driven out of the hearts of statesmen and Parliaments: policy, as King Feisal I. knew, was a matter of thought. India and Pakistan had suffered from imperialism far longer than Iraq had; yet Nehru, who had spent much of his life in British jails, had attended the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and so shown his political

wisdom. Thus Zionism could not be defeated by force alone, for it had the support of the United Nations and the Great Powers: but no force in the world could make the Arabs co-operate with the Zionists, and "Israel" could not exist without economic co-operation from the Arabs. "Israel" could be defeated in the end by an economic blockade, and this was the only realistic plan. It was no use blaming other Arab States for failing to do what was not in their power. At this point Nuri Pasha defended the Arab Legion and recalled its victories at the beginning of the war in Palestine. He concluded by referring to last spring's demonstrations and warning his hearers against communism and the fate of Albania, Roumania and Czechoslovakia.

14. A number of Opposition Deputies then spoke of familiar lines, and the session was adjourned until 28th November. At this second meeting a few Deputies made inconclusive speeches, the Prime Minister refused to answer questions on the resumption of fighting or the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Palestine, and a proposal to submit a resolution at the end of the meeting was accepted.

15. Senator Nuri as Said, speaking for the second time, wound up the debate. He said that the Iraqi army entered Palestine with no definite plans and had gradually been forced on to the defensive. After defending the abandonment of Lydda and Ramleh, he accused the Arab States of having no clear policy. In 1939 the Arabs had rejected the White Paper: now Faris el Khouri had submitted to the United Nations a plan for a unitary State which was essentially the same as the plan which you proposed, and the Arabs rejected, in 1947.

16. Finally, the following resolution was passed unanimously:—

- (1) There should be drawn up for the defence of Palestine an Arab military plan which should clearly specify the responsibilities and objects of each of the Arab armies.
- (2) There should be drawn up a unified Arab policy, fully supported by responsible Arab statesmen, which should demonstrate clearly and frankly what positive measures should be undertaken to defeat any attempt to create a Jewish State in Palestine, including resistance to any decision taken by the United Nations to establish a Jewish State.

- (3) The plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) above should aim at urgent action by all means, military or political, to clear Palestine of Jewish bands, and especially the whole of the city of Jerusalem, in

view of its military, political and religious importance.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

HENRY B. MACK.

E 16142/27/93

No. 22

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

Mr. Bevin to Sir H. Mack (Bagdad)

(No. 307)
Sir,

*Foreign Office,
31st December, 1948.*

The Iraq Minister of Education, Najib ar Rawi, who was the leader of the Iraq delegation to the United Nations, has paid a short visit to the United Kingdom at his own request. In the course of two long conversations with Mr. Wright, at which the Iraq Ambassador was also present, the following points were made.

2. Najib ar Rawi gave a long description of the reasons for which the Portsmouth Treaty could not be ratified and said that these reasons were purely tactical. Saleh Jabr had not taken political leaders into his confidence and had mishandled the situation generally. The Regent had had no alternative but to announce that the treaty could not be accepted.

3. The actions of Iraq since that time showed that there was a general desire in Iraq to have an alliance with Great Britain.

4. The Arab Governments realised that they had to choose between East and West, and they would choose the West, but they were disappointed that the West and, in particular, His Majesty's Government was treating them with such aloofness. It was time for us to make up our minds whether we wished to be friends with the Arabs or the Jews. It was impossible to have friendship with both.

5. Speaking on behalf of the other Arab representatives who had been at the United Nations and not only on behalf of the Iraq Government, Najib ar Rawi said that it would be much easier to have a defence system for the Middle East if this was based on an agreement with the Arabs as a whole and not only with individual countries. He realised that we had particular problems with particular countries, but these should be dealt with in the frame-work of a general agreement.

6. As regards Palestine, Najib ar Rawi

criticised His Majesty's Government for not having discussed the Bernadotte proposals with the Arab countries before we sponsored them in the United Nations. The Arab countries had been obliged to vote against these proposals as they could never accept anything which involved partition, but now that the Assembly resolution had been passed, he hoped that we would be able to have full discussions with the Arab countries about the line that should be pursued with the Conciliation Commission in order to reach a satisfactory settlement. The Arab countries were waiting for a lead from us.

7. The Jews were receiving arms from many countries. Why could we not send arms to the Arabs? In particular we ought to supply arms to the Iraq Government at least for the defence of North-Eastern Iraq, which was in the front-line defence against Russia. We could, if necessary, supervise the organisation of Iraqi defence in that area.

8. He realised the financial difficulties of Iraq, but he thought it would be better if we did not try to link this financial question with oil.

9. Arrangements should be made for continuous liaison between His Majesty's Government and the Arab League.

10. The Iraq Government was not well disposed with regard to French requests for oil exports and aircraft facilities because the French Government allowed the export of war material to the Jews.

11. In reply to these remarks Mr. Wright emphasised that it was not His Majesty's Government who had wanted to revise the existing Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930. The Iraq Government had wanted to do this in order to put the two parties to the treaty more obviously on a basis of equality and His Majesty's Government had agreed. As regards the procedure in the negotiation of the treaty, His Majesty's Government had naturally followed the suggestions of

the Iraq delegation; otherwise they would have been accused of intervening in Iraq's internal affairs. The unfortunate effect of Iraqi rejection of the treaty on British feelings towards Iraq, both on Parliament and public opinion, was also stressed.

12. Mr. Wright then referred to defence. The example of countries in Europe and of China showed that in the light of the Russian campaign of expansion which was being pursued in all directions with considerable vigour, two factors were necessary for the survival of independent States in the Middle East and elsewhere. First, these States must be strong internally. The example of Turkey showed the way in which such strength could be achieved. The example of China was that of a Government which had failed to strengthen its internal position, particularly on the economic side, and to make the best use of the very large amount of assistance given to it from outside. Secondly, countries threatened by Russian expansion must join together. Neither Turkey nor the United Kingdom nor even the United States felt confident of resisting this pressure individually and in isolation but sought to join their resources with those of other countries in the same situation. It was essential that there should be a strategic plan for the defence of the Middle East as a whole. Geographical and other factors made it essential that within this overall plan different parts of the area should play different rôles. For instance, it was obviously essential that the main supply base should be in Egypt, while in other areas efforts should be concentrated on the provision of airfields or land communications. Consequently, it was no use having merely a general agreement with countries in this area as a whole, nor was it possible to have identical agreements with each country. The agreements with each country must take account of the particular circumstances of the country, but subject to this there was no reason why these individual agreements and the whole conception of a joint plan should not be approved by the Arab League or by the Middle East countries as a whole. Another essential point was that in modern warfare it was no good relying on a period of grace at the beginning during which preparations and improvisations could be made to resist attack. In present conditions attack might be immediate and unexpected and it was necessary to be prepared beforehand.

13. Najib ar Rawi interjected here that while the Iraq people clearly wished to

have an alliance with the United Kingdom, they had shown that they did not like the form of the Portsmouth Treaty and he believed that a revision of the existing treaty was still necessary and that it should not be difficult for His Majesty's Government to agree to a satisfactory revision, particularly in view of their far-sighted policy in giving independence to other Asiatic peoples in India, Pakistan and Burma.

14. Mr. Wright went on to apply the principles which he had mentioned above to the case of Iraq. His Majesty's Government had had and still had considerable financial difficulties of their own and they were therefore inclined to be sympathetic with others in the same condition. We had dealt with this difficulty by making very large sacrifices in order to put our own house in order. We were receiving help from the United States not as charity but on the basis of the efforts which we were ourselves making and of the definite plans which we had announced for the future. The Iraq Government were now asking us for financial help. To grant this request would mean the diversion of resources which were needed for the British people. Parliament would have to be asked to agree to this. Particularly in view of their recent unfortunate experience with Iraq they would naturally be bound to satisfy themselves that the Iraq Government were taking the same kind of measures to set their house in order as His Majesty's Government had taken as a condition of American help to the United Kingdom. We had not so far heard of any serious attempt by the Iraq Government to carry out even the minimum essential economic and financial reforms. The finances were in disorder. There was no serious attempt to increase the taxation of those who could best afford to pay. In these circumstances we could hardly be expected to feel that a request to us for financial help was the action of a Government living up to its own professions of self-reliance and of equality with His Majesty's Government and other countries. There was no hope of financial help from His Majesty's Government or from the oil companies unless the Iraq Government could show that they had actually begun to take definite measures and had formulated definite further plans to the following effect:—

- (a) A reorganisation of the financial administration.

- (b) Increased taxes on the rich.
 (c) A programme of economic development to be worked out by a Development Board which should be mainly in Iraqi hands but should be divorced from politics.
 (d) A British economic expert should be appointed to assist the Board.
 (e) The social implications of development, e.g., the use of land newly brought under irrigation, should be studied at the same time.
 (f) Internal expenditure on development should be financed internally, i.e., the Iraq Government should not count on loans from abroad to pay for that element of development expenditure which was paid inside Iraq on wages, &c., since this would produce an inflationary effect.

15. Najib ar Rawi replied to these points by claiming that the Iraq Government had already begun to reduce their expenditure; that 10,000 civil servants and 3,000 Government employees had been dismissed; luxury expenditure had been abolished; land and water taxes and customs duties had been increased so as to provide £2 million extra revenue. The Iraq Government were considering new land taxes. When it was pointed out to him that the Finance Minister, Ali Mumtaz, had, it was believed, resigned owing to the non-approval of the financial reforms which he proposed, Najib ar Rawi said that the Government as a whole had approved these plans and it could not therefore be for this reason that he had resigned. He went on to say that the above measures showed that the Iraq Government was already doing all it could to put its house in order. He was not seriously concerned at the general financial situation. Customs revenue would increase when goods which had already been ordered began to come into the country. There was a large crop of tobacco which could be bought by firms in this country and it was hoped that there might be some barley exports this year. The difficulty was a temporary shortage of ready money. If this could be provided the difficulties would be overcome and the Iraq Government could go ahead with its development programme in which British firms would be associated. But if no help was given it was impossible to suppose that the Iraq Government could provide finance for the internal development expenditure.

16. As regards the social implications of development, Najib ar Rawi referred to a law for the distribution of newly irrigated land to landless peasants and for the provision of financial advances to enable them to cultivate this land. This showed that the matter was being dealt with on an equal and democratic basis.

17. Najib ar Rawi made a general plea that it was unfair to blame Iraq because the Treaty Delegation had failed to make a treaty which responded to the real wishes of the people of Iraq. The Iraq Government were perfectly willing to discuss financial matters and the appointment of a British expert in any way we liked, but he urged most strongly that we should give up our present attitude of aloofness and shows more willingness in principle to maintain our close relations with Iraq and to supply them with advice and assistance.

18. Mr. Wright then referred briefly to the proposal for export of crude oil through Haifa without the refinery being operated until the Palestine situation was clarified.

19. Najib ar Rawi said that he would be glad to consider this question. He then went on to refer to the danger of the Palestine situation to the whole Middle East. It was not necessary to look for a channel of Russian infiltration through China or Turkey. There was a much more dangerous one through Palestine.

20. Mr. Wright replied that we appreciated this danger but we felt certain that whatever the long-term result might be, it was now in the interest of all Arab States as an immediate policy to co-operate in drawing a frontier line for the Jewish State in Palestine so as to allow the Arabs to consolidate their internal situation without fear of a continuation of the present disturbed conditions. The appointment of the Conciliation Commission offered the best means of pursuing this policy.

21. Najib ar Rawi concluded by repeating the hope that His Majesty's Government would give guidance to the Arab Governments on the course which they thought it desirable for the Arabs to follow in dealing with the Palestine question in future.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Jedda and to the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.